SAPTAPADĀRTHĪ

D. GURUMURTI

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SAPTAPADĀRTHĪ—A MANUAL OF THE SEVEN CATEGORIES

TEXT IN DEVANĀGARI AND ROMAN TRANSLITERATION

चौखम्भा विश्वभारती
चौक (चित्रा सिनेमा के सामने)
वाराणसी-२२१००१

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SAPTAPADĀRTHĪ

OF

ŚIVĀDITYA

EDITED
WITH INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES
BY

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

IT has long been recognised that the philosophical thought of India has much of value to contribute to the advancement of human knowledge. Its ancient philosophy is contained in what are called the six 'Darśanas' or systems of philosophy. These are arranged in pairs, on account of certain common traits among them, as follows:

I. Nyāya (The System of Logic) and Vaiśeṣika (The System of Particulars).

II. Sāṅkhya (The System of Numbers) and Yoga (The System of Effort or of Union).

III. Mīmāṁsa (the Knowledge of Dharma or Duty) and Vedānta (the Knowledge of the Brahman or Absolute).

To facilitate the student of philosophy both in the East and the West in a study of the subject in the original, the T. P. H. has published and is publishing Sanskrit Texts and the standard Commentaries on them of

classics which are considered to be landmarks in the history of each System, side by side with an English Translation and notes. The *Saptapadārthī* or *A Manual of the Seven Categories* occupies an important place in the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika System, as pointed out by the author, to whom we are highly indebted for the valuable contribution which he has made to our Oriental Series.

T. P. H.

TO

MY WIFE

PREFACE

THE introduction of the study of Indian Philosophy in South Indian Universities during the last five or six years has been a step in the right direction, though, according to some, rather belated. Increasing attention to the valuable stores of philosophical literature, in which this country is uniquely rich, is bound to create a demand for modern editions of the classics of the past. As a first contribution towards that, the *Saptapadārthī* of S'ivāditya has been selected by the editor and it is his hope that it will be followed up by the publication of other classics with a view to reach the average reading public, combining scholarship with sufficient freedom from cumbersome detail while yet providing the required basis for accurate study. It has been the endeavour of the editor to avoid swelling the notes with technical matter of a too detailed character, and, as far as practicable, keep the

book free of mere repetition of information which can be readily had from well-known texts like the edition of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Bodas and Athalye.

The Introduction has been made to cover some of the most important doctrines of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system. As it happened, the Introduction grew in the writer's hands, and some of the topics, which were at first dealt with in the notes, were afterwards incorporated into the Introduction, thus causing a certain amount of unavoidable repetition. It is to be regretted that the work had to be hurried through and it is too much to hope that it is free from serious defects. Nevertheless it is offered to the public as a first effort in the hope that, if and when a second edition is called for, the work may be put into a more satisfactory shape.

In the preparation of this work, I have largely benefited by the editions of the *Saptapadārthī* by V. S. Ghate, and Rāma S'āstri. For general guidance I have relied upon A. B. Keith's *Indian Logic and Atomism*, Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* and Athalye's valuable notes on the *Tarka-Saṅgraha.*

It only remains to thank various friends who have contributed to make the book what it is, for, without the help so readily given, the book would have been far less satisfactory. My first word of gratitude is to my teacher, Dr. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, for the inspiration of his example, his never-failing sympathy, his stimulating instruction in philosophy which I received in my College days, and above all for his extreme kindness in contributing a Foreword to this book. To my colleague, Mr. R. Chakravarti, M.A., LL.B., Lecturer in Saṁskṛt in the Theosophical College, Madanapalle, I am indebted for considerable help willingly rendered in the different stages of my work. Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon), Reader in Indian Philosophy, Madras University, has been very kind to go through the MS. and suggest many improvements. Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon), has laid me under a very deep debt of obligation by going through the proofs and giving me the benefit of his critical understanding of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system. The work has been very much improved by his ready and untiring help. Mahāmahopādhyāya

Professor S. Kuppuswami S'āstri, M.A., I.E.S., was kind enough to go through the textual Introduction and discuss the points with me. Pandit S. K. Padmanābha S'āstri of the Presidency College, Madras, was also kind enough to help by going through the text with me.

Madanapalle

April, 1932. D. GURUMURTI.

FOREWORD

THE recent revival of interest in Indian Philosophy is responsible for the publication of a number of Indian Philosophical classics in the modern style with introduction, text, translation and notes. To the beginner in Nyāya-Vais'eṣika systems, *Kusumāñjali*, *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, and *Sapta-padārthī* are valuable introductions. It is a pleasure to know that Mr. D. Gurumurti, M.A. (Hons.) is bringing out an edition of *Sapta-padārthī* in the approved style. He has studied the text and the commentaries with great care, and his introduction and notes will be found extremely useful to those trained on western lines and mainly in western systems. I have no doubt that Indian Universities will find this edition of *Saptapadārthī* a suitable textbook for the B.A. classes in Indian Philosophy. I congratulate the author on a solid piece of work.

Waltair

25-3-32. S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

ABBREVIATIONS FOR REFERENCE

B. P.	Bhāṣā-Paricchcheda by Viswanātha Pañchānana.
E. R. E.	Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.
H. I. L.	History of Indian Logic by S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa.
I. L. A.	Indian Logic and Atomism by A. B. Keith.
I. L. E. S.	Indian Logic in the Early Schools by H. N. Randle.
I. P.	Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan.
I. T.	Indian Thought: A journal devoted to Saṁskṛt Philosophy, Allahabad.
J. A. O. S.	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
Jin.	Commentary on the Saptapadārthī by Jinavardhana Sūri.
Mita.	Commentary called Mitabhāṣiṇī on the Saptapadārthī by Mādhava Sarasvati.
N. B.	Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.
N. S.	Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama.

Pad.	Padārthacandrika-a commentary on the Saptapadārthī by S'eṣānanta.
P. D. S.	Padārthadharmasaṅgraha of Pras'as-tapāda also known as Pras'astapāda Bhāṣya.
S. B. H.	Sacred Books of the Hindus, Allahabad.
S. D. S.	Sarvadars'anasaṅgraha of Mādhava.
S. P.	Saptapadārthī of S'ivāditya.
S. P. G.	Saptapadārthī. Edited by V. S. Ghate. (Contains Padārthacandrika also).
S. P. R.	Saptapadārthī. Edited by Rāma S'āstri in the Vizianagram Saṁskṛt Series. (Contains the Mitabhāṣinī also).
S. P. W.	Saptapadārthī. Edited by Augustus Winter.
T. S. B.	Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa. Edited by Bodas and Athalye, Bombay Saṁskṛt Series.
T. S. K.	Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa. Edited by S. Kuppuswāmi S'āstri.
V. P. U.	Vais'eṣika Philosophy according to the Das'apadārthī S'āstra. Edited by H. Ui.
V. S.	Vais'eṣika Sūtras.
V. S. F.	Vais'eṣika System by Faddegon.

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TRANSLITERATION SCHEME

अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ
a	ā	i	ī	u	ū
ऋ	ॠ	ऌ	ए	ऐ	ओ
ṛ	ṝ	ḷ	e	ai	o

औ	अं	अ:
au	ṁ	ḥ

क	ख	ग	घ	ङ
k	kh	g	gh	ṅ
च	छ	ज	झ	ञ
c	ch	j	jh	ñ
ट	ठ	ड	ढ	ण
ṭ	ṭh	ḍ	ḍh	ṇ
त	थ	द	ध	न
t	th	d	dh	n
प	फ	ब	भ	म
p	ph	b	bh	m

य	र	ल	व
y	r	l	v
श	ष	स	ह
s′	ṣ	s	h

INTRODUCTION

A. Some General Considerations

I

In the history of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system of philosophy the *Saptapadārthī* holds an important place. It is one of the earliest, if not the first, of all attempts to synthesise the teachings of the Nyāya with the Vais'eṣika. Though avowedly the Vais'eṣika system is followed, yet under the quality of cognition much of the important teaching of Nyāya is incorporated. One editor [1] of this book speaks of it as Vais'eṣika prakaraṇam. The justification for this title lies in the fact that the book deals only with two pramāṇas instead of four which are generally characteristic of pure Nyāya treatises. Also the doctrines of Inference and Fallacies which are worked out in

[1] S. P. R. in the title page.

great thoroughness by typical Nyāya works are treated in this book in a comparatively brief manner. This book gives an indication of the condition of the synthesis at a very early stage.

As an introduction to the most important doctrines of Nyāya-Vais'eṣika, the *Saptapadārthī* may be considered very suitable. It helps in understanding the later developments of Nyāya-Vais'eṣika in its long history of many centuries to be able to take up the position of the teachings at a sufficiently early date and compare the nature of the topics dealt with and the manner of treatment as exhibited in a book like the *Saptapadārthī*. This manual was written towards the end of the period of the great commentators of this system.

II

The question of dates is specially difficult in the case of many Indian texts. It is particularly so in the case of the *Saptapadārthī*. We are not able to fix, with any measure of certainty, the date of the author. The usual methods adopted by oriental scholarship for fixing dates are highly unsatisfactory in the matter of yielding definite results. One of the principles

most frequently used for fixing the date is by means of references in the work under study to doctrines of other schools of thought. It might happen that owing to the conditions in which scriptures and writings were often handed down by word of mouth from teacher to pupil for generations, portions of treatises might have been lost, and references to other schools contained in those lost portions being absent from the work may lead to wrong inferences. Another principle employed by Orientalists is to examine a text with a view to find similarities in style and substance to other texts of known date and thus fix the date. This is made very risky by the fact that there are interpolations in well-known texts. Bodas[1] is of opinion that the Vais'eṣika Sūtra, I. i. 4, is an interpolation. With arguments apparently very plausible, he points out that it was a later addition. Such a fact must give us pause before rushing to conclusions on bare textual study as to the dates of authors and books. Dr. Gaṅgānāth Jhā expresses[2] himself

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[1] T. S. B. Introduction, p. 37.

[2] P. D. S. Introduction, p. 1. (Jhā's Edition in 'Pandit' Reprints).

out of sympathy with these attempts at fixing dates. In his Sādholāl Lectures on Nyāya, Dr. Jhā explains[1] his reasons for lack of faith in the methods adopted for fixing dates by taking three extracts from the famous article[2] by Bodas, now appearing as Introduction to his edition of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, and pointing out how those reasonings presume and presuppose a great deal more than what is strictly warrantable. Further, the Sūtra style which was adopted for philosophical writings is one that is so easy to imitate that we cannot definitely say that because a particular text is in the Sūtra style it must belong to a particular period. On the contrary, there is the well-known case of the Sāṅkhya-Pravacana-Sūtra which is assigned[3] to the fourteenth century A.D. A further complication in the situation is brought about by the fact that many treatises have been lost—some irrevocably. For example, the Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya on the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* is referred[4] to by several

[1] Indian Thought. Vol. IV, p. 258 et. seq.

[2] T. S. B. Introduction.

[3] I. P. Vol. II, p. 255.

[4] T. S. K. Introduction, p. 33.

writers, but no trace of it has been found. In the face of these facts, it is very difficult to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion with regard to the dates of philosophical texts.

III

This difficulty in fixing dates can be seen illustrated in the changes of opinion that have taken place with regard to the dates of the Nyāya and Vais'eṣika Sūtras. Bodas assigns [1] the Nyāya-Sūtras to the fourth century B.C. Jacobi, in his well-known article [2] on the 'Dates of the Hindu Philosophical Sūtras' maintains that the Nyāya-Sūtras must belong to the period A.D. 200 to A.D. 450 on the ground that these Sūtras polemise against the S'ūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna (who lived prior to A.D. 200) but not against the Vijñānavāda which is associated with Vasubandhu who belongs to the period after A.D. 450. Suali, Stcherbatsky, and Keith follow Jacobi. But Randle in his recent book [3] asserts as follows:

[1] T. S. B. Introduction, p. 32.

[2] J. A. O. S. 1910-11.

[3] I. L. E. S., p. 16.

"This much may, perhaps, be taken as proved, that Logic proper did not exist in India before 200 B.C. and it had come into existence by A.D. 200. Somewhere between these two dates the Vais'eṣika and Nyāya were systematised, the Vais'eṣika being the earlier of the two." The valuable chronological details from Buddhist sources given by Ui tend [1] to assign an early date to the Vais'eṣika, say, between 50 and 150 A.D. Randle quotes [2] Keith to say that we need not take seriously the conception of Nāgārjuna as the creator of the S'ūnyavāda philosophy. "If that is admitted, the splendid achievement of Jacobi in fixing the dates of the Sūtras falls to the ground." Prof. Kuppuswami S'āstri in his valuable introduction to his edition of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* (being issued from the press) advances [3] strong grounds for assigning the period between 4th and 2nd century B.C. for the production of the Nyāya and Vais'eṣika Sūtras, after meeting the criticism about the absence of mention in Kauṭilya's Arthas'āstra, and after disclaiming

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[1] V. P. U., p. 65.

[2] I. L. E. S., p. 18n.

[3] T. S. K. Introduction, p. 25.

Jacobi's attempt to differentiate between Patañjali, the author of the *Yoga Sūtras*, and the grammarian.

IV

As a result of many years of conscientious work, scholars like Bodas, Jacobi, Suali, Stcherbatsky, Ui, Keith and others have tried to fix an approximately accurate order of production in the Nyāya and Vais'eṣika systems. The value of a chronological order is very great in the matter of studying the history of the development of thought of philosophical systems. Modern research very justly attaches great importance to historical development. Nothing makes the achievements of modern time so full of significance as the natural perspective which enables one to see the various stages through which any particular system has passed. The greatest obstacle to an appreciation of some of the systems of Indian philosophy has been the absence of materials for a chronological treatment. We can therefore thankfully take the result of the labours of Orientalists to ascertain the accurate order

of production as provisionally satisfactory and use it as a basis of consecutive study. Of Nyāya treatises the order of production with approximate dates can be given as follows:

Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama, 2nd century B.C.

Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, 4th century A.D.[1]

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[1] An interesting light on the question of the date of Vātsyāyana is furnished by a reference very kindly supplied to me by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. In a MS. of Harisvāmin's commentary on the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, now found in the Queen's College Library, Benares, Pakṣilasvāmin, who is the same as Vātsyāyana, is mentioned as the great grandfather of Harisvāmin. The date of the commentary is given as 3740 of the Kali Era, which works out to 639 A.D. If so, Pakṣilasvāmin namely, Vātsyāyana, being removed by four generations from Harisvāmin can be with safety assigned to 539 A.D., allowing 25 years for each generation. This interesting find will require considerable recasting of the dates of successive authors in the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system as so far accepted by Keith, Randle, Faddegon and others.

The relevant passage is as follows:

श्रूयते पक्षिलस्वामी . . . . प्रसिद्धोजगतीपीठे नागस्वामी तन्नता श्रीगुहस्वामिनन्दनः ।

*　*　*　*　*

As for the date of Harisvāmin, the lines are:

यदाब्दानां कलेर्जग्मुः सप्तत्रिंशच्छतानिवै चत्वारिंशत् समाश्चान्यास्तदा भाष्यमिदं कृतम् ।

Nyāya-Vārtika of Udyotakara, 6th century A.D.

Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-Tīka, by Vācaspati Mis'ra, 9th century A.D.

Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-Paris'uddhi, by Udayana, 10th century A.D.

Of Vais'eṣika treatises the following order may be taken as fairly established.

Vais'eṣika-Sūtras of Kaṇāda, 3rd century B.C.

Padārtha-Dharma-Saṅgraha of Pras'astapāda, 5th century A.D.

Nyāya-Kandalī of S'rīdhara, 10th century A.D.

Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana, 10th century A.D.

Upaskāra of S'aṅkara-Mis'ra, 17th century A.D.

V

The history of the Nyāya and Vais'eṣika systems can be divided into three distinct stages. The first stage covers the period when the systems were in the making and were formulated into the Sūtras of Gautama and Kaṇāda. The second period covers the

age of the great commentators beginning with Vātsyāyana and Pras'astapāda and ending in the 11th century A D. From the 12th century onwards we have the period of what is known as Navya-Nyāya. This period is heralded by Gaṅges'a Upādhyāya with his monumental work, the Tattvacintāmaṇi. Alongside these three periods, there developed what Keith calls [1] the syncretist school, *i.e.*, a series of writers who tried to combine the Vais'eṣika Metaphysics with the Nyāya Logic. This is done in either of two ways.[2] A writer may begin by giving an account of the Vais'eṣika categories and under one of them bring in all the teaching of the Nyāya with regard to Logic and Reasoning, or, a writer may start with the sixteen topics of the Nyāya and introduce under the second of them, Prameya or objects of knowledge, the Vais'eṣika categories. Either way a very harmonious blend of the two systems is made possible. An example of the former kind is the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, and of the latter is the *Tarka-Bhāṣā*.

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[1] I. L. A., p. 36.

[2] H. I. L., p. 356 contains a more elaborate treatment.

VI

A good deal has been said and written with regard to the syncretism of the two schools. There are scholars[1] who hold that the tendency to syncretism dates from the original Sūtras of Gautama and Kaṇāda themselves. In evidence of this they cite several similarities[2] in the Sūtras of the Nyāya with those occurring in the Vais'eṣika. Throughout the history of the two systems, there is a good deal of common ground, so that the tendency to syncretism is not to be considered as something which arose suddenly at any particular stage of the history of the two systems. On the other hand, these two constitute what are called samāna tantra (allied systems) and even at the earliest stage of their formulation there were common features which are embodied[3] in the atomic theory, plurality of souls, the conception of buddhi, and its relation to soul, the division[4] of the physical world into object, sense organ

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[1] V. S. F., p. 17; T. S. K. Introduction, section V.

[2] I. P, Vol. II, p. 32n.

[3] I. P., Vol. II, p. 31.

[4] V. S. F., p. 48.

and body, and the lists of psychical qualities. Vātsyāyana in developing some of the doctrines of the Nyāya quotes the six categories of Kaṇāda. Pras'astapāda in his great work on Kaṇāda's Sūtras, the *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha*, which entitles him to a rank as co-founder with Kaṇāda of the Vais'eṣika sytem, makes remarkable advances on the Nyāya Logic. Jacobi remarks[1] that the fusion of these two schools began early and seems to have been complete at the time the *Nyāya-Vārtika* was written. Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī* is also indicative of a tendency to synthesis. But we can distinctly limit the title syncretism to the works that attempt to combine the two systems of Nyāya and Vais'eṣika in one manual by a symmetrical representation and arrangement. If so, it is possible to catalogue into a separate group all such works. Such works have been produced from the time of Udayana to modern days. Among these works the *Saptapadārthī* has to be given the first place as the earliest known model of the syncretist school. Keith thinks[2] that there must have been works even

[1] E. R. E., Vol. II, p. 201b, quoted in I. P., Vol. II, p. 31n.
[2] I. L. A., p. 36.

before the *Saptapadārthī*, which tried to amalgamate the two systems in exposition; but Bodas suggests [1] that this work is the earliest among syncretist manuals. The development of syncretism after the *Saptapadārthī* can be easily traced. Though not belonging to the syncretist type Bhāsarvajñā's *Nyāya-Sāra* is interesting as an example of the reduction of the sixteen topics of the Nyāya into one, *viz.*, Pramāṇa (Instrument of Right Knowledge). It shows distinct Vais'eṣika influence because it rejects Upamāna (comparison) as one of the means of knowledge. The classification of fallacies of Reason includes all the six kinds put forward by the *Saptapadārthī*. This work can be assigned [2] to A.D. 950. Varadarājā's *Tārkika-Rakṣā* is a syncretist work which starting with the Nyāya topics, embodies the Vais'eṣika categories under the second topic of Prameya (objects of knowledge). The synthesis is not satisfactory because the twelve objects of knowledge and the Vais'eṣika categories overlap each other.

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[1] T. S. B., Introduction, p. 48.

[2] H. I. L., p. 358.

The date[1] of this work is about A.D. 1150. Vallabhācārya's *Nyāya-Līlāvatī* is another syncretist work which starting with the Vaiśeṣika categories introduces the Nyāya logic under cognition, one of the subdivisions of the category, Quality, on the plan of the *Saptapadārthī*. This work is assigned[2] to the 12th century A.D. Keśava Miśra's *Tarka-Bhāṣā* reverts to the Nyāya topics and introduces the Vaiśeṣika categories under the second topic. This is considered to be the most elegant of the syncretist works of this type and is assigned[3] to A.D. 1275.

The seventeenth century may be considered to be the hey-day of syncretism. Four of the best known syncretist manuals are produced in this period: Jagadīśa's *Tarkāmṛta* is the earliest of the four and may be placed[4] at A.D. 1600. Annambhaṭṭa's well-known syncretist manual, the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, belongs to about the same date.[5] Visvanātha's *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda,* with its prose commentary,

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[1] H. I. L., p. 373.
[2] H. I. L., p. 386.
[3] H. I. L., p. 381.
[4] I. L. A., p. 38.
[5] I. L. A., p. 39.

Siddhānta Muktāvalī (A.D. 1634) [1] and Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Tarka-Kaumudī* are the two other manuals which have become famous as clear expositions of the syncretist Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika system. Of these, the second and the fourth works combine the Vais'eṣika categories with the Nyāya reasoning on the model of the *Saptapadārthī*, while the third work introduces the Nyāya doctrine of reasoning under the qualities of the Soul, unlike the other two which bring it under cognition which is one of the divisions of the category, Quality. The first work adopts a different plan and divides Tarkāmṛta into Viṣaya-kāṇḍa and Jñāna-kāṇḍa, the former being the Vais'eṣika categories and the latter being the Nyāya logic, both placed side by side as parts of one total whole.

The *Saptapadārthī* is an epoch-marking work. It is the proto-type of all the manuals of the syncretist school. The history of syncretism clearly proves that the judgment of S'ivāditya was sound in choosing the metaphysical categories of the Vais'eṣika as the framework, and the Nyāya doctrine of pramāṇas, (instruments of right knowledge) as a development

[1] I. L. A., p. 38.

of cognition which is one of the divisions of the category, Quality. It has proved to be the most suitable method of synthesis, justified by the fact that on metaphysical principles, there is fundamental agreement between these two systems. S'ivāditya's account of the seven categories fixed for all later time all that was of imperishable value in the Vais'eṣika works up to his time, while the doctrine of reasoning as embodied by him represents the essence of the Nyāya teaching, which Bhāsarvajñā and Udayana developed, until the time Gaṅges'a took it up and gave a new turn in his immortal work, the *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi.*

B. Doctrines

VIII

It is necessary to devote special attention to some of the doctrines of Nyāya-Vais'eṣika. The aim of this philosophy is Niḥs'reyasa (Final Beatitude) by means of Tattva-jñāna. It is the contention of this system that the ascertainment of reality can be carried on only with a view to the attainment of Supreme Bliss. In section 64, of our text, S'ivāditya gives a definition of the aim of the system. We investigate the categories because the ascertainment of the truth of these things is the only way of attaining final beatitude. Truth is that nature of knowledge which is not due to any superimposition of our minds but is an apprehension of things in their own nature. This has to be done according to Upaniṣadic injunction by attentive hearing, reasoning contemplation and lastly by direct realisation.

The pain which is caused by erroneous knowledge has to be extinguished by right knowledge. When this is achieved, liberation or supreme beatitude necessarily follows. The opinion has been expressed [1] that the Vais'eṣika system is free from "the craze for liberation which dominates nearly all forms of Indian thought." But we find [2] that the investigation of the categories is only a means to an end. By the achievement of Tattva-jñāna (ascertainment of reality) we are only assuring ourselves of attaining this final beatitude (Niḥs'reyasa). This is sought after by almost all systems of Indian philosophy, each in its own way. The Sāṅkhya aims at Kaivalya, the Vedānta at identity with Brahman, while the Yoga speaks of union in the state of Samādhi.

IX

Tattva-jñāna (ascertainment of reality) is to be achieved by an analytical investigation which the system undertakes. The beginner

[1] V. S. F., p. 12.

[2] V. S., I. 1. 4.

in the study of Indian philosophy generally gets bewildered by the tendency of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika to go into distinctions. Keith speaks in one place[1] of the needless love of subdivision. At every stage we find a definition, and a classification into subdivisions. The question arises why is it that distinctions are made so much of? What does it matter if qualities are 17 in number or 24? What does it matter if abhāva is of four kinds or five? Such a question is natural until we realise what Tattva-jñāna implies. Tattva-jñāna or the ascertainment of reality implies as a necessary axiom that there is no thought which cannot be expressed. And if thought is able to distinguish by its work of analytical study this complicated web of existence, its work has to be systematised by means of certain terms. The only test of having understood things is our capacity to give every thing its particular place in the scheme of the whole. Hence all Nyāya-Vais'eṣika treatises revel in distinctions.

We find considerable attention is devoted to the work of classification. In this connection

[1] I. L. A., p. 147.

the Vais'eṣika distinction of generality and particularity as two of the ultimate categories is interesting. Modern Logic has familiarised us with the importance of definition and classification for a study of the process of thinking. The conception of genus and species plays a very large part in the organisation of our knowledge of the natural sciences. It is interesting to see that the Vais'eṣika system, centuries ago, had recognised the importance of this process of thinking and arrived at the categories of generality and particularity. The conception of generality plays a very necessary role in the Vais'eṣika. This system had discovered very early what was familiar to the logicians of the middle ages, the fact that in our analysis of things there is an ascending and descending scale which is generally known as the Tree of Porphyry. At the top we have pure Sāmānya, spoken of in the Vais'eṣika as Sattā or Existence. (This is comparable to the Summum Genus.) At the bottom of the scale we have Antya-vis'eṣa or ultimate particular, exactly corresponding to the Infima Species. In between the two, we have grades of gene-

rality and particularity. Ui quoting Rohagutta divides[1] universality, *i.e.*, generality, into three kinds:—Mahāsāmānya or highest universality, Sattā Sāmānya, and Sāmānya-Vis'eṣa. The highest universality is nothing but existence. The lower includes all grades with the exception of existence and the ultimate particulars, the latter of which constitutes particularity. This is also expressed sometimes as universality, universality-particularity, and particularity.

This classificatory principle is used very much in the *Saptapadārthī*. The concept of Sāmānya is made equivalent to Existence, admitting thereby that the widest class that can be thought of is the idea of Existence and the smallest is antya-vis'eṣa which refers to an individual object in what constitutes its specific individuality. Tattva-Jñāna (ascertainment of reality) achieves its work by arranging our intellectual house into a system.

X

The analysis of all experience into seven padārthas or ultimate categories is an important step in the work of philosophy. Philosophers

[1] V. P. U., p. 70.

of all ages and climes have found it necessary to reduce the bewildering variety of this phenomenal universe into a few well-marked units, in order that the mind might evolve order and system and achieve a unitary synoptic vision of reality. Aristotle, Kant, Mill in western philosophy tabulated these ultimates of experience under the name of categories. The contents of these lists vary according to the metaphysical theories of different thinkers. In Indian philosophy, the various systems (or dars'anas) have their own analysis of the ultimates of reality or experience. Thus the Vedānta reduces everything to the one Brahman, the Sāṅkhya to Puruṣa and Prakṛti, (Spirit and Matter), the Nyāya speaks of 16 topics, while the Vais'eṣika reduces all thinkable and knowable experience into seven categories. Of these, a brief reference only will be made in this connection to a few of the special features, while the notes that follow will deal with each of the categories in their respective places.

XI

Abhāva or non-existence is reckoned for the first time as an independent category by the

Vais'eṣika writers after Pras'astapāda. It makes its appearance in Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī* as equivalent member of the classification with bhāva padārthas. S'ivāditya's *Saptapadārthī* includes it as the seventh of the categories and after him it is definitely reckoned as one of the Vais'eṣika categories.

Abhāva arose as a logical concept. It is serviceable for intellectual distinction. In knowledge, the idea of negation as the counterpart of affirmation is necessarily involved. All idealistic systems of philosophy are based on the opposition between the knowable and the unknowable. As relations play a large part in the intellectual explanation of the universe, they are distinguished from that which is above all relational consciousness. " When we speak of a thing the fact of its being or existence is emphasised ; while when we speak of a relation its non-being or negation is emphasised." It was Spinoza that said that all determination is negation.

This logical concept of negation was later adopted into the ontological scheme of the Vais'eṣika and made into the new category of non-existence. The employment of this category

in the Syncretist school has been very extensive. According to Athalye,[1] the wonderful accuracy of the Indian syllogism, the processes of reasoning and analysis have been greatly facilitated by the recognition of abhāva (non-existence). The notion of non-existence is claimed to possess as much reality as its opposite. This is stated in the form of a pratiyogi and anuyogi relation, that is, every entity involves at the same time the conception of its counter-entity and *vice versa.*

There is distinct difference of opinion between the Naiyāyikas and Vais'eṣikas as to the perceptibility of abhāva or non-existence. The former hold that it is an object of perception, while the latter that it is only an object of inference. The former go a step further and make non-existence consist of several kinds while properly speaking negation is simply non-existence in general. "All negation is pure and characterless" according to Athalye.[2] In the Syncretist school, the conception of abhāva is employed in the sense in which the later Nyāya employs it, *i.e.*, as consisting of

[1] T. S. B., p. 102.
[2] *Ibid.*

many kinds and as being as many as there are conceivable counter-entities. This is one of the conceptions of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system which has enabled it to develop a very subtle method of intellectual analysis.

XII

The category of Samavāya, (Inherence), is an important feature of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system. It has been rightly called[1] the corner-stone of the whole edifice. The main realistic position of this system, its conception of eternal atoms, and the doctrine of cause, depend on the acceptance of inherence. The inherent relation is conceived to be eternal and different from saṁyoga or conjunction. Inherence cannot be destroyed without destroying the object in which it resides. It exists only among things which are inseparable, but distinct, as for example, a cloth and the threads of which it is made. This way of conceiving the relation is necessary because the ultimate substantiality of all things cannot be maintained if a product could be explained

[1] T. S. B., p. 89.

away as due to mere conjunction. The eternal atoms are related to all manifest creation in the relation of inherence. Hence Inherence is made into a separate category by this system.

All the other systems of Indian philosophy have directed their attack on this doctrine ; in particular, the Vedānta. S'aṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* (on II, 2-13-17) argues very effectively on this question. By demolishing inherence and equating it with mere conjunction, he knocks the bottom out of the realism of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika, and arrives at the phenomenality of things. S'aṅkara shows the impossibility of admitting any real difference between inherence and mere conjunction ; eternality is true equally of conjunction ; inherence can no more exist without a third thing to unite it with its abode than conjunction, which is supposed by the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika to require inherence for the purpose. Calling one a category and the other a quality does not help ; the relation of cause and effect also is not a case of inherence but of essential identity. Against this criticism of S'aṅkara, the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika doggedly holds fast to the anchor of inherence and asserts

the existence of a substance apart from its qualities, while at the same time being inseparably bound up with it. The conception of cause in the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika arises out of this doctrine of inherence.

The Nyāya-Vais'eṣika conception of cause is known as asatkāryavāda, which means the contention of the non-existence of the effect. This view asserts that a cause exists before the effect comes into being. The cause must be understood to precede the effect always and effect has no existence until it is brought into being. Invariability (niyata-pūrva-vṛtti), and unconditionality (ananyathāsiddhi) are essential features of the concept of cause. The effect is the resultant of a sum-total of operative conditions (sāmagrī). In this sum-total, the samavāyi or inherent cause, the asamavāyi or non-inherent cause, and the nimitta or instrumental cause are distinguished. The samavāyi or material cause enters into inherent relation with the effect.

On this question, a historical controversy has raged between this Nyāya conception and the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya, the doctrine of the existence of the effect in the cause. While

the Sāṅkhya lays stress on the view that there can be no creation of anything new, that we cannot assert the existence of a cause without its producing an effect, the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika view holds that a cause must always precede an effect, that the effect is a new creation and must be distinct from cause; otherwise a pot and a saucer being both identical with atoms will become identical with each other. The Vedānta explains the cause as the only real and the effect as unreal. S'aṅkara's attack on the doctrine of inherence was motivated by his opposition to this Nyāya-Vais'eṣika conception of cause. It is because an inherence is admitted, that the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika is able to posit the existence of the cause before the effect. If inherence is not possible, the essential inseparability of cause and effect will result in a denial of distinction between them and their essential identity will have to be granted.

XIII

The Nyāya Syllogism has rightly been the object of interest. The formulation of the five-membered Syllogism in the *Nyāya-Sūtras* of

Gautama for the first time systematised reasoning and set the type for all subsequent development. That this five-membered form is a genuine historical successor to other formulations of the same is clearly evidenced [1] when Vātsyāyana says that others gave ten members to the Syllogism. The close similarity in the structure of the Indian Syllogism to the Aristotelian form only exhibits the truth that human thinking follows the same path whether it be in Greece or in India. All attempts to trace mutual influence have to be considered inconclusive so far.[2]

Syllogistic reasoning was and is largely employed in philosophical discussion in India. Its formulation into five steps, proposition, reason, illustration, application and conclusion is rhetorically so serviceable as to make it the best means of public discussion of truth. Though in the course of long controversies it tends to be employed enthemematically, it is a clear-marked method which has stereotyped features. The most characteristic feature of the Syllogism is what is called ' parāmarśa ' or

[1] I. L. A., p. 1-11.

[2] I. P., Vol. II, p. 84-86.

consideration. It is the mental process of thinking together, which constitutes the essence of inference. It is represented in the Syllogism in the fourth member, *viz.*, Upanaya or application. Advocates of Aristotelian logic fail to recognise the special need for such a statement. The major premise of Aristotle states the relation between the middle term and major, while the minor premise states the presence of the middle term in the minor term; the conclusion relates the minor and major terms. The Naiyāyika asserts that there is need for a further step before the conclusion, relating the major and minor premises in one act of thought. This is called parāmarśa. It is interesting to see that Bradley recognises this feature. He says, [1] "There is first a construction as Cæsar—man—mortal, and then by inspection we get Cæsar—mortal." Though we do not know if Bradley was referring to the Indian Syllogism, it is quite noteworthy that what he means by inspection is exactly what is conveyed by 'parāmarśa' in the Indian Syllogism.

[1] Principles of Logic, 1st Edition, p. 238.

XIV

The conception of Vyāpti is another important feature. Till the time of Pras'astapāda and Dignāga vyāpti or invariable concomitance was quantitatively considered. Hence we find in the earlier writers the usage of terms, pervasion, the pervader and the pervaded unlike their usage in later schools, being made the basis of explanation of the inferential process. The conversion of this quantitative conception into a qualitative one is an important step in the development of logical theory; because, so long as it remained a quantitative conception, reasoning was dependent on the particular. There was no guarantee that even if an udāharaṇa or illustrative example were given, an inference of two things happening together could be maintained, since particulars vary and mere agreement in occurring together holds forth no assurance as to future consistent occurring together. But when this conception of vyāpti is transformed into a relation of a qualitative kind, the analysis achieves a truer basis and as a consequence a necessary connection does not depend on an

illustration for its assurance. Keith is of opinion[1] that this important advance in logical theory is the contribution of the Buddhist logician, Dignāga, but other scholars[2] hold that it was developed by Pras'astapāda out of elements already found in the Sūtras of Gautama and Kaṇāda.

XV

In this connection it will be useful to observe the relation of deductive and inductive thinking in the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika. The very nature of the Indian Syllogism is such that it emphasises the third member, the example, which makes clear that reasoning was conceived as essentially both inductive and deductive at the same time. The problem which took several centuries in European thought was already studied in the very beginnings of Indian logical theory. What Mill analyses in the 19th century as the nature of inference, *viz.*, from particulars to particulars, was involved in the udāharaṇa, with the additional improvement

[1] I. L. A., Ch. 3, Sec. II.

[2] V. S. F., pp. 319-23 ; T. S. K., p. 260.

that the particular was meant to point to the universal principle involved. Prof. Kuppuswami S'āstri is of opinion [1] that from the very early stage of its formulation the Vais'eṣika emphasised the inductive phase of thinking while the Nyāya dealt with the deductive, synthetic phase.

He says,[2] "The Vais'eṣika-Sūtra, I, 1, 4. lays special emphasis not upon any of the categories, but upon the comprehension of truth through similarities and dissimilarities—upon the striking out of the *one* in the *many*; and this amounts to an unmistakable stress on 'the *analytic* or *inductive* method, of philosophical reasoning'. Gautama's *Nyāya-dars'ana* took its name from *nyāya*, which means 'the synthetic or deductive method of Syllogistic demonstration'."

The terms induction and deduction have assumed an exaggerated opposition to each other owing to the vicissitudes of the development of logic in Europe. Bacon, by his famous onslaught against Aristotelian logic, made induction come to birth with the blare of

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[1] T. S. K., Introduction, p. 27.

[2] T. S. K., Introduction, p. 26.

trumpets and with a highly exaggerated spirit of antagonism to deductive thinking. But in the course of three centuries it has been found that this sharp antagonism is untrue to fact and ha the flavour of progaganda about it, while true thinking always involves both aspects equally. With the conversion of the conception of Vyāpti into a qualitative one in Indian Logic, the proper synthesis of Induction and Deduction may be said to be complete.

The analysis of similarities and dissimilarities spoken[1] of by the Vais'eṣika cannot be equated with inductive reasoning. Induction in the modern sense of the term as *the* method of scientific analysis, is the direct result of the wonderful advance in scientific research and discovery of the last three centuries. Without the interrogation of nature and the enormous patience with which scientists have gone on applying observation and experiment to build up the new instrument of knowledge it would not have been possible to conceive of induction in the modern sense of the word. All that can be claimed for the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika from its earliest stages is that it had definitely grasped

[1] V.S. I. 1. 4.

the principle of the interconnection between inductive and deductive thinking. But the non-experimental tendency and verbal predilections have prevented the development of an inductive method with its central feature of hypothesis. The Nyāya-Vais'eṣika literature of the last five centuries contains illustration of the fact that a direct interrogation of nature with a view to discovery of laws was not a characteristic of the Indian type of thinking. Its natural regard for the revelations of the Vedas and the tendency to derive all knowledge from scripture prevented the investigation of phenomena from becoming the chief method of the progress of knowledge. To say this is not to deny that there have been schools of thought who have denied authority like the Cārvākas and post-Buddhistic schools. But these schools remain mainly negative in their tendency and, unlike the Empiricism of modern European thought, have not made positive contribution to the accumulation of ascertained knowledge. The Indian mind is essentially synthetic and deductive. Apprehension of truth has often relied on intuition, or direct supersensuous experience and the

function of reasoning has often[1] been to corroborate the deliverances of intuition rather than embark upon the arduous adventure of independent investigation of natural laws.

XVI

This is well illustrated in the conception of Definition in Indian thought as contrasted with the nature of definition in modern European thought. Vātsyāyana gives[2] his account of definition as an attribute which differentiates the definitum from all things different from itself. The main function of definition is to differentiate an object from other objects according to Nyāya-Vais'eṣika. The Vyāvartaka dharma, or differentiating function, is discharged by a liberal use of terms like itara (other than) and bhinna (separate from) marking off the boundary rather than exhibiting the nature of the contents. Unlike modern thought which requires a patient

[1] It is no intention of the writer to deny that a large amount of study of natural phenomena was actually conducted and principles discovered as is witnessed by the development of astronomy and medicine in early times.

[2] Nyāya-Bhāṣya, I, 1, 2 quoted in T.S.B., p. 80.

discovery of the essential features in giving rise to a concept, most of the definitions employed in Nyāya-Vais'eṣika content themselves with one feature which could serve to mark off the reference of a term. Thus a cow is defined as an animal having a dewlap, Earth is that which has smell. In the text of our present manual, a large number of definitions are employed and they clearly show how often a verbal definition is made to serve the purposes of knowledge. The meticulous pursuit of accuracy in concepts has given rise to a barren mannerism which has narrowed down the function of definition and prevented it from being an active aid in discrimination of our knowledge of things. This is all the more remarkable because this system has, forged ready at hand, all the tools necessary for intellectual analysis of the phenomenal world. Its wealth of terms shown by such conceptions as jāti, upādhi, upalakṣaṇa, vis'eṣa, sattā, and a host of other distinctions proves beyond all manner of doubt its wonderful armoury of intellectual tools. But they have all been devoted to a dry logic-chopping instead of being used to explore the variegated web of

the phenomenal universe, and positive achievement in discovery in recent centuries is small. This negative use of definition shows the essentially deductive attitude of mind, for the principle of exclusion is of invaluable help in arranging the intellectual house after the various details have been known. An idealist logician like Bosanquet is enamoured of the principle of exclusion for the same reason. While discovery of alternatives is an inductive function, the principle of exclusion helps to determine the relative importance of alternatives. Definition [1] in Indian Logic is really of deductive force or synthetic value. The content of knowledge has often been neglected and formal arrangement has been emphasised. This tendency reaches its climax in the school of Navya (new) Nyāya.

XVII

Adṛṣṭa is another doctrine which plays an important role in the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system. Considerable interest attaches to this, because Adṛṣṭa is brought in to discharge many vital

[1] On this subject, see T.S.B., p. 202 and p. 80.

duties in the Vais'eṣika cosmology. It has been considered a latent energy which resides in the self causing transmigration. It is a latent force resulting from the actions done in a previous life or a previous world and continuing to exist in the present life. It causes the conjunction and disjunction of atoms with one another. The Vais'eṣika system postulates a pluralism. The ultimates of its analysis are God, Adṛṣṭa the atoms and souls. How are these atoms to bring about the creation and destruction of the world? Not being effects themselves, they are co-eternal with God. In order that creation and destruction might take place, movement has to be generated in these atoms. They are incapable of generating movement by themselves. Hence the Vais'eṣika postulates Adṛṣṭa or unseen destiny which brings about the conjunction and disjunction of atoms with one another. Adṛṣṭa is also said [1] to cause four other activities—the upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing of wind, the falling down and sinking of earth and water and the contact of soul with mind. Adṛṣṭa takes the place of a convenient agency

[1] V. P. U., p. 75.

to bring about all the necessary contacts which cannot be otherwise explained from the realistic standpoint of the Vais'eṣika.

The question therefore arises, how far is the realism of the Vais'eṣika affected by the principle of Adṛṣṭa. The relative place of realism and idealism in the Vais'eṣika requires clarification. Dr. Radhakrishnan [1] in his estimate of the Vais'eṣika system goes into an elaborate discussion on this question and points out how the realistic and empirical bias of this school prevented it from gathering up the threads which could easily have been woven into an idealistic explanation, giving a complete view that was possible with the materials analysed and brought into prominence. By being untrue to its own analysis, the system fails to achieve a unitary conception. He says, [1] "The difficulty of the Vais'eṣika is that it does not piece together its results into a single coherently articulated structure". But the Vais'eṣika has done a great service to philosophical thinking in directing attention to the analysis of the real which is the starting point of all correct thinking. Its service is great in drawing

[1] I. P., Vol. II, p. 246.

attention to the details of existence. But its realistic standpoint suffers when the doctrine of Adṛṣṭa is imported into it to enable the atoms and souls to have interconnection and to constitute an intelligible world. The element of idealism is necessary to complete the system.

The conception of causation in the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika also makes it necessary to have recourse to the principle of Adṛṣṭa. The doctrine of asatkāryavāda requires a justification for the cause being capable of possessing the potency of bringing about effects without any visible proof. Hence Adṛṣṭa is supposed to embody the effect of actions in previous worlds and enable causes to bring about their appropriate effects in due course. It is interesting to compare the doctrine of Adṛṣṭa with the conception of Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz. He is also a pluralist. He also postulates numberless monads as the ultimate truth of existence. He is also compelled to find out some basis of explanation for these monads being able to come into contact with one another and constitute the relations that make up the universe. In a similar situation therefore we find him putting forward his

concept of Pre-established Harmony which helps to round up his realistic theory.

XVIII

The account given by S'ivāditya of the creation and destruction of the world requires a passing mention. It is based primarily on the graphic account given by Pras'astapāda in Section 40 of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.* When the time comes, when the Supreme Lord of the Universe feels that the souls in the toils of saṁsāra require a rest, a pralaya or dissolution is decided on. An action is set going in the atoms which produces a disjunction. This in its turn destroys the conjunction that makes a binary. The destruction of the binary is followed up by the destruction of the tertiary and so in turn larger masses. The intimate cause being destroyed the effects are done away with. The tertiaries, the binaries are in turn intimate causes. But the atoms are indestructible and therefore, in their case, only the conjunction which goes to make binaries is destroyed. Creation also follows a similar order. Out of the numberless atoms, by conjunction binaries are formed; the binaries go to

make tertiaries and they in turn larger masses of Earth, Water, Air, Light, etc. One interesting feature of this account is that destruction, instead of reversing the order of events, is supposed to follow the same order as creation. If so, if causes are destroyed first, the question arises where do the effects remain till their turn arrives for being destroyed. So later Naiyāyikas amend this by asserting that in destruction the order is reversed.

XIX

The physics of the *Saptapadārthī* deserves some attention. Unique among Indian systems of philosophy, the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system has made definite contribution to the analysis of the physical matter of the universe. Its analysis of all mūrta dravyas (corporeal substances) into the five elements, earth, water, air, light, and mind, its elaborate study of each element into body, sense-organ, and object, its theory of the effect of transformation brought about by heat, its classification of the qualities of different substances, its analyses of the various sensory qualities, and their forms of manifestation,—all these constitute a very valuable

contribution to human knowledge. Though as Monier Williams puts it, in his 'Indian Wisdom,' the views are crude, they contain shrewd hits at the real nature of the phenomenal universe. In the comparative absence of scientific apparatus and experimental demonstration, the ancient Vais'eṣika philosophers seem to have compassed by the light of intuition some of the fundamental concepts of scientific analysis. Prominent among these may be mentioned the atomic theory qualitatively considered, the nature of the soul, analysis of time, space and ether, constitution of matter, etc.

XX

In conclusion, the Saptapadārthī may legitimately be considered an epitome of the Nyāya and Vais'eṣika systems of philosophy. In a small compass, by means of a very symmetrical presentation, S'ivāditya has been able to condense all the important doctrines of the Nyāya and Vais'eṣika systems,—the analysis of the seven categories and their divisions, the doctrine of Perception and Inference, the

metaphysical conceptions of causality, Inherence, Non-existence, and creation and destruction, the epistemological theories of vyāpti or invariable concomitance, definition, nature of right knowledge, instruments of right knowledge, the physical theories of matter and its forms, and the ethical and religious quest of the Summum Bonum.

The function of S'ivāditya in the history of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika is twofold. On the one hand he gathered in himself all the tradition of the two systems coming down in parallel streams from Gautama and Kaṇāda and gave it in a succinct and masterly compendium. On the other hand he made the new departure of a harmonious synthesis of the two systems and set the fashion for all succeeding time of the true blending of the Nyāya and Vais'eṣika in such an attractive and efficient manner as to impress his example indelibly on the subsequent history of these two systems. Therefore, by a careful study of his manual one can legitimately hope to get an insight into the essentials of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika philosophy.

C. Textual Introduction

THE author of the *Saptapadārthī* is S'ivāditya, also known as S'ivāditya Mis'ra. He is referred to as Nyāyācārya which indicates acknowledged position as a leading exponent of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika. Saṅkara Mis'ra in his commentary on S'rī Harṣa's *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya* remarks, "Nyāyācārya-kṛta-Lakṣaṇa-mālā-granthe." This Nyāyācārya is S'ivāditya as he is known [1] to have been the author of the *Lakṣaṇamālā.*

The date of S'ivāditya is enshrouded in obscurity. A great deal depends on the question of his relation to Udayana, especially as to who of the two is the earlier. Rāma S'āstri in his Introduction to an edition of this book holds [2] that S'ivāditya preceded Udayana whereas Ghate [3] in another edition of the work holds that Udayana must be the earlier.

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[1] S. P. R., p. 4.

[2] S. P. R. Introduction.

[3] S. P. G. Introduction.

The terminus ad quem of S'ivāditya is supplied by Jinavardhana Sūri. Bhaṇḍārkar's Report on the search for manuscripts of the year 1882-83 mentions the find of a leaf inside a copy of Udayana's *Tātparya-Paris'uddhi*, mentioning that the copy belonged to Jinavardhana Sūri and giving his date as Saṁvat 1471 (A.D. 1414). This Jinavardhana Sūri is the known author of a commentary on the *Saptapadārthī*. So it is unquestioned that S'ivāditya must have lived before A.D. 1414.

The terminus a quo is difficult to fix. S'ivāditya is referred to by Gaṅges'a, the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, who quotes [1] S'ivāditya by name and refutes his doctrine. Thus it is clear that S'ivāditya preceded Gaṅges'a. Keith assigns [2] the period A.D. 1150-1200 as the not improbable date of Gaṅges'a. S'rī Harṣa in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* quotes the sentence, 'Tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā' from S'ivāditya. This is attested [3] by S'rī Harṣa's commentator S'aṅkara Mis'ra. If we could fix

[1] Tattva-cintāmaṇi, p. 830, quoted in S. P. G., p. VIII.
[2] I. L. A., p. 33.
[3] S. P. G., p. IX.

S'rī Harṣa's date S'ivāditya's must be earlier than that.

S'rī Harṣa's words,[1] " Vyāghāto yadi saṅkā asti " are quoted by Gaṅges'a. Hence S'rī Harṣa is earlier than Gaṅges'a. S'rī Harṣa *is believed* to have been a contemporary of Udayana, because Rāma S'āstri explains[1] that there were several doctrinal disputes between them both. Now Udayana's date has been fixed[2] at A.D. 984 based on his own statement in the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. If S'rī Harṣa is Udayana's contemporary, as S'ivāditya is quoted by him, S'ivāditya must be a little earlier or at least a contemporary of S'rī Harṣa and hence also either earlier than or a contemporary of Udayana. S'ivāditya's date must be somewhere about A.D. 984.

Now arises the question of the relative chronology of Udayana and S'ivāditya. Ghate inclines to the view[3] that S'ivāditya did not precede Udayana on two grounds, *viz.*, (*a*) the division of padārthas into bhāva and abhāva, made by Udayana, represents an

[1] S. P. R., p. 3.
[2] I. L. A., p. 31.
[3] S. P. G., p. IX.,

earlier stage in the transition from the six padārthas of Pras'astapāda to the seven of S'ivāditya, (*b*) Udayana does not refer to S'ivāditya. Keith obviously follows[1] Ghate. But Ghate also mentions the suggestion of an identification of S'ivāditya with Vyomas'ivācārya, author of a Vais'eṣika commentary called *Vyomavatī* mentioned along with Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*, S'rīdhara's *Nyāya-kandalī* and S'rīvatsa's *Līlāvatī*—all commentaries on Pras'astapāda Bhāṣya. This is supported by the colophon in a manuscript of the *Saptapadārthī* belonging to the Benares Saṁskṛt College. But both Rāma Sāstri[2] and Keith[3] are not prepared to credit it.

Now it may be suggested that the first argument used both by Ghate and Keith for Udayana's priority is not decisive. It is quite a feasible idea to ascribe the division of padārthas into bhāva and abhāva to a later date than the stage of seven padārthas. For this supposition there is ground. H. Ui in his work on Vais'eṣika Philosophy according to the *Das'apadārthī* has retranslated from Chinese sources a

[1] I. L. A., p. 37.
[2] S. P. R., p. 1.
[3] I. L. A., p. 37.

work by Candra assigned[1] to the first half of the 6th century A.D. This work, the *Das'a-padārthī*, enumerates ten[2] Vais'eṣika categories, thus increasing the categories from six. We may rightly infer from this that the number of Vais'eṣika padārthas was increased soon after Pras'astapāda, who is believed to belong[3] to 5th century A.D. Doubtless there were other works that made similar increases. There is internal evidence in the *Saptapadārthī* that there were authors who included more categories than seven. In Section 56, S'ivāditya states that S'akti or potentiality is only the nature of Substance, implying that it need not be a separate padārtha. Similarly Sādṛs'ya or commonness is also said to be only Sāmānya or generality, implying again that it need not be a separate padārtha. We find that these two along with as'akti or non-potentiality constitute the three additional categories to make up the ten[4] categories of *Das'apadārthī*. In Section 61,

[1] V. P. U., p.10.
[2] V. P. U., p. 93.
[3] I. L. A., p. 27.
[4] V. P. U. p. 93.

S'ivāditya says, 'If there are any other padārthas suggested, they can be shown to be included in the seven mentioned.' Further[1] Udayana's distribution of the seven padārthas into bhāva and abhāva is quite in keeping with the tendency for classification, which is characteristic of Indian systems, which takes well known divisions and regroups them. As a parallel case one might cite the fact that the four kinds of abhāvas, *viz.*, prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsābhāva, atyantābhāva and anyonyābhāva were later regrouped[2] into two main divisions as saṁsargābhāva and anyonyābhāva, the former being subdivided into prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsābhāva, and atyantābhāva. While the Jain logician Samantabhadra (A.D. 600) classifies abhāvās[3] into four kinds, Vācaspati Mis'ra (A.D. 898)[4] groups them into (1) negation of identity, and (2) negation of correlation, the latter being broken

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[1] Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvalī* is writing a commentary on Pras'astapāda's work, and as the latter speaks only of six padārthas, Udayana could bring abhāva in only as an extra, other than the six, as the denial of the bhāva padārthas.

[2] B. P. quoted in T. S. B., p. 100.

[3] H. I. L., pp. 182-184.

[4] I. L. E. S., p. 39.

up into prior, posterior and absolute negations, while the former is identified with reciprocal negation.

The second argument of Ghate is the absence of reference to S'ivāditya by Udayana. But there are striking similarities between some of Udayana's statements and S'ivāditya's. Ghate himself observes[1] that the definition, 'tattvam anāropitam rūpam,' is word for word the same in the *Kiraṇāvalī* and the *Saptapadārthī*. In the repudiation of darkness as a separate substance, Udayana's words are closely similar to S'ivāditya's, 'aropita nīla rūpo abhāvo andhakāraḥ,' only Udayana uses 'āropitam rūpam tamo bhā abhāvah', the word bhāḥ being the addition to the rest of the sentence, meaning light, which is obviously implied in S'ivāditya's sentence. The definition of Upādhi by S'ivāditya, *viz.*, (Upādhis' ca sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhya-sama-vyāptiḥ) is closely paralleled by Udayana's[2] (sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakaḥ). There is reason to hope that a close comparative study of Udayana's and S'ivāditya's work will yield more evidence.

[1] S. P. G., p. XI footnote.

[2] T. S. B., p. 313.

These similarities, though they may be considered double-edged leading to either conclusion, show in each case that Udayana's is an improvement on S'ivāditya's. Further much store need not be set on the absence of reference by Udayana to S'ivāditya. The practice of referring by name or otherwise to contemporary or earlier authors is by no means popular or universal among Indian authors. On the other hand, there is the well-known case of Udyotakara who does not refer [1] to Dignāga directly or by name, though we have Vācaspati Mis'ra's evidence that the doctrines attacked by Udyotakara were Dignāga's, nor does he directly mention Pras'astapāda who is definitely ascertained [2] to have preceded Udyotakara. Such a self-conscious giant of intellect as Udayana can be understood if he did not deign to refer to other authors. Even the majesty of God did not offer any restraint to his gigantic self-possession, if the reported reprimand [3] which he is said to have made to God when the doors of the temple at Puri were

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[1] I. L. A., p. 28.

[2] I. L. E. S., p. 27.

[3] I. P., Vol. II., p. 40n. 2.

not opened, is to be believed. Considering the present state of our knowledge [1] on the subject, the supposition may be entertained that S'ivāditya did precede Udayana and hence may be assigned to a date a little earlier than Udayana's, which as already cited is fixed at A.D. 984.

S'ivāditya is also the author of another work entitled *Lakṣaṇamālā*. This is mentioned [2] by the commentator in the *Chitsukhīvyākhyā*. The possible suggestion that it is only another name for the *Saptapadārthī* is also disproved by Rāma S'āstri [3] by drawing attention to a quotation occurring in the *Chitsukhīvyākhyā* purporting to be from S'ivāditya, which is not to be found in the *Saptapadārthī*. Also the passage quoted by Gaṅges'a referring to S'ivāditya by name (already referred to) is not found [4] in the *Saptapadārthī*. Hence the authorship of the *Laksaṇamālā*, a separate work, is defintely attributable to S'ivāditya.

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[1] See T. S. K. Introduction for the opposite contention, which is discussed in Appendix A.

[2] S. P. R., p. 4.

[3] S. P. R., p. 4.

[4] S. P. G., p. XI.

The text that has been followed in the present edition has been based on three printed editions.

1. *Saptapadārthī* with Mitabhāṣiṇī, edited with Introduction by Tailanga Rāma S'āstri, Vizianagram Saṁskṛt Series, Benares, 1893.

2. *Saptapadārthī* with Padārthacandrika, edited with Introduction and notes by V. S. Ghāte, Poona, 1909.

3. *Saptapadārthī*. Text only with a Latin introduction by Dr. Augustus Winter, Bonn University.

It has not been considered necessary to burden the book with readings. Except in a few very important cases where the meaning is substantially affected by the variations, no alternative readings are given, but effort has been made to choose the best readings as far as possible. Winter's edition takes the easiest readings and there is evidence of an attempt at simplification. Ghate is fullest of readings; while Rāma S'āstri gives the chief variations only. It is clear that many hands have been at the text trying to emend it in the course of its long history of ten centuries.

There are several commentaries on the *Saptapadārthī* of which the following are the most important:

1. Commentary by Jinavardhana Sūri (A.D. 1415).

2. Mitabhāṣinī—a commentary by Mādhava Sarasvati (A.D. 1523).

3. Padārtha-candrika—a commentary by S'eṣānanta (before A.D. 1608).

4. S'is'ubodhinī by Bhairavendra.

In the preparation of notes for the present edition, the editor has used commentaries 1-3. Of these the Mitabhāṣiṇī is the clearest and shows considerable philosophical acumen. As Winter remarks it is written by a true philosopher, who in some places differs from S'ivāditya, which according to Winter is rather rare among commentators. Ghate's edition supplies copious notes somewhat modelled on Athalye's edition of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*. The Padārtha-candrika is often verbose, but ingenious. As Winter remarks, he often gives more words than light, but is valuable.

D. Analytical Outline of the Text

N. B. The figures enclosed in brackets indicate the sections in which the topic is dealt with.

According to the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system the highest good, Niḥs'reyasa is the object of all science (64) and the means towards this end is the ascertainment of reality, Tattva-jñāna (64) which helps in the destruction of all the 21 kinds of pain (64) by giving rise to Right Knowledge (140). Right knowledge starts with Perception (142) and leads up to Inference (143), which depends on the knowledge of Vyāpti (147) and knowledge of Vyāpti or invariable connection requires investigation of the categories.

The method of exposition is threefold; Enumeration (182), Definition (65) and general examination. Accordingly the work proceeds symmetrically. Sections 2-62 give a complete enumeration of all the heads of study and can

be called Uddeśa-khaṇḍa. Sections 65-115 constitute the definitions and can be called Lakṣaṇa-khaṇḍa. Here all the enumerated topics of study are defined in the same order. Sections 116-198 constitute a general examination which includes description and classification. This also follows the same order and can be called the Parīkṣā-khaṇḍa.

Categories are enumerated (2-10), defined (67-73) and examined (183-188). The categories are Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Particularity, Inherence and Non-existence.

Substances are enumerated (11-21), defined (74-82) and examined with all the necessary terms involved (116-135). Qualities are enumerated (22-50), defined (83-105) and subdivided and examined (136-173) (183). As cognition is the most important among qualities, as it gives rise to the method of Right knowledge, the whole doctrine of Perception and Inference is gone into in detail (139-163). Here we get kinds of inference (146), elements of the inferential process (148-153), five members of the syllogism (156) and fallacies of reason (157-163). Forms of false knowledge

are analysed and defined (164-168). Other qualities are examined (136-138, 169-173).

Actions are enumerated (51), defined (106-110) and examined.

Generality is enumerated (52), defined (111) and examined (185).

Particularity is enumerated, defined (71) and examined (186) with its auxiliary conceptions (174-193-197).

Inherence is enumerated and defined (72) and examined (187).

Non-existence is enumerated (53), defined (73) and subdivided (112-115).

The doctrine of cause has to be studied in order to know how things come to be. Cause is enumerated (62), defined and examined (179). This leads on to the question of creation and destruction which are defined (128-129) and examined (189-190).

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

THE scheme followed in this work is that adopted by the International Congress of Orientalists at Athens in 1912. The chief point to note is the rendering of the Nagari श by the symbol S' instead of the older Ç and the Nagari ष by Ṣ and च by C. With regard to long compounds in Saṁskṛt, I have been in a difficulty. To be strict, they should either be transliterated exactly as in the original, which will make them unreadable, or they should be broken up and connected by hyphens, which will make the text unsightly, because too many hyphens have the effect of dominating the visual impression. So I have sacrificed the good opinion of the mere scholar by breaking up the compounds while not using hyphens, in the interests of æsthetic effect. For this I request the forbearance of the reader.

सप्तपदार्थी

SAPTAPADĀRTHĪ—A MANUAL OF THE SEVEN CATEGORIES

INVOCATION

हेतवे जगतामेव संसारार्णवसेतवे ।
प्रभवे सर्वविद्यानां शम्भवे गुरवे नमः ॥

Hetave jagatām eva saṁsārārṇavasetave
Prabhave sarvavidyānām S'ambhave gurave namaḥ.

Salutation to the Lord S'ambhu, who is the cause of the world, who is the bridge across the ocean of saṁsāra and who is the Teacher of all sciences. (1)

NOTES

S'ivāditya at the outset strikes the main note as to the need for right knowledge. It is in order to overcome the pain of the recurring cycle of births. There is special appropriateness in his

invoking Īs'vara as the cause of the world; for that is the main argument of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system for the proof of God's existence and is known as the creationistic argument. It can be briefly stated thus: Every effect must have an agent. The world is an effect. So it must have an agent who is called God by some systems.

Some difference of opinion with regard to the phrase 'gurave sarvavidyānām' is possible. Ghate would keep the words as they occur and interpret, 'prabhave sarvavidyānām,' when the meaning is lord of all sciences. But Pad. interprets 'gurave' with 'sarvavidyānām' which is more in tune with the meaning.

The mention of S'ambhu lends colour to the supposition that S'ivāditya was perhaps a worshipper of S'iva.

UDDES'A KHAṆḌA

ENUMERATION

प्रमितिविषयाः पदार्थाः ।

Pramiti viṣayāḥ padārthāḥ.

The Categories are objects of right knowledge. (2)

NOTES

After invocation, the enumeration begins. S'ivāditya follows strictly the method of exposition

laid down by Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* (I-1-2), which consists of enunciation (uddeśa), definition (lakṣaṇa) and examination (parīkṣā). Though at this place the categories are only enunciated, and though according to Śivāditya's definition of lakṣaṇa, it has to make use of a negative feature (See sec. 65 infra), we find that he does not give any further definition of padārthas than is contained in this enunciation. (See section 66.)

A padārtha is what is knowable and nameable—*i.e.*, the ultimate of intellectual analysis. Padārtha has its nearest equivalent in English in 'Category'. The categories are the objects of right knowledge. This means that right knowledge fulfils its function in comprehending these categories.

Pramiti or right knowledge is defined as the knowledge of a thing as it is. It is called Yathārthānubhava or experience of the real nature of things; it is the experience of the generic nature as abiding in the subject. It is acquired by means of four instruments according to the Nyāya which are Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal Testimony; but according to the Vaiśeṣika and the *Saptapadārthī* the instruments are two only, namely, Perception and Inference.

Pramiti or Right Knowledge is distinguished from bhrama or misapprehension. (See sections 140 and 141.)

ते च द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाख्याः सप्तैव ।

Te ca dravya guṇa karma sāmānya vis'eṣa samavāya abhāvākhyāḥ saptaiva.

And they are but seven : Substance, Quality, Action (or Motion), Generality, Particularity, Inherence and Non-existence (or Negation). (3)

NOTES

These are the Vais'eṣika categories. They were originally six, according to Kaṇāda and Pras'astapāda. Abhāva (non-existence) was added later. By the time of S'ivāditya the categories had been fixed at seven ; the title of the book emphasises this idea.

There is special significance in the order in which the categories are mentioned. Substance is the substratum which possesses all the other categories in the relation of inherent cause and is placed first. Quality inheres in a substance as a property and arises immediately after it and so is placed next. Motion or Action is a variable quality and is distinguished from Quality which is permanent. As Motion is an essential property of substance it is placed next. Generality resides in the first three and comes after them. Particularity is in intimate relation with Generality and so is placed next. Inherence being in inseparable connection with the above five comes next. Non-existence being a negation of the above six is mentioned last. (Mita.)

Abhāva rendered as Negation emphasises the logical concept while as Non-existence it refers to the Ontological aspect.

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ।

Tatra dravyāṇi pṛthivy ap tejo vāyvākāśa-kāla dig ātma manāṁsi navaiva.

Of these, Substances are only nine: Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul and Mind. (4)

NOTES

Each of the seven categories enumerated in the last section is elaborated and shown to consist of several subdivisions. Thus the category Substance is ninefold. Jin. sees a significance in the order of enumeration. "Earth, Water and Light are placed first as they are comprehended by Perception, the first means of knowledge. Air is placed next as being experienced by the sense-organs. Ether follows because it unites all the previous four. Time and Space are taken next as they give rise to perceivable properties as posteriority and priority. Then Soul as the means of uniting all these and lastly Mind as the instrument of the Soul."

There arises here a long-standing controversy between the Mīmāṁsakas and the upholders of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as to the

possibility of a tenth substance—Darkness. It is said to possess quality and motion, *viz.*, blueness and motion; but the Vais'eṣikas repudiate that as being due to misapprehension, and assert that Darkness is only the negation of light. S'ivāditya reverts to this later. (See sections 175 and 55.)

गुणास्तु रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभाग-परत्वापरत्वबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कार-धर्माधर्मशब्दाः चतुर्विंशतिरेव ।

Guṇās tu rūpa rasa gandha spars'a saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva buddhi sukha duḥkha icchā dveṣa prayatna gurutva dravatva sneha saṁskāra dharmādharma s'abdāḥ caturviṁs'atir eva.

But qualities are twenty-four:

Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Posteriority, Priority, Understanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Volition, Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Predisposition, Merit, Demerit and Sound. (5)

NOTES

These are the qualities of all the nine substances catalogued in one lump. In a later section

(183) Śivāditya assigns to each of the Substances its respective qualities.

Kaṇāda recognised only 17 qualities. Praśastapāda added the last seven. Other attempts to add to the list of qualities are implied in sections 54, 57, 58 and 60 but Śivāditya disallows them by explaining that they are involved in the 24 qualities.

कर्माण्युत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्चैव ।

Karmāṇy utkṣepaṇa apakṣepaṇa ākuñcana prasāraṇa gamanāni pañcaiva.

Action (or Motion) is of five kinds: Motion upwards, motion downwards, contraction (*i.e.*, motion towards oneself), expansion (*i.e.*, motion away from oneself), and movement in general. (6)

NOTES

Athalye in his notes on the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* explains that motion can be divided into three kinds: vertical, horizontal and slanting; vertical may be from above downwards or the reverse—that covers the first two divisions in the text; horizontal may also be in two directions—that covers the third and fourth kinds given here; all other movement is grouped in the fifth kind.

सामान्यं परमपरं परापरं चेति ।

Sāmānyam param aparam parāparam ceti.

Generality is either widest, narrowest or intermediate. (7)

NOTES

Usually only the first two are given. S'ivāditya includes an intermediate. This is more valuable logically than having only two. (Cf. V. P. U., p. 70.) (See Introduction section, 9.)

विशेषास्तु यावन्नित्यद्रव्यत्वात् अनन्ता एव ।

Vis'eṣās tu yāvannitya dravyatvād anantā eva.

But particularities, by reason of their abiding in all eternal substances, are infinite. (8)

NOTES

Particularity or Individuality differentiates the substance in which it resides. It abides in every atom of each substance, different from every other substance. As the atoms are infinite, the particularities also are numberless. These particularities are the means of distinguishing atoms of substances. In the case of created or produced things, differences of shape, quality, action and the like help to distinguish one object from another. But eternal things like the atoms of the first four substances, Ether, Space, Time, Soul and Mind require Particularities to distinguish them.

This concept of Particularity is a special feature of the Vais'eṣika System, and is believed by

some authors to have given the name to the system. But Ui (V. P. U., p. 6) mentions that in Chinese tradition the name meant superior. Faddegon (V. S. F., p. 18) stresses the tendency of the system to investigate similarities and dissimilarities as given in V. S. I., 1, 4 as the probable meaning of the name Vaiśeṣika. (See T. S. K. Introduction, p. 26.)

समवायस्तु एक एव ।

Samavāyastu eka eva.

Inherence (or intimate union) is one only. (9)

NOTES

The conception of Inherence is a special characterising feature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is essential for establishing the Asatkāryavāda, or the doctrine of the non-existence of the effect. Unless Inherence is admitted, *i.e.*, unless the relation of two things which cannot exist separately and which stand in the relation of substrate and that which exists in it, is possible, the postulation of the doctrine of eternal substances, the existence of cause before effect are all in jeopardy. The Vedānta of Śaṅkara directs its main attack on this doctrine of Inherence to obtain the phenomenality of all things ; and by holding fast to this doctrine, the ultimate reality of Substance is maintained and hence Inherence is the main basis of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism.

Inherence is distinguished from conjunction. In the case of the latter, two things which are

separate come together. In the former they remain inseparable. Śivāditya refers to this again in Lakṣaṇa-khaṇḍa and also under ayuta-siddha (sections 72 and 197).

अभावस्तु प्रागभाव प्रध्वंसाभाव अत्यन्ताभाव अन्योन्याभावलक्षणः चतुर्विधः ।

Abhāvas tu prāgabhāva pradhvaṁsābhāva atyantābhāva anyonyābhāva lakṣaṇaḥ caturvidhaḥ.

Non-existence is of four kinds: antecedent non-existence, consequent non-existence, absolute non-existence and reciprocal non-existence. (10)

NOTES

The doctrine of Abhāva or negation arose as a logical concept and was afterwards adopted as a category in the ontological scheme of the later Vaiśeṣika system and became non-existence. It is not included as a category either by Kaṇāda or Praśastapāda, the founders of the Vaiśeṣika. In later Nyāya it is very much employed. Its usefulness as a logical category may be said to have been fully exploited by the school of Navya-Nyāya. It has invaded definition and become an indispensable characteristic feature of modern Nyāya literature.

Some writers regroup abhāvās into two main divisions. (See Textual Introduction.)

पृथिवी नित्यानित्या च । परमाणुलक्षणा नित्या कार्यलक्षणा त्वनित्या । सापि शरीरेन्द्रियविषयरूपा । शरीरमस्मदादीनां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धव्यञ्जकम् । विषयो घटादिः ।

Pṛthivī nityānityā ca; paramāṇulakṣaṇā nityā; kāryalakṣaṇā tvanityā; sāpi s'arīrendriya viṣaya rūpā; s'arīram asmadādīnām pratyakṣasiddham; indriyam gandhavyañjakam; viṣayo ghaṭādiḥ.

Earth is both eternal and non-eternal; eternal in the form of atoms, non-eternal in the form of products. That again is threefold: body, sense-organ and object. Body is that which is like ours and others realised in perception; the sense-organ of Earth is the olfactory sense; objects are pots, etc. (11)

NOTES

The first category Substance is now subdivided and each of the nine substances is enumerated in order. This analysis of Earth is typical of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika analytical method. The doctrine that atoms are eternal is one chief principle of this system. This is why this system is spoken of as materialism. The analysis of produced things into body, sense-organ and object shows us the various ways of realising Earthy substances. It

will be seen that by speaking of Earth only an elementary state of matter is meant.

Pad. explains that the atomic form of Earth, which is eternal, and the non-eternal product are related, because the latter brings out the nature of the former. Pad. further states that the analysis into body, sense-organ and object should apply to atomic earth also; for there cannot be body, etc., in the produced form of Earth apart from the atoms.[1] Further the phrase, 'realised in perception' used in connection with the body refers equally to sense-organ and object.

The Atomic theory can be explained in this connection. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the division of matter into smaller particles cannot go on indefinitely. It comes to a point where we cannot divide further. That is the atom. But the atom is invisible. Two atoms combine to make a binary. Three binaries make a tertiary. This tertiary is the smallest visible particle comparable in size to the mote in a sunbeam. So the size of an atom is computed to be equal to a sixth part of a mote in a sunbeam. All matter is made of atoms.

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[1] This interpretation of Sāpi is a little forced. The greater mass of opinion among commentators is rightly in favour of applying the analysis into body, etc., only in connection with Earth in the form of product.

Ghate explains that according to the Naiyāyikas, the body is made only of Earth unlike the popular view that it is made of five elements. The other elements are considered only instrumental causes while Earth alone is material cause.

There is an interesting parallel between this conception of atom, binary and tertiary, which last is the first visible product and the theory of Geometrical space. A point is that which has position but no magnitude. This is comparable to the atom. A series of points between two fixed ends constitutes a line which has length but no breadth. This corresponds to a binary. Three straight lines are needed to enclose a space and constitute a surface which is visible. This corresponds to a tertiary. Can we say that the ancient Naiyāyikas had knowledge of this scientific analysis of space? (The suggestions contained in this paragraph are based on Dr. Brajendranath Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.*)

आपो नित्या अनित्याश्च । परमाणुलक्षणा नित्याः । कार्यलक्षणास्त्वनित्याः । ता अपि शरीरेन्द्रियविषयरूपाः । शरीरं वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसव्यञ्जकम् । विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिः ।

Āpo nityā anityās' ca; paramāṇu lakṣaṇā nityāḥ; kārya lakṣaṇās tvanityāḥ; tā api s'arīrendriya viṣaya rūpāḥ; s'arīram varuṇa loke; indriyam rasa vyañjakam; viṣayaḥ saritsamudrādiḥ.

Water is both eternal and non-eternal; eternal in the form of atoms; non-eternal in the form of products. That again is in its turn threefold: body, sense-organ and

object. Body is in the region of Varuṇa ; sense-organ in taste ; objects (or masses) in the form of river, ocean, etc. (12)

तेजोऽपि नित्यमनित्यं च । परमाणुलक्षणं नित्यम् । कार्यलक्षणमनित्यम् । तदपि शरीरेन्द्रियविषयरूपम् । शरीरमादित्यलोके । इन्द्रियं रूपव्यञ्जकम् । विषयो भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजरूपः ।

Tejo'pi nityam anityam ca ; paramāṇu lakṣaṇam nityam ; kārya lakṣaṇam anityam ; tadapi s'arīra indriya viṣaya rūpam ; s'arīram āditya loke ; indriyam rūpa vyañjakam ; viṣayo bhauma divya audarya ākaraja rūpaḥ.

Light is eternal and non-eternal ; eternal in the form of atoms, non-eternal in the form of product. That again is threefold : body, sense-organ and object. Body exists in the region of Āditya ; organ is sense of sight ; objects are earthy, celestial, gastric and mineral. (13)

NOTES

The inclusion of gold as a form of light is interesting and novel. Properly speaking many metals are lustrous and should be so classed. The Naiyāyikas use the following argument to class

gold as light. Gold cannot be Earth because it has fluidity in a molten condition which is not destroyed like the fluidity of earthy substance like ghee. It cannot be Water because its fluidity is occasional and not inherent; nor can it be Air as it has colour; nor can it be the other five substances which are incorporeal, while gold is corporeal. Hence gold is Light. (Based on T. S. B., pp. 112-13.)

The crude physics and chemistry of these early speculations contrasts very vividly with the very striking and shrewd hits at scientific truth such as the atomic theory, nature of Time and Space, etc., which these non-experimental analytical philosophers themselves made in the early dawn of the human mind.

Monier-Williams says in *Indian Wisdom*, "We might even be tempted to contrast some of the discoveries of modern chemistry and physics with the crude but shrewd ideas of Indian philosophers prosecuting their investigations more than 2,000 years ago without the aids and appliances now at everyone's command." (Chapter on Nyāya-Vais'eṣika philosophy.)

वायुरपि नित्योऽनित्यश्च । परमाणुलक्षणो नित्यः । कार्यलक्षणोऽनित्यः । सोऽपि शरीरेन्द्रियविषयप्राणरूपः । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शव्यञ्जकम् । विषयो वृक्षादिकम्पजनकः । प्राणस्तु शरीराभ्यन्तरचारी वायुः । स एव क्रिया-

भेदादपानादिसंज्ञां लभते । स्तिमितवायुस्तु परमाणुसमूह एव अनारब्धद्रव्यः ।

Vāyur api nityo'nityas' ca ; paramāṇu lakṣaṇaḥ nityaḥ ; kārya lakṣaṇo'nityaḥ ; So'pi S'arīrendriya viṣaya prāṇarūpaḥ ; S'arīram vāyuloke; indriyam spars'a vyañjakam ; viṣayo vṛkṣādi kampa janakaḥ ; prāṇas tu s'arīrābhyantaracārī vāyuḥ ; sa eva kriyābhedāt apānādi saṁjñām labhate ; stimita vāyus tu paramāṇu samūha eva anārabdha dravyaḥ.

Air also is both eternal and non-eternal; eternal in the form of atoms ; non-eternal in the form of products. That again is in the form of body, sense-organ, object, and vital breath. Body exists in the region of Vāyu. Organ in the sense of touch (or temperature sense). Object is that which causes movement of trees and the like. Vital breath is the air which moves in the inner regions of the body. This according to movement (or differences in function and location) is again distinguished as apāna and the others. As for *still air* it is

only an aggregation of atoms not yet formed into a substance. (14)

NOTES

The conception of vital breath or prāṇa is very popularly known in Hindu life. Here it is pointed out by Pad. that the vital breath circulating in the body, particular species of fluids such as red, yellow, etc., are set in action.

Because of having the sense of touch, air is reckoned an object and the air in motion it is, that is spoken of as object. Still air causes a problem. Is it atomic or in the form of product? Since the sense of touch is born in the still air of a room by the motion of a fan, the air before the fan's action is considered to be a mere aggregation of atoms (anārabdha dravya).

आकाशस्तु घटाकाशादिभेदभिन्नोऽनन्त एव ।

Ākās'as tu ghaṭākās'ādi bheda bhinno'nanta eva.

Ether is infinite (appearing) split up (as it were) into such differences as the ether in a pot and so on. (15)

NOTES

The plurality of ether is only apparent. When we speak of ether in a pot, it is thought of as limited by location in a pot, cloth, etc.; but

really it is all-pervading (vibhu) like Time and Space.

कालस्तूत्पत्तिस्थितिविनाशलक्षणस्त्रिविधः ।

Kālas tu utpatti sthiti vinās'a l a k ṣ a ṇ a s tri-vidhaḥ.

Time is of three kinds being characterised by creation, sustentation and destruction. (16)

NOTES

Like Ether, Time also is endless and all-pervading and appears in three different ways owing to differences of conditions.

दिगैन्द्री आग्नेयी याम्या नैर्ऋती वारुणी वायवी कौबेरी ऐशानी नागी ब्राह्मी रौद्री चेत्येकादशविधा ।

Dig aindrī āgneyī yāmyā nairṛtī vāruṇī vāyavī kauberī ais'ānī nāgī brāhmī raudrī ca ekādas'a vidhā.

Direction (or Space) is elevenfold :

East, South-East, South, South-West, West, North-West, North, North-East, Lower, Upper and Middle. (17)

NOTES

Dik is ordinarily taken as equivalent to Space but this section and the next make it clear that

the word should be more properly rendered as Direction.

The names given to the eleven directions are based on the conception of presiding deities. Indra is the lord of the East, Yama of the South, Varuṇa of the West, and Kubera of the North. Similarly the others also.

Usually only ten directions are distinguished but S'ivāditya adds an eleventh which is the middle region.

आकाशादित्रयं तु वस्तुत एकमेव उपाधिभेदान्नानाभूतम् ।

Ākās'āditrayam tu vastuta ekam eva upādhi-bhedān nānā bhūtam.

The three substances beginning with Ether (*i.e.*, Ether, Time and Space) are in fact only one, but appear as different owing to differences of condition. (18)

NOTES

Here we come upon one of the most profoundly meaningful remarks of S'ivāditya. The identity of Time and Space and Ether when dissociated from their limiting conditions is one of the most debated questions of modern metaphysical, physical and mathematical speculation. What is geometrical Space when distinctions of direction are removed ? What is Time when the notion of now, before and after are eradicated ?

What is Ether or physical Space in the last analysis? Bergson's analysis of Time, Einstein's conception of physical and mathematical Space, the researches of physicists as to the ultimate nature of Ether are pursuing this fascinating problem. Time depending on action, Space depending on spread-out-ness, Ether depending on holes in the matrix of matter, when lifted out of these limiting characteristics can be conceived of as identical.

Athalye in T. S. B., p. 133, discusses the difference between Ether and Space. Ether is an element while Space is a form of the mind. The first is objective, the second subjective. Ether produces one kind of effect, namely, sound, while Space is a general cause like Time, God and Adṛṣṭa. But Athalye admits that the deeper point of view of both is to find an underlying identity between Ether which is physical Space and 'Dik' which is mathematical Space.

आत्मा तु परमात्मा क्षेत्रज्ञश्चेति द्विविधः । परमात्मा ईश्वर एक एव । क्षेत्रज्ञा अस्मदादयोऽनन्ता एव ।

Ātmā tu paramātmā kṣetrajñas′ ceti dvividhaḥ; paramātmā īs′vara eka eva; kṣetrajñā asmadādayo'nantā eva.

Soul is of two kinds: Supreme and individual souls. The Supreme Soul is Īs′vara and only one. Individual souls (literally, knowers of the field) like ourselves are numberless. (19)

NOTES

Commentators draw attention to the fact that the Soul is classed with the Earth, Air and other Substances and point out that this is evidence of a materialistic tendency. But that is more due to the unphilosophical way of understanding the word substance. Another point of more value is the contention that Kaṇāda in his original *Vais'eṣika Sūtras* does not mention God but commentatorial ingenuity has surreptitiously smuggled God in as a variety of the substance Soul, though a supreme variety at that. But it is unquestioned that Pras'astapāda, the first great authority on the Vais'eṣika after Kaṇāda does[1] make God take his place in this system. (For interesting light on this question, see T. S. K., Introduction, p. 32.)

The use of the term Kṣetrajña for the individual is of special interest as it distinctly suggests Vedāntic affinity. It is also noteworthy that the *Bhagavad-Gītā* has an elaborate say on the soul as Kṣetrajña. (B. Gītā, Ch. 13.)

मनस्तु प्रत्यात्मनिष्ठत्वात् अनन्तम् ।

Manas tu pratyātma niṣṭhatvād anantam.

But Mind as it exists in, (being conjoined to), every soul is innumerable. (20)

(For NOTES, See section 82)

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[1] Pras'astapāda in his graphic account of the Creation and Destruction of the world refers to the Great Lord, Ruler of the Universe (V. S. F., 163) ; also in his opening verse.

आकाशादि पञ्चकं नित्यमेव । अन्यत् नित्यमनित्यं च ।

Ākās'ādi pañcakam nityam eva; anyat nityam anityam ca.

The five substances beginning with Ākās'a are all eternal only. The others are both eternal and non-eternal. (21)

NOTES

The four substances, Earth, Water, Air and Light are eternal in the form of atoms and non-eternal in the form of products.

रूपं सितलोहितपीतकृष्णहरितकपिशचित्रभेदात् सप्तविधम् ।

Rūpam sita lohita pīta kṛṣṇa harita kapis'a citra bhedāt saptavidham.

Colour is of seven kinds: White, red, yellow, black, green, purple and variegated. (22)

NOTES

The need for a separate kind called variegated is sometimes called into question. Pad. gives an elaborate defence and points out that in the case of a cloth woven out of threads of different colours, a combined effect is produced which is none of the individual colours and so a variegated colour is needed and has to be admitted.

रसोऽपि मधुरतिक्तकटुकषायाम्ललवणचित्रभेदात् सप्तविधः ।

Raso'pi madhura tikta kaṭu kaṣāya āmla lavaṇa citra bhedāt saptavidhaḥ.

Taste is of seven kinds: Sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, sour, saline and variegated. (23)

NOTES

Variegated taste is to be admitted since the individual qualities of the parts are different from that of the whole. A capacity for synthesis being admitted, the total effect of different tastes cannot be explained by the elements going to make it.

गन्धोऽपि द्विविधः । सुरभिरसुरभिश्चेति ।

Gandho'pi dvividhaḥ ; surabhir asurabhis'ceti.

Odour is of two kinds: Fragrant and non-fragrant. (24)

NOTES

In this case a variegated smell is out of question as the two kinds are mutually repellent.

स्पर्शस्तु शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् त्रिविधः ।

Spars'astu s'ītoṣṇa anuṣṇās'īta bhedāt trividhaḥ.

Touch (or Temperature sense) is of three kinds: Cool, hot and temperate (*i.e.*, neither hot nor cool). (25)

संख्या एकत्वद्वित्वबहुत्वभेदात् त्रिविधा ।

Saṅkhyā ekatva dvitva bahutva bhedāt trividhā.

Number is of three kinds: Oneness, Duality and Plurality. (26)

NOTES

Oneness is both eternal and non-eternal; eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in produced substances.

परिमाणमणुमहद्दीर्घह्रस्वभेदाच्चतुर्विधम् ।

Parimāṇam aṇu mahat dīrgha hrasva bhedāc caturvidham.

Dimension is of four kinds: minuteness, largeness, length and shortness. (27)

NOTES

As Ghate remarks, this distinction is not very logical. Length and shortness involve only two dimensions, while largeness is a thing of three

dimensions and minuteness is indefinite in dimension. Keith remarks that there is no investigation of the precise character of extension. (I. L. A., p. 188. Compare note on section 11.)

पृथक्त्वं एकानेकवृत्ति ।

Pṛthaktvam ekāneka vṛtti.

Separateness (or Severalty) resides in one as well as in many. (28)

NOTES

Residing in one means as in the statement 'this pot which is full of water appears distinct from other pots, cloth, etc.'—Residing in many means, 'these two pots are different from those others'. (See section 89.)

संयोगोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजः संयोगजश्च ।

Saṁyogo'pi dvividhaḥ karmajaḥ saṁyogajaś ca.

Conjunction is of two kinds: that born of action, and that produced by another conjunction. (29)

NOTES

Conjunction is to be carefully distinguished from Inherence, the sixth category. Conjunction is

always a relation between two things which are separate (See note on section 9).

Some writers subdivide conjunction born of action into two further kinds : anyatara-saṁyoga, which is a conjunction where one of the two things joined is stationary like the conjunction of a bird and a mountain ; ubhaya-karmaja, where both the things joining are moving like two wrestlers. (See T. S. B., p. 165.)

विभागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्च ।

Vibhāgo'pi dvividhaḥ karmajo vibhāgajas' ca.

Disjunction is also of two kinds: That born of action and that produced by another disjunction. (30)

परत्वं कालकृतं दिक्कृतं च । अपरत्वमपि कालकृतं दिक्कृतं च ।

Paratvam kālakṛtam dikkṛtam ca ; aparatvam api kālakṛtam dikkṛtam ca.

Posteriority is effected either by Time or by Space. Priority is also effected either by Time or by Space. (31)

NOTES

Jin. explains : Posteriority in time means as in an old man and priority as in the case of a boy ;

in point of Space, posteriority is used with reference to an object at a distance and priority with reference to an object not far of.

बुद्धिरपि द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च । अनुभवोऽपि द्विविधः । प्रमाप्रमा च । अप्रमापि द्विविधा संशयो विपर्ययश्च । प्रमापि द्विविधा प्रत्यक्षमनुमितिश्च ।

Buddhir api dvividhā smṛtir anubhavas' ca ; Anubhavo'pi dvividhaḥ ; pramā pramā ca ; Apramāpi dvividhā saṁs'ayo viparyayas' ca ; Pramāpi dvividhā pratyakṣam anumitis' ca.

Cognition is of two kinds : remembrance and apprehension. Apprehension again is of two kinds : True and False apprehension. False apprehension is of two kinds : Doubt, and Erroneous knowledge. True apprehension is of two kinds : Perception and Inference. (32)

NOTES

In this section all forms of knowledge are just enumerated. They will be dealt with in great detail in the Parīkṣākhaṇḍa. (See sections 139-163).

S'ivāditya sets the fashion for all syncretist Nyāya-Vais'eṣika treatises by including all the logical doctrine of the Nyāya under the Vais'eṣika

list of categories, under the subdivision of knowledge or cognition among Qualities, the second of the categories. Others bring in the subject under the Soul. (See Introduction, section VI.) Another famous work following this model is the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, which adopts closely the arrangement of the *Saptapadārthī*; but is briefer and less rich in matter, though more clear in exposition. Another manual which excels both these in elegance and ease, though following the same method of exposition is *Tarka-Kaumudī* of Laugākṣi Bhāskara.

प्रत्यक्षं सप्तप्रकारकम् । तच्चेश्वरघ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्छ्रोत्रमनोलक्षणम् ।

Pratyakṣam saptaprakārakam ; tac ca Īśvara ghrāṇa rasana chakṣus tvak śrotra mano lakṣaṇam.

Perception is of sevenfold nature ; that is, characteristic of God, smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing and mind. (33)

NOTES

There is no intention on the part of Śivāditya to give an account of the sources of Perception here. (See section 145.)

अनुमितिरपि त्रिविधा लिङ्गस्य त्रैविध्यात् । केवलान्वयि केवलव्यतिरेकि अन्वयव्यतिरेकि चेति । तदपि स्वार्थं परार्थं

च । परार्थाङ्गानि प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि । उभयाङ्गानि पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वं विपक्षात् व्यावृत्तिः अबाधितविषयत्वं असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति । तदाभासा असिद्धविरुद्ध अनैकान्तिक अनध्यवसित कालात्ययापदिष्ट प्रकरणसमाः ।

Anumitir api trividhā liṅgasya traividhyāt; Kevalānvayi kevalavyatireki anvayavyatireki ceti; tadapi svārtham parārtham ca; parārthāṅgāni pratijñā hetu udāharaṇa upanaya nigamanāni; ubhayāṅgāni pakṣadharmatvam sapakṣe sattvam vipakṣād vyāvṛttiḥ abādhitaviṣayatvam asatpratipakṣatvam ceti; tadābhāsā asiddha viruddha anaikāntika anadhyavasita kalātyayāpadiṣṭa prakaraṇasamāḥ.

Inference is of three forms; because the mark (or Middle Term) is of three kinds; namely, purely affirmative, purely negative and affirmative negative. These three kinds are again either for oneself or for others.

Inference for another has five members: Proposition (or Thesis), Reason, Example, Application and Conclusion. Both forms (*i.e.*, Inference for oneself, and Inference for another) have (the following) members (in

common): (1) being present in (all the individuals included in) the subject; (2) being present in a similar subject; (3) being absent from a dissimilar subject; (4) not having the probandum (or major) disproved by a stronger proof; (5) not having a rival indicatory mark which proves the opposite of the probandum (or major).

The fallacies arising therefrom are the Unproven, the Contradicted, the Discrepant, the Inconclusive, the Time-lapsed, and that which is in the same position as the topic (to be proved). (34)

NOTES

Here we have the enumeration of the main features of the doctrine of Reasoning. Sections 139-163 deal in full detail with this all-important topic. We can notice how the doctrine consists of the means of Right Cognition, Perception, Inference, the various details of Inference, its kinds, its features or limbs, fallacies of Reason and false knowledge. It is by the inclusion of this doctrine that the *Saptapadārthī* becomes the type of all syncretist Nyāya-Vais'eṣika manuals. Another point of interest is the inclusion of 'anadhyavasita' as a sixth fallacy, which is an unique feature of this work shared with the *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña. Later Nyāya-Vais'eṣika literature fixed upon five fallacies as the final form of the

doctrine. We get a glimpse here of the history of the development of fallacies. The six fallacies of the *Saptapadārthī* represent a transition stage before the school of Navya Nyāya systematised the fallacies. According to later Naiyāyikas 'anadhyavasita' is to be included in 'Prakaraṇa-sama' or 'Satpratipakṣa'. The whole topic of fallacies has had a very involved and interesting history.

According to V. S. only three fallacies are recognised—asiddha, viruddha, and sandigdha. P. D. S. has four—the same three and anadhyavasita. N. S. speaks of five—asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika, prakaraṇasama and kālātīta. Śivāditya has six. The *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña adopts also the sixfold classification of the *Saptapadārthī*. It is a matter for legitimate doubt who borrows from whom.

तर्कस्वप्नौ संशयविपर्ययावेव ।

Tarka svapnau saṁśaya viparyayāv eva.

Confutation (*Reductio ad absurdum*) and dreams are to be included (or identified with) doubt and error. (35)

NOTES

Tarka has been variously rendered. Gaṅgānāth Jhā makes it hypothetical reasoning. Cowell has confutation. Most of the others like Keith take it as *reductio ad absurdum*. While it is included under misapprehension, it serves a

useful purpose in knowledge in reducing an opponent's position to an absurdity. Hence it is a useful intellectual tool.

Pad. interprets the text as follows: Tarka is only error, while dream is either doubt or misapprehension.

सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकयोस्तु प्रमायां अप्रमायां च अन्तर्भावः ।

Savikalpaka nirvikalpakayos tu pramāyām apramāyām ca antarbhāvaḥ.

Determinate and indeterminate cognitions are involved both in Right and False knowedge. (36)

NOTES

Śivāditya considers that even false knowledge can have a first stage when it is not differentiated just as in right knowledge there is a first vague cognition. This is usually elaborated under Perception which is one of the forms of Right Cognition. It is worth noting that Śivāditya does not bring it in under Perception. In this he is quite unlike the later syncretist writers like Annambhaṭṭa. This is another indication of the undeveloped condition of the synthesis of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika at an earlier stage.

एवं प्रत्यभिज्ञा हानोपादान उपेक्षाज्ञानानामपि ।

Evam pratyabhijñā hāna upādāna upekṣā jñānānām api.

Similarly Recognition, and the Cognitions of an object as to be avoided, as to be sought or as indifferent (are also involved both in Right and False knowledge). (37)

ऊहानध्यवसाययोस्तु संशय एव ।

Ūhānadhyavasāyayos tu saṁśaya eva.

Conjecture and non-ascertained (indefinite) knowledge, are involved in doubt. (38)

सुखं सांसारिकं स्वर्गश्च ।

Sukham sāṁsārikam svargaś ca.

Pleasure is worldly and heavenly. (39)

NOTES

Pleasure is of two kinds: Those which are enjoyed in this world, and those which are enjoyed in svarga.

दुःखमपि दुःखकारणमात्रप्रभवम् ।

Duḥkham api duḥkha kāraṇa mātra prabhavam.

Pain is (only one kind) produced only by its (well-known) cause (Saṁsāra). (40)

NOTES

Considerable difficulty is felt in interpreting this section. Some take it to mean that pain is twofold, of this world and of hell. Ghate suggests: 'Pain also is that which springs from all causes of pain, *i.e.*, it has manifold causes.' Mita. explains that pain is only worldly. The last seems most suitable. The word 'mātra' is definitely suggestive that there is only one cause of pain, *viz.*, worldly abode of pain, the body and saṁsāra.

इच्छापि द्विविधा । साध्यविषया साधनविषया च ।

Icchāpi dvividhā; sādhya viṣayā sādhana viṣayā ca.

Desire also is of two kinds: That which aims at (certain) fulfilments and that which aims at the means of fulfilment. (41)

द्वेषोऽपि साध्यविषयः साधनविषयश्च ।

Dveṣo'pi sādhya viṣayaḥ sādhana viṣayaś ca.

Aversion also is twofold: That which avoids pain and the means of pain. (42)

प्रयत्नोऽपि विहितनिषिद्धोदासीनविषयः ।

Prayatno'pi vihita niṣiddha udāsīna viṣayaḥ.

Volition has for its object something that is prescribed, or something that is prohibited or something which is neither prescribed nor prohibited. (43)

NOTES

The third kind of volition can be called discretionary volition. There may be activities which are necessary for life which belong neither to the first nor the second kind like breathing, etc. Prescribed always connotes scriptural authority; prohibited also implies scriptural objection.

A slightly different interpretation may be suggested. Thus 'vihita' may be said to mean effort to gain an object. Niṣiddha may be the need for avoiding certain ends; and the third kind is involuntary actions like digestion, etc.

गुरुत्वं समाहाररूपं एकावयविनिष्ठं च ।

Gurutvam samāhārarūpam ekāvayaviniṣṭham ca.

Weight is in aggregates, and is also found in parts. (44)

NOTES

The meaning here is that there is weight due to aggregations of units and also weight in the individual parts that go to make aggregates. Pad interprets this line to mean that there is weight in eternal things like atoms as also in non-eternal things which are products consisting of parts.

द्रवत्वं सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च ।

Dravatvam sāṁsiddhikam naimittikam ca.

Fluidity is that which is natural (belonging to a thing by its very nature), and that which is brought about by special agency (*i.e.*, caused). (45)

NOTES

Heat is the agent that brings about fluidity as a special cause. In the Vais'eṣika system as developed by Pras'astapāda a very elaborate theory as to 'pākaja,' effects produced by application of heat, has been put forward.

स्नेहः स्वाभाविक औपाधिकश्च ।

Snehaḥ svābhāvika aupādhikas' ca.

Viscidity is both that which is natural and that which is conditional. (46)

NOTES

Conditional here means due to some accidental circumstance as opposed to natural.

संस्कारो वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्च ।

Saṁskāro vego bhāvanā sthitisthāpakaś ca.

Predisposition is of three kinds: Velocity, mental impression and elasticity (or inertia). (47)

NOTES

Often the word Saṁskāra is rendered as faculty. But the meaning is better brought out by the term predisposition; because in all the three cases of it what is distinguishing is the power of some action being done with ease owing to a favourable condition having been generated. Thus speed is the predisposition that helps in fast movement; mental impression is the facility generated for certain experiences occurring readily; inertia is the power of continuing in a particular state originally brought about till a counteracting force is made to operate. Inertia, used in the scientific sense and not the popular sense of the word, is a better rendering than the usual elasticity.

धर्मः प्रवर्तको निवर्तकश्च । अधर्मः फलावसानो नमस्कारादिनाश्यश्च ।

Dharmaḥ pravartako nivartakas' ca ;
Adharmaḥ phalāvasāno namaskārādi nās'yas' ca.

Merit is that which leads to enjoyment of worldly existence (literally, contact with the world), as well as that leading to freedom from worldly existence.

Demerit is either that which ends by actual experiencing of the fruits of action or that which is destroyed by performance of austerities (virtuous deeds), etc. (48)

NOTES

In this section we come upon the familiar concepts of Merit and Demerit which are two of the common fund of conceptions found in most Indian systems of philosophy. The ideas of Pravṛtti mārga, and Nivṛtti mārga are very well-known. Enjoyment of the world is the path of Forthgoing ; activities which bring about freedom from worldly contact such as niṣkāma karma (desireless action) constitute Nivṛtti or the path of Return. These concepts interpreted according to Nyāya-Vais'eṣika terminology amount to saying that by engaging in meritorious deeds we

remove the obstacles to the acquisition of true knowledge which enables us to work our way to liberation.

Demerit is overcome in two ways. One way is by suffering the fruits of cruel and sinful acts of the past and the other way is to practise penance, perform virtuous deeds to overcome the effects of evil deeds. Both ways will be necessary according to the nature of the deeds.

Demerit and Merit are also spoken of under the single title of Adṛṣṭa, which is translated unseen destiny, and which decides the kind of life each soul will have in each world period. (For a fuller account see Introduction.)

शब्दो वर्णात्मकोऽवर्णात्मकश्च ।

S'abdo varṇātmako'varṇātmakas' ca.

Sound is either articulate (*i.e.*, in the form of letters) or inarticulate. (49)

NOTES

Sound carefully analysed into distinct units constitutes letters, while general sounds are inarticulate.

A very important discussion is generally raised here on the Mīmāṁsaka doctrine of the eternality of sound. The Nyāya-Vais'eṣika rejects that doctrine because as Gautama pointed

out, sound has a beginning, it is perceived by an organ of sense and like any other product it has attributes (I.L.A., p. 172). The deliverances of the Veda become far less binding if the eternality of sound is not accepted. But the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika instead of repudiating the authority of the Vedas, makes it necessary to have the Vedic revelation supplemented by the statement of men who have a vision of the truth like the sages Gautama and Kaṇāda. The pure Vais'eṣika does not include S'abda among the means of Right Knowledge. S'ivāditya refers to this topic in section 155.

अत्र गन्धसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वसुखदुःखद्वेषसंस्कारधर्माधर्मशब्दा अनित्यैकरूपाः । अन्ये नित्यानित्यरूपाः । संयोगविभागसुखदुःखद्वेषसंस्कारधर्माधर्मशब्दा अव्यापकाः । बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना उभयरूपाः । अन्ये स्वाश्रयव्यापकाः ।

Atra gandha saṁyoga vibhāga paratva aparatva sukha duḥkha dveṣa saṁskāra dharma adharma s'abdāḥ anityaikarūpāḥ ; Anye nityānityarūpāḥ ; saṁyoga vibhāga sukha duḥkha dveṣa saṁskāra dharma adharma s'abdāḥ avyāpakāḥ; buddhi icchā prayatnāḥ ubhayarūpāḥ ; anye svās'rayavyāpakāḥ.

In the enumeration of qualities, odour, conjunction, disjunction, posteriority, priority,

pleasure, pain, aversion, impression, merit, demerit and sound—these twelve are non-eternal only (*i.e.*, never eternal). The others are either eternal or non-eternal. Conjunction, disjunction, pleasure, pain, aversion, impression, merit, demerit and sound pervade their abodes partially. Cognition, desire, volition are of both kinds; (*i.e.*, pervade partially as well as wholly). The remaining qualities pervade their abodes wholly. (50)

NOTES

Jin. explains this fully. Of these qualities the first list, smell, etc., whether they abide in eternal things as ether, etc., or in non-eternal things like binary atoms, jars and the like, are always non-eternal only and never partake of the nature of their abode. The qualities other than this first list are eternal when abiding in eternal things, and non-eternal when abiding in non-eternal things. Cognition, desire and volition when residing in individual souls like ours are non-eternal but when residing in God they are eternal. Conjunction, etc., are non-pervading as they pervade only a portion of their abode. Cognition, desire and volition are partially pervading in individual souls, while wholly pervading in God. The rest, *i.e.*, the twelve qualities beginning with colour pervade the whole of their abode.

उत्क्षेपणादयो विहितनिषिद्धोदासीनरूपाः ।

Utkṣepaṇādayo vihita niṣiddha udāsīna rupāḥ.

Upward motion and the other varieties of motion are of three forms: either prescribed, or prohibited, or indifferent (*i.e.*, neither prescribed nor prohibited). (51)

सामान्यं जातिरूपं उपाधिरूपं च । जातिः सत्ताद्रव्यगुण-कर्मत्वादि । उपाधिरूपं पाचकत्वादि ।

Sāmānyam jātirūpam upādhirūpam ca ; jātiḥ sattā dravya guṇa karmatvādi ; upādhirūpam pācakatvādi.

Generality is of two forms: generality of a class and generality which is conditional (or variable). The former is such as existence, substantiality, being a quality, an act, etc. The latter is such as being a cook, etc. (52)

NOTES

The classification of generality into jāti or genus and upādhi or condition suggests a comparison with the five predicables of formal logic. The Nyāya-Vais'eṣika concepts of

mahāsāmānya, sattāsāmānya and vis'eṣa can be equated with summum genus, proximate genus and infima species. The concept of upādhi may be equated with either proprium or accidens, preferably the latter. In the stock example, "This man is a cook," being a cook is an upādhi or variable condition, whereas manuṣyatva is jāti or genus, that is, characterising quality. Hence upādhi bears a close resemblance to accidens. Upādhi is rendered as "suggested condition" by Cowell. Its function is to restrict a too general applicability of a class notion to a limited reference. If the determining condition is removed an upādhi will become identical with jāti or generic quality. (See note on section 70.)

प्रागभावादयः प्रतियोगिभेदादनन्ता एव ।

Prāgabhāvādayaḥ pratiyogibhedād anantā eva.

The various forms of non-existence such as antecedent non-existence, etc., are innumerable being as many as there are counter-entities. (53)

NOTES

The conception of negation or non-existence is made much use of in this Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system with the special term 'pratiyogi' or counter-entity. For every possible object, the counter-entity is considered to exist and is as real as the object itself. The modern School of Logic,

Navya Nyāya, makes use of this pair of terms, pratiyogi and anuyogi. Thus a jar standing on the ground in the relation of union is called pratiyogi and the ground is the anuyogi of the relation.

मध्यत्वं परत्वापरत्वाभावः ।

Madhyatvam paratvāparatvābhāvaḥ.

Middleness is the negation of posteriority and priority. (54)

NOTES

From this section on to the 60th S'ivāditya considers several conceptions which were put forward as further substances or qualities by other schools or authors and shows how each of them could be found involved in the categories, substances and qualities listed by him. Thus madhyatva (middleness) need not be a separate quality; it is only the negation of priority and posteriority. Darkness is not a separate substance; it is only the negation of light. S'akti need not be a separate category; it is only the expression of the nature of substance. Relatedness need not be a separate category, nor attributiveness, nor commonness nor lightness.

अन्धकारोऽप्यभाव एव ।

Andhakāro'pyabhāva eva.

Darkness is only negation (*i.e.*, of light). (55)

शक्तिर्द्रव्यादिस्वरूपमेव ।

S'aktir dravyādisvarūpam eva.

Potentiality is only the nature of Substance. (56)

NOTES

The Mīmāṁsakas of the Prābhākara school recognise S'akti as a separate category. The *Das'apadārthī* of Candra adds s'akti, as'akti and sādṛs'yam as further categories. (See Textual Introduction.) S'ivāditya equates s'akti with substance.

वैशिष्ट्यं तु विशेषणविशेष्य[1]संबन्ध एव ।

Vais'iṣṭyam tu vis'eṣaṇa vis'eṣya sambandha eva.

The nature of being qualified is only the relation of attribute and attributant. (57)

NOTES

If we accept the reading tatsambandha the meaning will be: Vais'iṣṭya is nothing but Vis'eṣaṇa, Vis'eṣya and tatsambandha—all three are equally prominent with no idea of subordination. But the reading adopted omitting 'tat'

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[1] Another reading has 'tat' before 'sambandha'.

makes Vais'iṣṭya the relation between Vis'eṣaṇa and Vis'eṣya.

S'ivāditya's purpose in this section is to show that Vais'iṣṭya is not distinct from the related things and does not require to be made into another category.

ज्ञातता ज्ञानविषयसंबन्ध एव ।

Jñātatā jñānaviṣaya sambandha eva.

Being known is only the relation between knowing and its object. (58)

NOTES

A question may be asked, "Is not being known a distinct padārtha in as much as there is a difference between a jar that is known and a jar that is not?" No; because being known is only a relation between knowledge and the object of knowledge.

Here some texts omit Viṣaya. Ghate thinks that that is the better reading because S'ivāditya in a later section (176) takes up this line as jñāna-sambandha only.

सादृश्यं उपाधिरूपं सामान्यम् ।

Sādṛs'yam upādhirūpam sāmānyam.

Similarity (or Commonness) is generality characterised by a condition (but not forming a class or jāti). (59)

NOTES

Sādṛśya is a category in the *Daśapadārthi* and the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā system. Śivāditya includes it in generality and disallows the position of a separate category to it.

लघुत्वं गुरुत्वाभावः ।

Laghutvam gurutvābhāvaḥ.

Lightness is the negation of weight. (60)

NOTES

That is, it need not be added to the list of qualities.

एवं अन्यस्यापि पदार्थस्य सतोऽत्रैव अन्तर्भावः । यथा संख्याया एव गुणे ।

Evam anyasyāpi padārthasya sato'traiva antarbhāvaḥ. Yathā saṅkhyāyā eva guṇe.

In this manner anything else that can be suggested can be included in the above

mentioned; such as, for instance, number which can be included among qualities. (61)

एतेषु मध्ये नित्यानां कारणत्वमेव। अनित्यानां कारणत्वं कार्यत्वं च। तत्र समवायिकारणं असमवायिकारणं निमित्तकारणं चेति त्रिविधं कारणम्।

Eteṣu madhye nityānām kāraṇatvameva; anityānām kāraṇatvam kāryatvam ca; tatra samavāyi kāraṇam asamavāyi kāraṇam nimitta kāraṇam ceti trividham kāraṇam.

Among these, Eternals are only in the form of causes. Non-eternals can be either causes or products. Causes are of three kinds: intimate cause, non-intimate cause, and instrumental cause. (62)

NOTES

Here we have just the enumeration of causes. Definitions are given in a later section (sec. 179).

The conception of cause as analysed by the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika consists of three features:

1. Samavāyi Kāraṇam or Intimate cause. This is always a substance and is comparable to the Upādāna Kāraṇam (material cause) of the

Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. 2. Asamavāyi Kāraṇam or non-intimate cause. This is always a quality or action. 3. Nimitta Kāraṇam or Instrumental cause. The typical examples are: the threads constitute the intimate cause of cloth, the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause, and the loom, weaver, etc., are the instrumental causes. Sometimes Nimitta or Instrumental cause is subdivided into two kinds: Sādhāraṇa or general, and asādhāraṇa or special. Sādhāraṇa or general causes are common to all events. They are God, God's knowledge, God's desire, God's will, Adṛṣṭa, Time, Space and Antecedent Non-existence. The special instrumental cause is also known as karaṇa.

अपरे भेदाः स्वयमूहनीयाः ।

Apare bhedāḥ svayamūhanīyāḥ.

Other distinctions can be easily guessed. (63)

NOTES

Śivāditya claims that the list of padārthas which he has given is all-sufficing. Any other distinctions that may be suggested can be easily identified with those given.

एतेषां तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः । तत्त्वमनारोपितं रूपं । तस्य ज्ञानमनुभवः । स च श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनसाक्षात्कार-लक्षणः चतुर्विधः । निःश्रेयसं पुनस्तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पाद्यमिथ्याज्ञान-कारणप्रध्वंससमानाधिकरणतत्कार्यसमस्तदुःखाभावः ।

दुःखं तु शरीरं षडिन्द्रियाणि षड् विषयाः षड् बुद्धयः सुखं दुःखं चेति एकविंशतिप्रकारं ।

Eteṣām tattvajñānam niḥs'reyasahetuḥ; tattvamanāropitam rūpam; tasya jñānam anubhavaḥ; sa ca s'ravaṇa manana nididhyāsana sākṣātkāra lakṣaṇas' caturvidhaḥ; niḥs'reyasam punas tattvajñānotpādya mithyā jñāna kāraṇa pradhvaṁsa samānādhikaraṇa tatkārya samasta duḥkhābhāvaḥ.

Duḥkam tu s'arīram ṣaḍ indriyāṇi ṣaḍ viṣayāḥ ṣaḍ buddhayaḥ sukham, duḥkham ceti ekaviṁs'ati prakāram.

A knowledge of the reality of these is the cause of final beatitude. Reality is the nature of a thing as it is without having anything superimposed upon it. Right knowledge of that is direct apprehension. It is characterised by a fourfold nature: attentive hearing, ratiocination, contemplation and direct realisation. As for final beatitude, it is the negation of all pains brought about by erroneous knowledge, coexisting with the extinction of erroneous knowledge which is their cause, this

extinction being produced by right knowledge.

Pain is of 21 kinds: the body, six sense-organs, six objects of sense, six corresponding cognitions, pleasure and pain. (64)

NOTES

The aim of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika is explained here. It is called apavarga, niḥs'reyasa. It is to be attained by achieving tattva-jñāna. Tattva-jñāna is knowledge of things as they are in their true nature. Knowledge of Truth is attained by the fourfold method of attentive hearing, ratiocination, contemplation and lastly, direct realisation. This Niḥs'reyasa is negatively conceived of as the extinction of all pain. Pain itself is due to erroneous knowledge. When erroneous knowledge is corrected by vision of truth, no more pain is generated. Realisation of truth leads directly to apavarga.

It will be useful to compare with this section, sūtra I, 1, 4 of the *Vais'eṣika Sūtras*. Practically the present section is only an elaboration of that sūtra. Nyāya sūtra I, 29 also explains the same aim.

Ghate expresses this as follows: Right knowledge of padārthas and their distinct nature is necessary for the right knowledge of self. This extinguishes false knowledge. When false knowledge is gone, no passions can be produced. Freedom from passion makes activity or volition needless. Activity ceasing, merit and

demerit are not accumulated. So, no birth or misery. That means salvation. (S. P. G., p. 25.)

The catalogue of 21 kinds of pain suggests Sāṅkhya influence. The twenty-one kinds of pain are explained in the Nyāya-Vārtika as follows: Of these the body is regarded as pain because it is the abode of all painful experiences; the sense-organs, the objects and cognitions are so regarded because they constitute the agency through which painful experiences come; pleasure is regarded as pain because it is always accompanied by certain sources of pain [(1) the fact that man has not full control over the means whereby pleasure is attained, (2) the transient character of the pleasure, (3) the desire or hankering one feels towards the pleasure], and pain is so regarded by its very nature.

LAKṢAṆA KHAṆḌA

DEFINITIONS

इदानीं लक्षणाधीनत्वात् तत्त्वज्ञानस्य लक्षणमेवोच्यते। तत्र केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुविशेषो लक्षणम्। प्रयोगस्तु लक्षणमितरेभ्यो भिद्यते केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतुविशेषवचनत्वात्। यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते तत् केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतुविशेषवचनमपि न भवति यथा धूमवत्त्वम्। तथा चेदं केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतुविशेषवचनं न भवतीति न। तस्मादितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते इति न, किंतु भिद्यत एव। एवं सर्वत्र लक्षणे प्रयोगो द्रष्टव्यः।

Idānīm lakṣaṇādhīnatvāt tattvajñānasya lakṣaṇam evocyate; tatra kevalavyatirekī hetu vis'eṣo lakṣaṇam; prayogas tu lakṣaṇam itarebhyo bhidyate kevalavyatirekihetuvis'eṣa vacanatvāt; yad itarebhyo na bhidyate tat kevalavyatirekihetuvis'eṣa vacanam api na bhavati yathā dhūmavattvam; tathā ce'dam kevalavyatirekihetuvis'eṣavacanam na bhavatīti na; tasmād itarebhyo na bhidyate iti na, kintu bhidyata eva. Evam sarvatra lakṣaṇe prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ.

As Right Knowledge depends on correct definition, hereafter definitions are going to be given. A definition is characterised by the possession of a mark which has negative concomitance only. The application of a definition is as follows:

A definition is in the form of a differentiation of an object defined from everything else.

Because it is distinguished by a mark which has negative concomitance only.

Wherever there is no differentiation made from everything else, we cannot have the statement which is characterised by negative

concomitance only; as for example in the case of smokiness.

Thus we cannot say that the statement which is characterised by negative concomitance only is not possible.

Therefore we cannot say that there is absence of differentiation from everything else.

Thus there is differentiation. In every definition that is given this application can be seen. (65)

NOTES

(For a discussion of the nature of definition see Introduction, sec. XVI.)

The author has finished the enumeration and now begins the second section of the book on 'Definitions' very appropriately with a definition of definition itself. He shows how a definition is a differentiation from everything else. The application is exhibited in the form of a five membered syllogism. The argument is of the kevala vyatirekī (purely negative concomitance) type. The special feature of this is that no similar instance can be given. The illustration given in the third member, yathā dhūmavattvam, can be explained as follows: Since the inference is of the purely negative type, it can have only a negative example. The thesis to be maintained is that a definition is a differentiation from everything else. Here any alakṣaṇa or non-definition

can be the dissimilar instance. As one example of non-definition dhūmavattvam, smokiness, can be taken.

Hereafter follows a series of definitions. It will be noticed in almost all cases the definition is verbal. In pursuit of absolute accuracy, this system invents a 'jāti' or generality for everything that has to be defined and defines a thing as possessing the generality of its quality. The negative concomitance which Śivāditya calls the feature of definition is seen in this sort of definition, because possessing the generality of its quality excludes all other objects from the definition. Though in several cases alternative definitions are given, the uniform method is to define an object in terms of its generality to secure exclusion of other things.

It will thus be seen that the function of definition in this system is a specialised and narrow one. The enumeration of the essential characteristics which is observed in European Logic is absent here.

तत्र पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणं कृतमेव ।

Tatra padārtha sāmānya lakṣaṇam kṛtam eva.

Of definitions, the definition of padārthas (categories) in general has already been given. (66)

NOTES

In section 2, padārtha has been defined as object of right cognition. Śivāditya here refrains

from giving a definition possessing differentiating feature. The main reason is that there is nothing outside padārthas from which they could be differentiated.

द्रव्यं तु द्रव्यत्वसामान्ययोगि गुणवत्समवायिकारणं चेति ।

Dravyam tu dravyatva sāmānyayogi guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam ceti.

A substance is (to be defined as) that which has inherent with it the generality of its nature (substanceness) and that which has qualities in intimate union with it or that which is an inherent cause. (67)

NOTES

Three alternative definitions are given : of which the first is the typical one and fulfils the requirement of definition as given in the previous section. The second one, *viz.*, having qualities inherent in it, shows how substances are necessary as the substrates of qualities. The third definition shows how substance alone can be the intimate cause of everything else. All products come into being only in intimate relation with substance.

गुणस्तु गुणत्वजातियोगि जातिमत्त्वे सति अचलनात्मकत्वे सति समवायिकारणरहितश्चेति ।

Guṇas tu guṇatvajātiyogi jātimattve sati acalanātmakatve sati samavāyikāraṇa rahitaś ceti.

Quality is (to be defined as) that which has the generality of quality inherent in it, and which is not of the nature of motion while possessing a generality and cannot be an intimate cause. (68)

NOTES

Guṇa or quality is an attribute depending on substance, distinct from the other attribute of substance, namely, motion, different from substance by not being an intimate cause.

Guṇa in as much as it possesses the genus of quality excludes the other categories, Generality, Particularity, Inherence and Non-existence.

Other syncretist manuals like the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Bhaṣā-Pariccheda* give further definitions of guṇa : Since jāti or genus can abide only in three categories, Dravya, Guna and Karma, one easy definition for quality is: "Dravya karma bhinnatve sati sāmānyavān" which means, 'that which possesses generality but (is different from) is other than Substance and Action'. (*Tarka-Dīpikā.*) *Bhūṣa Pariccheda* has as follows : 'Dravyāśritā jñeyā nirguṇā niṣkriyā guṇāḥ,' *i.e.*, Guṇas reside in Substance but are themselves devoid of attributes and motions.

कर्म कर्मत्वजातियोगि आद्यसंयोगविभागयोरसमवायिकारणं चेति ।

Karma karmatvajātiyogi ādya saṁyoga-vibhāgayorasamavāyi kāraṇam ceti.

Action (or Motion) has the generality of motion inherent in it and is the non-intimate cause of the first conjunction and disjunction. (69)

NOTES

According to the *Tarka-Dīpikā*, Motion is the non-intimate cause of conjunction but is not itself a conjunction. Kaṇāda says "Action inheres in substance, but is not a quality and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction."

In the definition as given in the text, the word 'ādya,' *i.e.*, first is used because, excepting the first conjunction, other conjunctions can have as their non-intimate cause another conjunction.

सामान्यं नित्यमेकमनेकसमवेतं च ।

Sāmānyam nityam ekam anekasamavetam ca.

Generality is that which is one and eternal and is in intimate relation with many. (70)

NOTES

The terms of this definition are carefully chosen in order to exclude categories and relations

which possess some of its features. Thus the word 'nitya' (eternal), is used to exclude conjunction, disjunction, severalty, the product, etc., which are in intimate relation but are not eternal like 'Sāmānya'. The word 'aneka' (many) is used to exclude a substance like the sky which is also eternal and in intimate relation but is one only. The word 'samaveta' (inherent) is used to exclude absolute negation which is eternal, and resides in many but not in inherent relation. The word 'eka' (one) is used to exclude Viśeṣa which is also eternal and in intimate relation but many. (See T. S. B., p. 89.)

It is necessary to note the various differences between Sāmānya and Viśeṣa, the relation between jāti and upādhi. Already in section 52, this matter was dealt with to a certain extent.

The words generality and genus bear close resemblance to Sāmānya. But while the usage in European logic makes the word genus comprehend the individuals also, Sāmānya implies the common characteristic which is the basis of the class grouping. As Kaṇāda in his Sūtra (V. S., I., 2, 3) has it, the notion of generality depends on the operation of the intellect. The word jāti is used to indicate both the category Generality (*i.e.*, Sāmānya) and also the group of objects that form a class.

A quality becomes Sāmānya when conceived of as residing in many, while the same can be regarded as Viśeṣa if it is taken as a differentiating peculiarity marking off one individual thing

from another. An attribute inhering in an object is a Vis'eṣa when used to mark it, the same attribute becomes Sāmānya when it is conceived by the mind as the basis of a class grouping.

In section 52 S'ivāditya makes jāti and upādhi two subdivisions of Sāmānya. But ordinarily jāti is used as synonymous with Sāmānya and upādhi is the characteristic which has been prevented from becoming jāti. Upādhi too belongs to several individuals but fails to constitute the basis of a class owing to a certain deficiency. This deficiency is analysed by Udayaṇa to consist of six conditions, any one of which vitiates the formation of a jāti (see section 174).

विशेषस्तु सामान्यरहित एकव्यक्तिवृत्तिः ।

Vis'eṣas tu sāmānya rahita ekavyakti vṛttiḥ.

Particularity is devoid of generality and is found in only one abode (*i.e.*, abiding in intimate relation with one thing only). (71)

NOTES

Here again 'devoid of generality' is used to differentiate Vis'eṣa from Dravya, Guṇa and Karma all of which have generality. 'Ekavyaktivṛttiḥ' is used to exclude Sāmānya, Samavāya and Abhāva. Annambhaṭṭa defines Vis'eṣa as a quality residing in eternal substances and serving to differentiate them from each other. The eternal

substances in which Vis'eṣas inhere are the atoms of the first four substances, earth, water, light and air, and also the five other substances.

The doctrine of Vis'eṣa is necessary in this system to account for the distinctive character of each of the substances, and the atoms. This doctrine is put forward by Pras'astapāda. It has been much criticised by later Naiyāyikas on the ground that the atoms themselves can be assumed to possess inherent distinctiveness and the conception of Vis'eṣa as a category can be renounced.

नित्यसंबन्धः समवायः ।

Nitya sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ.

Inherence is an eternal relationship (or connection). (72)

NOTES

The word 'nitya' is used to exclude Saṁyoga or Conjunction which is also a relationship, but not eternal. The word 'Sambandha' is used to exclude all other eternal things.

The *Tarka-Saṅgraha* defines inherence as a permanent connexion existing between two things that are always found inseparable. The permanent connexion makes it different from conjunction which is a quality and non-eternal while inherence is a category and eternal.

The following pairs of things have inherence: a whole and its parts; a quality and the qualified; motion and moving object; individual and the common characteristic; particularity and eternal substance in which it inheres.

According to the Vais'eṣikas, Samavāya is not perceived but only inferred.

प्रतियोगिज्ञानाधीनज्ञानोऽभावः ।

Pratiyogi jñānādhīnajñāno'bhāvaḥ.

Non-existence (or Negation) is that cognition which depends upon the conception of a counter-entity. (73)

NOTES

Non-existence or Negation is that which necessarily depends upon the conception of its counter-entity. It is the opposite of negation. Thus the pratiyogi of 'ghaṭābhāva' (non-existence of a pot) is the ghaṭa (pot) itself; we cannot cognise the 'non-existence of the pot' without thinking of the pot. (See sections 10 and 53.)

Having defined the categories, the author now proceeds to deal with the definition of the subdivisions of each of the categories in order. He takes up the subdivisions of Dravya or Substance.

पृथिवीत्व सामान्यवती गन्धवती च पृथिवी ।

Pṛthivītva sāmānyavatī gandhavatī ca pṛthivī.

Earth is in intimate union with its generality (Earthness) and is that which has odour. (74)

NOTES

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, odour is the differentiating quality of Earthy substance, possessed by no other substance. If it is objected that a stone has no smell, the reply is that the smell is there but is imperceptible and can be perceived when the stone is burnt to ashes. If it is pointed out that water and air have smell, the reply is that it is due to the presence of earthy particles mixed in water and air.

अप्त्वजातिमत्यः शीतस्पर्शवत्य आपः ।

Aptva jātimatyaḥ śītasparśavatya āpaḥ.

Water is that which has cool touch and is in intimate union with its genus. (75)

NOTES

Cool-touch is the differentiating feature of water. If a slab of marble feels cool it is due to the presence of particles of water, if hot water is hot, it is due to the presence of light (heat).

Thus the Naiyāyikas explain away any objection.

तेजस्त्वजातियोगि उष्णस्पर्शवत्तेजः ।

Tejastva jātiyogi uṣṇaspars'avat tejaḥ.

Light is that which has hot touch and is in intimate relation with its genus. (76)

वायुत्वजातियोगि अरूपस्पर्शवान् वायुः ।

Vāyutva jātiyogi arūpaspars'avān vāyuḥ.

Air is that which is in intimate union with its genus, which has touch but no colour. (77)

NOTES

Having no colour and having touch are the characteristics that pertain to air. Ether, Time, Space and Soul are colourless but are without touch. Earth, Water and Light have touch and colour. The only substance combining in itself possession of touch and colourlessness is Air.

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् ।

S'abda guṇam ākās'am.

Ether is that which has the quality of sound. (78)

NOTES

The word quality in the definition emphasises the fact that sound is a quality and not a substance as some other systems maintain. It is the specific, characterising, differentiating quality of Ether. It is a quality possessed by no other substance. S. D. S. defines Ether as the seat of that particularity which coexists with a special quality (*viz.*, Sound) that is created but not produced from conjunction. The quality of sound is proved to belong to Ether by a disjunctive reasoning, by showing that no other substance is capable of having it as its distinguishing quality as follows:

Sound must abide in some substance as it is a quality. This abode cannot be Earth, Air, Water or Light because the specific qualities of these four agree in having three common features: having the similar quality of a causal substance as their antecedent; being produced by contact with fire; and being perceptible. Sound has only the third qualification and hence cannot be the distinguishing feature of these four substances. Nor can it be Space, Time or Mind, because sound is a specific quality, while these three have no specific qualities. Nor can it abide in the Soul, because it is perceptible by external senses, while the properties of the Soul are not. Therefore it must abide in Ether.

आदित्यपरिवर्तनोत्पाद्य परत्वापरत्वासमवायिकारणाधारः परत्वापरत्वानधिकरणं कालः ।

Āditya parivartanotpādya paratvāparatva asamavāyikāraṇādhāraḥ paratvāparatva anadhikaraṇam kālaḥ.

Time is that substance which is the abode of the non-intimate cause of posteriority and priority produced by the motion of the sun and which is not at the same time an abode of the posteriority and priority themselves. (79)

NOTES

The *Tarka Saṅgraha* defines Time as the special cause of notions like the past, etc. But Śivāditya's is elaborate and more significant. Pad. points out the merits of the definition as follows: the phrase 'non-intimate cause' is used to exclude Soul which is also the cause of the notions of priority and posteriority; the phrase 'not being the abode of posteriority and priority' is used to prevent overlapping with Quality; the phrase 'produced by the motion of the sun' is introduced to exclude Space.

आदित्यसंयोगानुत्पाद्य परत्वापरत्वासमवायिकारणाधारः परत्वापरत्वानधिकरणं दिक् ।

Āditya saṁyogānutpādya paratvāparatvāsamavāyi kāraṇādhāraḥ paratvāparatvānadhikaraṇam dik.

Space is that which is an abode of the non-intimate cause of posteriority and priority, but

which is not produced by the movements of the sun and which is not an abode of posteriority and priority. (80)

NOTES

The special significance of the various expressions here is as above.

B. P. defines Space as the cause of the notions of far and near. S. D. S. defines Space as that which, not being Time, is co-extensive and is devoid of any special quality. The distinction between Time and Space can be put thus: Time is the cause of the usage with reference to now and before; Space is the cause of usage with reference to near and far.

The special condition which diversifies Time is production or any kind of action while in the case of Space it is contact with corporeal objects.

It is noteworthy that in the definitions of Time, Space and Ether, no term indicative of jāti or class is used. It is due to the fact that in these three cases no genus is possible; they are each one only. For, the conception of genus involves a plurality of objects.

आत्मत्वसामान्यवान् बुद्धिगुण आत्मा ।

Ātmatva sāmānyavān buddhiguṇa ātmā,

Soul has self-hood as its generality, *i.e.*, is in intimate relation with its own generality, and is the substance characterised by the quality of cognition. (81)

NOTES

The existence of the soul is inferred from the fact that there must be some substance in which cognition resides. It cannot abide in any of the other eight substances. Therefore a ninth substance must be admitted as the abode of qualities like buddhi, icchā, sukha, duḥkha, etc. Also the existence of organs of sense and their appropriate objects implies a distinct knower who can use them.

In this connection the distinction between the soul and body is also clear. Though the body undergoes change as the various stages of childhood, youth, old age pass by, the soul remains the same. The soul is all-pervading capable of experiencing the feelings in several parts of the body at the same time, while the mind is atomic and capable of one experience only at a time. According to the Vais'eṣika conception cognition arises as follows: the soul is first conjoined with the mind, the mind with the sense-organ, and the sense-organ with the object.

मनस्त्वजातियोगि स्पर्शशून्यं क्रियाधिकरणं मनः ।

Manastvajātiyogi spars'as'ūnyam kriyādhi—
karaṇam manaḥ.

Mind is the abode of activity devoid of touch and is in intimate relation with the generality of its own nature. (82)

NOTES

Pad. 'Void of touch' is put in to exclude all tangible things like a jar, etc.; 'abode of activity' excludes all intangible things like ether; *i.e.*, without touch, with activity, covered by the genus of mindness and possessing a class—this is the definition of Mind.

Mind is conceived by this system as a sense-organ but internal. It is the instrument of the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc. Activity is said to abide in the Mind, because the other four incorporeal substances—Space, Time, Ether and Soul—being all-pervading can have no motion, while Mind alone of incorporeal substances has a limited dimension and hence can act. Mind being intangible is inferred.

Kaṇāda's proof of the Mind is the fact that knowledge is produced or not according as there exists or not the conjunction of Mind with Soul, sense-organs and objects. Gautama's proof: Non-simultaneous origin of cognition is the sign of Mind.

The existence of the Mind is absolutely necessary for the Naiyāyika theory of perception. No sense-organ can produce perception unless the Mind acts as a mediating link between it and the Soul. If Mind is not admitted we must get a simultaneous cognition of all perceptions through all organs as the Soul is all pervading. But that does not happen. So the Mind has to be admitted.

One interesting theory in connection with the Mind is the conception that the Mind goes

into a fleshy hiding place called ' Purītat ' (identified by some with the pericardium), when the individual is in sleep. That is supposed to account for the absence of mental activity in deep sleep.

Having now defined all the nine substances, S'ivāditya next proceeds to define all the qualities one by one :

रूपत्वजातिमच्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् ।

Rūpatvajātimac cakṣurmātragrāhyo guṇo rūpam.

Colour is that quality which can be perceived only by the eye and which possesses the generality of colour. (83)

NOTES

Colour of all the seven kinds abides in Earth ; only white abides in Water, and Light ; brilliant white in the latter, mild in the former.

S'aṅkara Mis'ra prescribes four necessary conditions for the perception of colour : magnitude, light, not being overpowered by a stronger light and the property of colour.

रसत्वजातियोगी रसनग्राह्यो गुणो रसः ।

Rasatvajātiyogī rasanagrāhyo guṇo rasaḥ.

Taste is that quality which is apprehended by the organ of taste and which is in intimate relation with the generality of taste. (84)

गन्धत्वजातियोगी घ्राणग्राह्यो गुणो गन्धः ।

Gandhatvajātiyogī ghrāṇagrāhyo guṇo gandhaḥ.

Odour is that quality which is apprehended by the organ of smell and which is in intimate relation with the generality of odour. (85)

NOTES

In this and the immediately preceding one the word 'mātra' (only) is not needed as there is no possibility of these two qualities being perceived by any other sense-organs.

स्पर्शत्वजातियोगी स्पर्शनमात्रग्राह्यो गुणः स्पर्शः ।

Spars'atvajātiyogī spars'anamātragrāhyo guṇaḥ spars'aḥ.

Touch is that quality which is apprehended only by the organ of touch and which is in intimate relation with the generality of touch. (86)

NOTES

'Mātra' (only) is used in this definition to exclude Number which is also apprehended by the sense of touch in addition to other sense-organs.

संख्यात्वसामान्यवती गणनासाधारणकारणं संख्या ।

Saṅkhyātva sāmānyavatī gaṇanāsādhāraṇa-kāraṇam saṅkhyā.

Number is the special cause of counting and is in intimate relation with the generality of number. (87)

NOTES

The term 'asādhāraṇa kāraṇa' is used to exclude 'sādhāraṇa kāraṇa' or general causes which are Time, Space, Adṛṣṭa, God, etc.

"Number is the first of the ten qualities enumerated together here which reside in all substances. They pertain to substance in general and not to any particular kind of substance and hence they cannot be special characteristics which distinguish one substance from another. All these qualities connote an aspect or state of a thing and not any attribute inherent in the thing itself. They are notional rather than material. They are 'aropita' . . . Number is a subjective property." (T. S. B., p. 160.)

The number one is eternal in eternal things and non-eternal in products, while duality and the rest are only non-eternal as they are made up by counting of units.

परिमाणत्वजातियोगि मानव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं परिमाणम् ।

Parimāṇatvajātiyogi mānavyavahārāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam parimāṇam.

Dimension is the special cause of the common usage of measurement and is in intimate relation with the generality of its class. (88)

पृथक्त्वजातियोगि पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणकारणं पृथक्त्वम् ।

Pṛthaktvajātiyogi pṛthakvyavahārāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam pṛthaktvam.

Severalty is the special cause of differentiation (of one thing from another) and is in intimate relation with the generality of severalty. (89)

NOTES

Some texts adopt the reading 'pṛthak *tvatva*'. This is involved in the meaning; it means the quality of being severalty.

B. P. understands by severalty the cause of separating one thing from all the rest, the determination of the identity of one thing by separating it from all others.

Severalty has to be carefully distinguished from mutual negation. When we say A is different from B, we certainly imply that A is a certain person. But in mutual negation there is denial of sameness of nature. This is as much as to say, severalty is a material distinction while mutual negation is notional.

संयोगत्वसामान्यवान् अनित्यः संबन्धः संयोगः ।

Saṁyogatva sāmānyavān anityaḥ sambandhaḥ saṁyogaḥ.

Conjunction is a non-eternal relation and possesses the generality of its quality. (90)

NOTES

See Section 29.

विभागत्वसामान्यवान् विभक्तप्रत्ययासाधारणकारणं विभागः ।

Vibhāgatva sāmānyavān vibhakta pratyayāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam vibhāgaḥ.

Disjunction possesses the generality of its property and is the special cause of the separation (of two things joined together). (91)

NOTES

Disjunction should not be taken as the negation of conjunction, for then its place would be in 'abhāva'. "It denotes an actual separation which produces the destruction of a previous contact. Further Disjunction denotes not the act of separating which will be a kṛya (act) but the state which results from the act of separation" (T. S. B.)

परत्वत्वसामान्यवत् परव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं परत्वम् । अपरत्वत्वसामान्ययोग्यपरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं अपरत्वम् ।

Paratvatva sāmānyavat paravyavahārāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam paratvam. Aparatvatvasāmānyayogy aparavyavahārāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam aparatvam.

Posteriority possesses the generality of its own property and is the special cause of the common usage of (the word) posterior. Priority is in intimate relation with the generality of its own nature and is the special cause of the common usage of (the word) prior. (92)

NOTES

These notions of posteriority and priority are "nothing more than relations of corporeal things

to time and space expressed in the form of qualities for the purpose of marking their varying degrees". (Athalye).

बुद्धित्वसामान्यवती आत्माश्रयः प्रकाशो बुद्धिः ।

Buddhitva sāmānyavatī ātmās'rayaḥ prakās'o buddhiḥ.

Cognition possessing the generality of its own nature is the light abiding in the Soul. (93)

NOTES

In this definition, the word 'ātmās'raya,' abiding in the soul, is used to exclude the light of the sun, lamp, etc., as these also are lights. The word light, prakās'a, is used to exclude the other qualities of soul like desire, pleasure, etc., because they too reside in the soul.

Jin. explains 'light abiding in the soul' as follows: cognition is of the nature of light because it dispels the darkness of ignorance and illuminates all objects to the mind's eye.

(See Section 139.)

सुखत्वसामान्यवत् निरुपाध्यनुकूलवेद्यं सुखम् ।

Sukhatvasāmānyavan nirupādhy anukūla-vedyam sukham.

Pleasure possesses the generality of its nature and is felt as agreeable without any qualification. (94)

NOTES

The qualification is put in to emphasise that pleasure must be felt desirable for its own sake and not as due to its being a means to some other end. Being an experience of the soul it is subjective. The Sāṅkhyās, however, regard Pleasure and Pain as attributes possessed by things ; which is certainly not so philosophical a view. The *Tarka-Dīpikā* defines Pleasure as the agreeable feeling that arises in the individual experience of each person and is expressed by such terms as, "I am happy" and the like.

दुःखत्वसामान्यवन् निरुपाधि प्रतिकूलवेद्यं दुःखम् ।

Duḥkhatvasāmānyavan nirupādhi pratikūlavedyam duḥkham.

Pain possesses the generality of its own nature, and is felt as disagreeable without any qualification. (95)

इच्छात्वसामान्यवती अर्थित्वलक्षणेच्छा ।

Icchātva sāmānyavatī arthitva lakṣaṇā icchā

Desire is characterised by the yearning for an object and possesses the generality of its nature. (96)

NOTES

Pad. That quality the virtue of which is usually attributed in common usage to one while desiring or wishing for something is called Desire.

द्वेषत्वजातिमान् प्रज्वलनात्मकः द्वेषः ।

Dveṣatvajātimān prajvalanātmakaḥ dveṣaḥ.

Hatred shows its nature in blazing up and possesses the generality of its nature. (97)

NOTES

S'ivāditya uses rather an apt simile to define anger as the blaze of a flame.

प्रयत्नत्वसामान्यवान् प्रयत्नव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं प्रयत्नः ।

Prayatnatva sāmānyavān prayatnavya-vahārāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam prayatnaḥ.

Volition possesses the generality of its nature and is the special cause of the empirical forms of volition. (98)

NOTES

Volition is an attribute of the soul, to be carefully differentiated from the external act. It denotes the internal activity which is the cause of the act; characterised by such mental effort as its attribute, it excludes the act itself.

P. D. S. defines it as the cause of the activity which is able to acquire what is desirable or avoid what is undesirable and is not the activity itself.

गुरुत्वत्वजातिमत् एकवृत्ति आद्यपतन असमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वम् ।

Gurutvatva jātimat ekavṛtti ādyapatana asamavāyi kāraṇam gurutvam.

Gravity possesses the quality of its genus and is the non-intimate cause of the first act of falling and abides in one thing only. (99)

NOTES

Pad. gives another reading 'Ekavṛtti patanāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam gurutvam'.

In the definition given in the text the word 'ādya,' (first) is used to exclude velocity which is the cause of subsequent acts of falling; the word 'ekavṛtti' (abiding in one thing) is used to exclude Saṁyoga and Vibhāga which, though they may produce the first act of falling, require two things.

द्रवत्वत्वजातिमत् एकवृत्ति आद्यस्यन्दन असमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वम् ।

Dravatvatva jātimat ekavṛtti ādyasyandana asamavāyi kāraṇam dravatvam.

Fluidity possesses the generality of its nature and is the non-intimate cause of the first flow and resides in one thing only. (100)

स्नेहत्वसामान्यवान् द्रवत्वत्वशून्यः संग्रहासाधारणकारणं स्नेहः ।

Snehatva sāmānyavān dravatvatva s'ūnyaḥ saṅgrahāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam snehaḥ.

Viscidity possesses the generality of its nature and is the special cause of the agglutination of particles and does not possess the quality of fluidity. (101)

संस्कारत्वजातिमान् स्वोत्पत्त्यवस्थापादको गुणः संस्कारः ।

Saṁskāratvajātimān svotpattyavasthāpādako guṇah saṁskāraḥ.

Predisposition possesses the generality of its nature and is that quality which produces

in its abode the condition in which it was at its production (or which is capable of bringing about the condition which it had when it originally arose). (102)

NOTES

(See Section 46.)

The *Tārkika-Rakṣā* defines impression as a force which produces effects exactly similar to itself by some internal power, and without external agency.

The three varieties of Saṁskāra are 'Vega' (Velocity), Impression, and Inertia. The reason for their being grouped together is that in each case there is a predisposition left by the first activity which facilitates a further action. Of these three Velocity resides in Earth, Water, Air, Light and Mind ; that is, all the substances having a limited dimension. 'Bhāvanā' impression relates to cognition only and hence pertains to the Soul. Inertia belongs to Earth.

धर्मत्वसामान्यवान् सुखासाधारणकारणं धर्मः ।

Dharmatvasāmānyavān sukhāsādhāraṇa-kāraṇam dharmaḥ.

Merit possesses the generality of its nature and is the special instrumental cause of pleasure. (103)

NOTES

(See Section 48.)

Merit arises as the result of performing actions which are enjoined by the Vedas. It is popularly spoken of as ‘puṇya’.

अधर्मत्वसामान्यवान् दुःखासाधारणकारणमधर्मः ।

Adharmatva sāmānyavān duḥkhāsādhāraṇa kāraṇam adharmaḥ.

Demerit possesses the generality of its nature, and is the special instrumental cause of pain. (104)

NOTES

Demerit arises as the result of performing prohibited actions.

शब्दत्वसामान्ययोगी श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः ।

S'abdatvasāmānyayogī s'rotragrāhyo guṇaḥ s'abdaḥ.

Sound is that which is in union with the generality of its nature and is that which is apprehended by the organ of hearing. (105)

Having defined all the 24 qualities, the author proceeds to define the five kinds of action.

उत्क्षेपणत्वजातिमत् ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगकारणं कर्मोत्क्षेपणम् ।

Utkṣepaṇatva jātimat ūrdhvades'a saṁyoga kāraṇam karmotkṣepaṇam.

Motion upwards possesses the genus of its nature and is the action which causes contact with the upper region. (106)

अपक्षेपणत्वजातिमत् अधोदेशसंयोगकारणं कर्मापक्षेपणम् ।

Apakṣepaṇatvajātimat adhodes'asaṁyoga kāraṇam karmāpakṣepaṇam.

Motion downwards possessing the genus of its nature is the action which produces contact with the downward region. (107)

आकुञ्चनत्वजातिमत् वक्रत्वापादकं कर्म आकुञ्चनम् ।

Ākuñcanatvajātimat vakratvāpādakam karma ākuñcanam.

Contraction (or motion towards oneself) possesses the genus of its nature and is the action which causes retrograde motion. (108)

प्रसारणत्वजातिमत् ऋजुत्वापादकं कर्म प्रसारणम् ।

Prasāraṇatvajātimat ṛjutvāpādākam karma prasāraṇam.

Expansion possesses the genus of its nature and is the action which brings about motion in a straight direction. (109)

गमनत्वजातिमत् अनियतदेशसंयोगकारणं कर्म गमनम् ।

Gamanatvajātimat aniyatades'a saṁyoga kāraṇam karma gamanam.

Motion in general, possessing the genus of its nature, is the action which causes contact with any region indefinitely. (110)

Now the author proceeds to define Generality.

व्यापकमात्रं सामान्यं परम् । व्याप्यमात्रं सामान्यं अपरम् । व्याप्यव्यापकोभयरूपं सामान्यं परापरम् ।

Vyāpakamātram sāmānyam param; vyapyamātram sāmānyam aparam; vyāpyavyāpakobhayarūpam sāmānyam parāparam.

Widest generality is that which only pervades other things (but is never pervaded); narrowest generality is that which is pervaded only (but never pervades other things); middle (or intermediate) generality is that which partakes of the nature of both pervader and pervaded. (111)

NOTES

See Sections 7, 52 and 70.

Widest generality is exactly equivalent to the Summum Genus of the 'Tree of Porphyry' familiar to students of European Deductive Logic. Narrowest generality is comparable to Infima Species. Intermediate generality is exactly like Proximate Genus.

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः ।

Anādiḥ sāntaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ.

Antecedent non-existence is that which has no beginning but is capable of an end. (112)

NOTES

Antecedent non-existence refers to the negation of a thing before its coming into existence, and it is destroyed when its counter-entity is produced. Antecedent non-existence can also be regarded as one of the causes producing a thing.

It is included in the eight general causes of all things: God, His knowledge, His desire, His action, Adṛṣṭa (merit and demerit), Time, Space and Antecedent Non-existence.

सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसाभावः ।

Sādiranantaḥ pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ.

Consequent non-existence (*i.e.*, non-existence due to destruction) has a beginning but no end. (113)

अनादिरनन्तः संसर्गाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावः ।

Anādiranantaḥ saṁsargābhāvo'tyantābhāvaḥ.

Absolute non-existence is relational non-existence and is beginningless and endless. (114)

NOTES

The four kinds of non-existence are re-grouped into two kinds :

(1) Saṁsargābhāva or negation by relation.
(2) Anyonyābhāva or negation of identity.

The 1st is again divided into Prāgabhāva, Pradhvaṁsābhāva and Atyantābhāva. Though Śivāditya mentions saṁsargābhāva in connection with atyantābhāva only, really it includes the three.

As Ghate puts it, the distinction between saṁsargābhāva and anyonyābhāva is that in the former the counter-entity is characterised by some connection like conjunction or inherence, while in anyonyābhāva, the counter-entity is characterised by identity.

तादात्म्यनिषेधोऽन्योन्याभावः ।

Tādātmya niṣedho anyonyābhāvaḥ.

Reciprocal non-existence is denial of identity. (115)

NOTES

See Section 114.

Having defined the Categories in full Śivāditya proceeds to their examination.

PARĪKṢĀ KHAṆḌA

SUBDIVISION AND EXAMINATION

नित्यत्वं प्रध्वंसविरहः ।

Nityatvam pradhvaṁsa virahaḥ.

Eternity is being without destruction. (116)

NOTES

Other definitions of Eternity are: a thing is called eternal of which we cannot predicate

antecedent negation or consequent negation; or eternal is that which is without the relation of past, present and future.

अनित्यत्वं प्रध्वंसवत्त्वम् ।

Anityatvam pradhvaṁsavattvam.

Non-eternity is liability to destruction. (117)

निरवयवः क्रियावान् परमाणुः ।

Niravayavaḥ kriyāvān paramāṇuḥ.

An atom is that which is without parts and is active. (118)

NOTES

Pad. defines an atom as that which is not a product and is possessed of action in intimate relation. The term 'niravayavaḥ' (being without parts) is used to differentiate an atom from binaries and all produced things. The term 'kriyāvān' (possessed of action) is used to distinguish the atom from Ether and the like which are also without parts, but do not possess action. It is suggested by Pad. that 'samavāyi sambandhena' (by intimate relation) has to be assumed before 'possessed of action' in order to exclude Space and Time which are without parts and possessed of action but general abodes of everything.

द्रव्यसमवायिकारणमवयवः ।

Dravya samavāyi kāraṇam avayavaḥ.

Part is that which is the inherent cause of substance. (119)

NOTES

The relation between part and whole is according to the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika an instance of Inherence.

प्रागभाववत्कार्यम् ।

Prāgabhāvavat kāryam.

A product is one that has antecedent non-existence. (120)

NOTES

Pad· defines effect as the counter-entity of antecedent negation.

The definition of effect given in the text brings us to the special Nyāya-Vais'eṣika theory of causation known as Asatkāryavāda ; *i.e.*, the theory that the effect is non-existent before production and is quite distinct from its cause. This theory along with the doctrine of Inherence (Samavāya) involved in it constitutes the corner-stone of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika realism. In the history of philosophical development in India a

battle royal has been waged time after time between this Naiyāyika theory of the non-existence of the effect before production and the Sāṁkhya theory of the co-existence of the effect with the cause and the Vedānta theory of the reality of the cause and unreality of the effect, and the Bauddha theory that an effect is produced from an unreal cause. Athalye summarises the criticism against the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika theory by saying that if the effect is totally distinct from the cause there can be found no determining principle to establish the relation of causality between two things and it will amount to saying that the effect is produced from nothing. The reply is that unless the effect is supposed to be quite distinct from the cause we cannot account for the obvious difference between the two. The whole metaphysical realism of Nyāya Vais'eṣika depends on this doctrine of causation.

द्रव्यानारम्भकं कार्यद्रव्यमन्त्यावयवि ।

Dravyānārambhakam kāryadravyam antyāvayavi.

Ultimate composite (is that which cannot have further parts) is a produced substance which is incapable of giving rise to a substance. (121)

NOTES

S'ivāditya, in this, in the preceding and a few following sections, is giving a series of

definitions and descriptions of terms which are necessary to be used in the examination of substances. (Sections 116—135.)

As an illustration, the definition of a pot may be taken. It is an ultimate composite. It is itself produced but it does not produce any other substances.

भोगायतनमन्त्यावयवि शरीरम् ।

Bhogāyatanam antyāvayavi s'arīram.

Body is that ultimate composite which is the abode of enjoyment. (122)

NOTES

Since the soul is all-pervading, it is the body that provides a seat of enjoyment.

स्वसमवेतसुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारो भोगः ।

Svasamaveta sukha duḥkhānyatara sākṣāt-kāro bhogaḥ.

Enjoyment is the direct experience of either pleasure or pain in intimate union with oneself. (123)

NOTES

The word anyatara (either) is used to avoid the possibility of simultaneous perception of both.

One cannot have experience of other people's pleasures and pains and hence 'union with oneself' is specified. Also it is distinguished from God's experience which cannot be said to be enjoyment as He has no pleasure or pain of His own.

यदवच्छिन्न आत्मनि भोगः तदायतनम् ।

Yadavacchinna ātmani bhogaḥ tadāyatanam.

That, limited by which, the soul can have enjoyment, is the abode of enjoyment. (124)

साक्षात्कारि ज्ञानकरणं अतीन्द्रियं इन्द्रियम् ।

Sākṣātkāri jñānakaraṇam atīndriyam indriyam.

Sense-organ is that which is the special cause of direct perception and which is itself supersensuous. (125)

NOTES

An alternative reading is to omit 'atīndriyam'. The term 'special instrument of direct perception' is meant to exclude inference which though an instrument of knowledge is not direct perception. 'Manana' or contemplation also

leads to direct perception but it is not 'atīndriya' (supersensuous). The definition also excludes God who is both an instrument of direct perception and supersensuous but is not 'indriya'.

Pad. equates the definition with the following: It is a supersensuous active instrumental cause of activity characterised by possession of direct perception.

ज्ञायमानतया आत्मनो भोगकारणं विषयः ।

Jñāyamānatayā ātmano bhogakāraṇam viṣayaḥ.

That which is the cause of enjoyment to the soul by reason of its being known is object. (126)

NOTES

The distinction between the senses which are also means of enjoyment and object lies in the fact that the latter gives rise to enjoyment only by means of its being known. That is, the object must be cognisable and must give rise to pleasure or pain.

A variation in reading in this definition is the omission of the word 'jñāyamānatayā'. It is necessary for the meaning, and can be easily assumed as involved in the text.

In the foregoing sections Śivāditya has been explaining all the terms employed in his definitions

of substances, such as 'nityatva,' 'aṇu,' 'avayava,' 'kārya,' 'śarīra,' 'bhoga,' 'indriya,' 'viṣaya,' etc. This kind of explanation continues up to section 135. Then he takes up Qualities for examination.

पार्थिवमात्रेन्धनं तेजो भौमम् । जलमात्रेन्धनं तेजो दिव्यम् । पार्थिवजलेन्धनं तेज औदर्यम् । निरिन्धनं तेज आकरजम् । तच्च सुवर्णादि ॥

Pārthiva mātrendhanam tejo bhaumam ; jala mātrendhanam tejo divyam ; pārthiva-jalendhanam teja audaryam ; nirindhanam teja ākarajam ; tac ca suvarṇādi.

Earthy light is that which has for its fuel earthy matter ; celestial light is that which has for its fuel water ; gastric light is that which has both earthy and watery fuel ; mineral light is independent of fuel ; the last is gold and the like. (127)

NOTES

See Section 13.

सकलकारणयौगपद्यं उत्पत्तिः ।

Sakala kāraṇa yaugapadyam utpattiḥ.

Creation (or production) is the simultaneous co-existence of all the causes. (128)

अनेकेषां एकक्षणसंबन्धो यौगपद्यम् ।

Anekeṣām ekakṣaṇa sambandho yaugapadyam.

Simultaneous co-existence means several things being conjoined with one moment of time. (129)

विभागानुत्पाद्य विभागप्रागभावसंबद्धकर्मावच्छिन्नः कालः क्षणः ।

Vibhāgānutpādya vibhāga prāgabhāva sambaddha karmāvacchinnaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ.

A moment is that unit of time during which an action is produced prior to its disjunction from another unit and having not yet produced another disjunction. (130)

NOTES

(The translation of the definition of a moment has been adapted from Brajendranath Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*).

Pad. defines a moment as that time which covers an action together with the antecedent negation of the resultant disjunction. When two things that were together are separated, the first thing to take place is an action and next follows the disjunction. The interval between these two is one moment.

तन्मात्रावस्थायि क्षणिकम् ।

Tanmātrāvasthāyi kṣaṇikam.

That which is existent only for that duration is momentary. (131)

स्थितिर्वर्तमानत्वम् । तच्च प्राक्संबद्धस्वाभावरहितस्वरूपवत्त्वम् । स्वकार्यप्रागभावसंबन्धित्वं वा ।

Sthitirvartamānatvam ; tac ca prāk sambaddhasvābhāvarahitasvarūpavattvam ; svakāryaprāgabhāvasambandhitvam vā.

Existence is the being of a thing. That is, a thing exists when it partakes of the nature of being the negation of its antecedent non-existence ; or (it may be defined as) that which is connected with the antecedent non-existence of its own product. (132)

NOTES

Pad. reads 'virahaḥ' instead of 'rahita'. Instead of the second clause, another is taken by Jin: Prāgabhāva pradhvaṁsābhāva rahita svarūpavattvam. The meaning is not changed. A thing is said to exist when its antecedent non-existence is destroyed and its subsequent non-existence is not yet produced.

विनाशः प्रध्वंसः ।

Vinās'aḥ pradhvaṁsaḥ.

Destruction is being put an end to. (133)

शरीरसंबन्धेन ज्ञानवत्त्वं क्षेत्रज्ञत्वम् ।

S'arīrasambandhena jñānavattvam kṣetrajñatvam.

Being the knower of the field (*i.e.*, being an individual soul) is being possessed of knowledge due to association with body. (134)

NOTES

Pad. interprets this to mean that the individual soul has knowledge only by conjunction with a body, *i.e.*, by means of sense-organs, and therefore the knowledge of the individual souls is produced. While God's knowledge is

eternal and independent, the soul's knowledge is non-eternal and dependent on sense-organs.

प्रत्यात्मसमवेतधर्माधर्मोपगृहीतत्वं प्रत्यात्मनिष्ठत्वम् ।

Pratyātmasamavetadharmādharmopa-
gṛhītatvam pratyātmaniṣṭhatvam.

Being attached to every individual soul means learning the merit and demerit which are in intimate relation with each soul. (135)

NOTES

This doctrine of merit and demerit under the title of Adṛṣṭa plays an important role in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. (See Introduction, Section XVII and Section 48.)

सितादीनां सप्तानां सितत्वादिकं लक्षणम् । मधुरादीनां मधुरत्वादिकम् । गन्धयोः सुरभित्वासुरभित्वे । शीतादीनां शीतत्वादिकम् । एकत्वादीनां एकत्वादिकम् । अणुत्वादीनां अणुत्वादिकम् ।

Sitādīnam saptānām sitatvādikam lakṣaṇam.
Madhurādīnam madhuratvādikam.
Gandhayoḥ surabhitvāsurabhitve.
S'ītādīnām s'ītatvādikam.
Ekatvādīnām ekatvādikam.
Aṇutvādīnām aṇutvādikam.

The seven colours beginning with white have for their definition, possessing whiteness, etc.

Sweetness and the rest have for their definition possession of sweetness, etc.

For odours, fragrance and non-fragrance.

For coolness and the rest, possessing the quality of coolness and the rest.

For oneness and the rest, the possession of oneness and the rest.

For minuteness and other dimensions, possession of the quality of being minute and the rest. (136)

कर्मासमवायिकारणकः संयोगः कर्मजः ।
संयोगासमवायिकारणकः संयोगः संयोगजः ॥
कर्मासमवायिकारणको विभागः कर्मजः ।
विभागासमवायिकारणको विभागो विभागजः ॥

Karmāsamavāyikāraṇakaḥ saṁyogaḥ karmajaḥ.
Saṁyogāsamavāyikāraṇakaḥ saṁyogaḥ saṁyogajaḥ ;
Karmāsamavāyikāraṇako vibhāgaḥ karmajaḥ

Vibhāgāsamavāyikāraṇako vibhāgo vibhāgajaḥ.

An action-born conjunction is one that has action for its non-intimate cause.

A conjunction-born conjunction is one that has another conjunction for its non-intimate cause.

An action-born disjunction has an action as its non-intimate cause.

A disjunction-born disjunction is one that has another disjunction for its non-intimate cause. (137)

आदित्यसंयोगोत्पाद्ये परत्वापरत्वे कालकृते ।
आदित्यसंयोगानुत्पाद्ये परत्वापरत्वे दिक्कृते ॥

Āditya saṁyogotpādye paratvāparatve kālakṛte; āditya saṁyogānutpādye paratvāparatve dikkṛte.

Posteriority and priority which are brought about in connection with the Sun refer to Time. Posteriority and priority which are brought about unconnected with the Sun refer to Space. (138)

NOTES

(See Section 79.)

भावनासाधारणकारणं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । अस्मृतिरूपं ज्ञान-
मनुभवः ।

Bhāvanāsādhāraṇakāraṇam jñānam smṛtiḥ ;
asmṛtirūpam jñānam anubhavaḥ.

Remembrance is that knowledge which has for its special cause mental impression. Knowledge which is not of the form of remembrance is apprehension. (139)

NOTES

Knowledge or cognition is of two kinds : (1) Remembrance is that cognition of which the special cause is the impression left behind by a first cognition. (2) A first cognition which is knowledge other than remembrance ; *i.e.*, every new cognition which is not the repetition of a previous cognition is called 'anubhava'.

तत्त्वानुभवः प्रमा । अतत्त्वानुभवः अप्रमा ।

Tattvānubhavaḥ pramā ; atattvānubhavaḥ
apramā.

Right apprehension is the cognising of the real nature of a thing. Wrong apprehension is the erroneous cognition of a thing. (140)

NOTES

The definition of tattva already given in section 64 explains how tattva is 'anāropitam rūpam,' *i.e.*, that nature of a thing which is not due to any superimposition by the mind. The same thought is taken up here; and right apprehension is defined as the experiencing of the real nature of things. This takes us to the Nyāya theory of knowledge and the relation between the knower and the known. The Nyāya-Vais'eṣika is a strict realism and believes that things are other than the knowledge of them; it attempts to treat of knowledge which arises in the soul as capable of giving rise to the cognition of the real nature of things by a relation called 'Svarūpa-sambandha' (Cf. I. P., Vol. II, p. 136). Wrong apprehension is the taking a thing to be other than what it is in reality. This is also called 'bhrama'.

An alternate reading is atattvajñānam instead of atattvānubhavaḥ.

अनवधारणं ज्ञानं संशयः । अवधारणरूपातत्त्वज्ञानं विपर्ययः ।

Anavadhāraṇam jñānam saṁs'ayaḥ.
Avadhāraṇa rūpātattvajñānam viparyayaḥ.

Doubt is cognition which is not certain. Erroneous knowledge is cognition which is false but of the nature of certitude. (141)

NOTES

All right knowledge must be certain in character. If knowledge is uncertain it is incorrect apprehension. There are two varieties of incorrect apprehension. Doubt or Saṁśaya is one where with reference to the same subject two or more alternatives are predicable. A typical example is that on seeing an object in the distance we get a doubt, 'is it a post or a man'? The other variety of misapprehension is Viparyaya or Error. Here there is certitude; but it is wrong certitude. A typical example is mistaking a rope for a snake. The cogniser is quite certain it is a snake; but the cognition is erroneous. This is called technically in psychology as illusion, where a wrong meaning is attached and a perception takes place.

The difference between Doubt and Error is that the latter has the appearance of Right Knowledge while the former is a state of undecided perception.

अज्ञायमानकरणजन्यः तत्त्वानुभवः प्रत्यक्षप्रमा ।

Ajñāyamānakaraṇajanyaḥ tattvānubhavaḥ pratyakṣapramā.

Right knowledge by means of Perception is the cognition of truth produced by an instrumental cause which is not itself cognisable. (142)

NOTES

Perceptive knowledge has for its cause the sense-organs and their contact with objects. These sense organs have already been explained to be 'atīndriya,' supersensuous, *i.e.*, not perceptible. (See Section 125). Perceptive knowledge differs from anumiti in this feature, because the latter has a cognition as the instrumental cause as will be seen in the sequel.

ज्ञायमानकरणजन्यस्तत्त्वानुभवो अनुमितिप्रमा ।

Jñāyamānakaraṇajanyas tattvānubhavo anumitipramā.

Right knowledge by means of inference (or Inferred Knowledge) is cognition of Truth brought about by an instrumental cause which is cognisable. (143)

NOTES

This instrumental cause which is cognisable is identified with 'liṅga' or indicatory mark. This can be known; and only as it is known is inference possible. (This 'liṅga' is dealt with in a later section.)

According to the *Saptapadārthī* only two sources of Right Knowledge are recognised: Perception and Inference. This limitation to two is characteristic of the Vais'eṣika system, while the

Nyāya system recognises four, *i.e.*, Comparison and Verbal knowledge in addition. This limitation to two has made some assert that the *Saptapadārthī* must be considered a Vais'eṣika manual.

(See Introduction, Section 1.)

प्रमायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं प्रमाणम् ।

Pramā'yogavyavacchinnam pramāṇam.

Proof is that which is never unconnected with true knowledge (and hence is invariably followed by true knowledge). (144)

NOTES

'Ayogavyavacchinnam' means invariable association. It is not a mere connection by accompaniment (vyāptam). The expression is used to take the place of karaṇa or cause, to describe the relation of pramāṇa to pramā, in order "to convey the fact that the means of proof does not merely produce knowledge but assures its correctness".

S. D. S. defines 'pramāṇa' thus: 'proof is that which is always followed by right apprehension and is united with the appropriate organ and receptacle of knowledge, *viz.*, soul.' Pramāṇa has a double function of producing right knowledge and also testing its truth. Gaṅgānāth Jhā in translating the *Tarka-Bhāṣā* renders 'Pramāṇa' as instrument of right cognition.

प्रत्यक्षप्रमायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् । तच्चेश्वरघ्राण-रसनचक्षुःस्पर्शनश्रोत्रमनोलक्षणम् ।

Pratyakṣa pramā 'yoga vyavacchinnam pratyakṣa pramāṇam; tac ca īs'vara-ghrāṇa rasana cakṣus spars'ana s'rotra-manolakṣaṇam.

Proof by perception is that which is in invariable connection with true knowledge of the perceived kind.

It is sevenfold : God's perception, perception resulting from the organs of smell, taste, vision, touch, hearing and the mind. (145)

NOTES

The mind, according to the definition of perception is necessary to mediate between the sense-organs and soul. In addition it has certain perceptions which are due to itself such as pleasure, pain, which are qualities of the soul independent of external organs.

अनुमितिप्रमायोगव्यवच्छिन्नमनुमानम् ।
तच्च व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताविशिष्टलिङ्गज्ञानम् ॥

Anumiti pramā'yogavyavacchinnam anumānam; tac ca vyāptipakṣadharmatā-vis'iṣṭaliṅgajñānam.

Proof by Inference is the invariable connection resulting in true knowledge of the inferred kind. It is the cognition of the mark characterised by invariable concomitance with the thing to be proved and pervasion of the subject. (146)

NOTES

This section describes the nature of Inference. The cause of inferential knowledge is stated to be the reflection which sees 'the thing to be proved' to be in invariable concomitance with the mark and which also sees the mark as an attribute of the subject. The stock example given is the inference of fire on a mountain on the reflection upon the connection between smokiness and fieriness and smokiness being present on the mountain.

व्याप्तिश्च व्यापकस्य व्याप्याधिकरण उपाध्यभावविशिष्टः संबन्धः ।

Vyāptiś ca vyāpakasya vyāpyādhikaraṇa-upādhyabhāva viśiṣṭaḥ sambandhaḥ.

Invariable concomitance (or pervasion) is that relation where the thing to be proved (pervader) co-exists with the mark (the pervaded) while at the same time characterised

by the absence of any adventitious circumstances. (147)

NOTES

The all-important conception of Vyāpti or invariable concomitance is now dealt with. This conception can be interpreted quantitatively or qualitatively. If the former, the terms pervasion, pervader and pervaded are used. If the latter, the terms concomitance; major term (thing to be proved), and mark are used. Each of these terms is explained by S'ivāditya himself in the succeeding sections.

(See Introduction for more on Vyāpti.)

'Upādhi' has been translated into adventitious circumstances as conveying the best meaning in this context.

(See notes on Sections 52 and 70.)

The *Tarka-Saṅgraha* defines Vyāpti as sāhacarya-niyama, co-existence or connection as a rule, *i.e.*, invariability. The *Tarka-Dīpikā* expands the meaning further to mean, co-existence of sādhana and sādhya (*i.e.*, the *probans* and the *probandum*) is such that it can never be the counter-entity of an absolute negation co-existing with the *probans*. The absence of the thing to be inferred can never be found where there is the mark (probans). If even one instance be found where there is the mark but not the 'thing to be proved,' the vyāpti falls to the ground. So in every vyāpti two elements are essential: Invariability (*i.e.*, niyatatva) which is the same as

absence of any exception; co-existence which is known by knowledge of constant association. If a contrary instance can be shown this doctrine of concomitance will become conditional. That is why in the definition given in the text the expression 'qualified by absence of adventitious circumstances' is used.

पक्षधर्मता तु व्याप्यस्य पक्षसंबन्धः ।

Pakṣadharmatā tu vyāpyasya pakṣasambandhaḥ.

Pervasion of the subject means the connection of the mark (or pervaded) and the subject (that in relation to which the *probandum* is to be inferred). (148)

NOTES

Pad. points out that this connection must extend to all the individuals included in the subject. This is exactly the conception of distribution in formal logic. If this is not secured the fault of bhāgāsiddhi (unproved of a part of the subject) is committed.

व्यापकं साध्यम् । व्याप्यं लिङ्गम् ।

Vyāpakam sādhyam, vyāpyam liṅgam.

The pervader is the *probandum* (or predicate). That which is pervaded is the mark (or *probans*). (149)

NOTES

The various terms can be tabulated as follows :

Vyāpti or Invariable concomitance or pervasion.	liṅgam or reason or middle term or *probans* or the pervaded (vyāpya) or the sādhana.	sādhyam or major term or predicate or pervader (vyapaka) or *probandum*.	pakṣa or subject, or minor term.

There are three sets of terms. From the quantitative point of view, the terms pervasion pervader or major term, pervaded or middle term and subject or minor term may be used. From the qualitative point of view, invariable concomitance, reason or *probans*, *probandum* and subject may be used. Vyāpti, liṅgam, sādhyam and pakṣa form another set.

That which pervades, *i.e.*, the pervader is widest in extent. That which is pervaded is smaller in extent.

उपाधिश्च साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यसमव्याप्तिः ।

Upādhiś'ca sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptiḥ.

An adventitious circumstance or condition is that which is exactly coincident with the thing to be inferred but does not pervade the reason. (150)

NOTES

(See Textual Introduction.)

The stock example of upādhi is the red flower placed near a crystal giving red appearance to the crystal. Thus upādhi denotes an external cause. In the usual syllogism, of fire and smoke, smokiness being present wherever fire is present is possible only when we grant the upādhi of 'contact with wet fuel'. That is, the condition has to pervade the sādhya (the thing to be inferred); but should not pervade smokiness. For if it did it would cease to be an upādhi. That condition whose pervasion of the sādhya is necessary to safeguard the inference, is called upādhi.

(*a*) पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षस्पर्शी विपक्षशून्यः अबाधितविषयः असत्प्रतिपक्षः केवलान्वयी ।

(*b*) पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षशून्यः विपक्षात् व्यावृत्तः अबाधित-विषयः असत्प्रतिपक्षः केवलव्यतिरेकी ।

(*c*) पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षस्पर्शी विपक्षात् व्यावृत्तः अबाधित-विषयः असत्प्रतिपक्षः अन्वयव्यतिरेकी ।

(*a*) Pakṣavyāpakaḥ sapakṣaspars'ī vipakṣas'ūnyaḥ abādhitaviṣayaḥ asatpratipakṣaḥ kevalānvayī.

(*b*) Pakṣavyāpakaḥ sapakṣaśūnyaḥ vipakṣāt-vyāvṛttaḥ abādhitaviṣayaḥ asatpratipakṣaḥ kevalavyatirekī.

(*c*) Pakṣavyāpakaḥ sapakṣasparśī vipakṣāt-vyāvṛttaḥ abādhitaviṣayaḥ asatpratipakṣah anvayavyatirekī.

(*a*) The Reason that has only positive invariable concomitance should possess five characteristics: (1) being present in all the individuals denoted by the subject; (2) being present in similar instances; (3) not having dissimilar instances; (4) not having its sādhya (or pervader) disproved by a stronger proof; (5) and not having a rival indicatory mark which proves the opposite.

(*b*) The Reason that has only negative invariable concomitance has the following characteristics: (1) being present in all individuals denoted by the subject; (2) being devoid of similar instances; (3) being absent from dissimilar instances; (4) not having its sādhya disproved by a stronger proof; (5) not having a rival reason which proves the opposite.

(*c*) The Reason which has positive and negative concomitance must have the following

characteristics: (1) being present in all the individuals included in the subject; (2) being present in similar instances; (3) being absent from dissimilar instances; (4) not having its sādhya disproved by a stronger proof; (5) and not having a rival reason which proves the opposite. (151)

NOTES

This section gives an account of the three kinds of concomitant relation based on the Reason. Of these the third is the perfect type of argument, where both positive and negative concomitance are possible. In the purely affirmative type the nature of the subject is such that no negative concomitance is possible. In the purely negative type the subject is of such a nature that no positive concomitance is possible.

संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मवत्वेनोपात्तत्वं पक्षत्वम् ।

Sandigdha sādhyadharmatvenopāttatvam pakṣatvam.

The Subject is one in which the presence of the attribute to be inferred (*i.e.*, sādhya) is (provisionally, *i.e.*, before proof) taken to be doubtful. (152)

NOTES

The thesis or proposition before being proved is in the nature of a doubt, provisionally assumed.

The proposition raises the question whether the subject has a particular attribute, that is, the thing to be proved.

निश्चितसाध्याधिकरणत्वं सपक्षत्वम् ।
निश्चितसाध्याभावाधिकरणत्वं विपक्षत्वम् ॥

Nis'cita sādhyādhikaraṇatvam sapakṣatvam.
Nis'cita sādhyābhāvādhikaraṇatvam vipakṣatvam.

Similar instance is one which has been ascertained to be the abode of the thing to be inferred.

Dissimilar instance is one which has been ascertained to be devoid of the thing to be inferred. (153)

स्वार्थत्वं अर्थरूपत्वं । परार्थत्वं शब्दरूपत्वम् ।

Svārthatvam artharūpatvam, parārthatvam s'abdarūpatvam.

Inference for oneself is of the nature of understanding the meaning.

Inference for another is in the form of words. (154)

NOTES

This distinction is, according Keith, first introduced by Pras'astapāda. (I. L. A. chapter on Inference).

The inference for another is the famous five-membered Indian Syllogism. Essentially the process of inference in both forms is the same. But the inference for another is fully worked out, rhetorical and dialectical.

शब्दस्याप्यनुमानविषयत्वेन अविनाभावोपजीवकत्वेन वा अनुमानत्वम् ।

S'abdasyāpi anumānaviṣayatvena avinābhāvopajīvakatvena vā anumānatvam.

S'abda also is to be considered as an Inference because it has got the same object as inferential proof and it depends upon the relation of invariable concomitance. (155)

NOTES

This section can also be given a different meaning in consonance with the previous section (154) as follows :

Inference for another which is characterised by words is also of the same nature as inference for oneself because it has also invariable and necessary connection and has for its object inferred knowledge.

The former meaning distinctly shows that S'ivāditya is here giving his reason for not admitting S'abda as an additional proof of true knowledge. This is an indication of the transition stage before syncretism finally took shape. If this first interpretation is accepted one should expect S'ivāditya to state somewhere that upamāna or comparison also need not be a separate proof and can be included in inference. Perhaps this is what happened. S'ivāditya was only explaining that inference for another is the same process as inference for oneself. As the text looked suitable for making it an argument against the independent assertion of S'abda as a proof, some later hand made one or two slight changes and made it read like an argument against recognising S'abda as a proof. Further S'ivāditya is methodical and it is inexplicable why in the middle of 'anumāna pariccheda' (account of inference) he should wedge in this argument. Its proper place should have been later. There is also an alternative reading which shows that this section was more for explaining the function of words in expressing an inference.

The following words are found added in some MSS. 'Avinābhāva jñānasya padasahakāritvam ca'.

Now S'ivāditya proceeds to explain the five members of the parārtha-anumāna.

1. तत्र साध्यवत्वेन पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ।

2. लिङ्गस्य पक्षधर्मत्ववचनं हेतुः ।

3. दृष्टान्तवचनं उदाहरणम् ।
4. परामर्शत्ववचनं उपनयः ।
5. लिङ्गसंबन्धप्रयुक्तनिश्चितसाध्यत्ववचनं निगमनम् ।

1. Tatra sādhyavatvena pakṣavacanam pratijñā.
2. Liṅgasya pakṣadharmatva vacanam hetuḥ
3. Dṛṣṭānta vacanam udāharaṇam.
4. Parāmars'atva vacanam upanayaḥ.
5. Liṅga sambandha prayukta nis'cita sādhyatva vacanam nigamanam.

1. Assertion (or Thesis) is that which states the subject as possessed of the quality to be inferred.

2. Reason is that which states the mark as abiding in the subject.

3. Example is that which states the similar instance (as showing the invariable concomitance between the reason and inferred quality).

4. Application is that which states the consideration (of the invariable connection and the presence of the mark in the subject).

5. Conclusion is that which states the ascertainment of the inferred quality in the subject as the result of its connection with the mark. (156)

NOTES

A concrete example will illustrate these five steps.

1. The hill is fiery.
2. Because it smokes.
3. Whatever shows smoke shows fire, as a kitchen.
4. So is this hill.
5. Therefore it is fiery.

Special interest attaches to the third step. The invariable concomitance is always expressed along with an illustrative example. Questions have been raised whether the original Nyāya syllogism was only an inference from particular to particular. There is reason to think that the conception of a univeral connection as the basis of inference was conceived early and the illustrative example was only a rhetorical device to furnish a further case of such concomitance. But this matter has been one of the most debated points of Nyāya Logic (See I. L. A. Chapter on Inference).

Another point of interest is that this five-membered form called 'mahānyāya' was in practice later reduced to three members, omitting the first two or the last two as the case may be ;

for in both cases the result is the same. But still further reduction is made in argument for convenience. For we often come across the statement of the conclusion and the reason. It is a sort of an Enthymeme assuming or implying the remaining members. A difference in reading in this section is the omission of sādhyatvena in line 1.

Now S'ivāditya proceeds to explain the fallacies of Reason.

अङ्गवैकल्यं आभासत्वम् ।

Aṅga vaikalyam ābhāsatvam.

A fallacious reason is one which lacks any of the necessary characteristics. (157)

NOTES

In section 151 the characteristics of the mark were explained. A fallacy or appearance of reason arises when any of those characteristics is lacking. (See notes on Section 34.)

लिङ्गत्वेनानिश्चितत्वमसिद्धत्वम् ।

Liṅgatvena anis'citatvam asiddhatvam.

The Unproven Reason is that which has not been ascertained to be of the nature of a proper mark. (158)

NOTES

Siddha means that the mark being in concomitance with the major abides in the subject. Asiddha means that the mark is either devoid of concomitance or not found in the subject or lacks a subject. Thus there are three subdivisions of asiddha.

An alternative reading here is Pakṣadharmatvena instead of liṅgatvena.

पक्षविपक्षमात्रस्पर्शित्वं विरुद्धत्वम् ।

Pakṣa-vipakṣa-mātra-spars'itvaṁ viruddhatvam.

A Contradictory Reason is one which is present only in the subject and the dissimilar instance. (159)

NOTES

It is absent from 'sapakṣa'; that means the reason is equally true of A and not—A. That is, it is contradictory.

पक्षत्रयवृत्तित्वं अनैकान्तिकत्वम् ।

Pakṣa traya vṛttitvam anaikāntikatvam.

The Discrepant Reason is one which is found in the subject, similar instance and dissimilar instance. (160)

NOTES

This fallacy is also known as Savyabhicāra.

साध्यासाधकत्वे सति पक्षमात्रवृत्तित्वं अनध्यवसितत्वम् ।

Sādhyāsādhakatve sati pakṣamātravṛttitvam anadhyavasitatvam.

The Inconclusive Reason is one where the thing to be proved cannot be established and the reason is found only in the subject. (161)

Alternative reading:

साध्यतदाभावसाध्यं संदिग्धत्वम् ।

Sādhya tadabhāva sādhyam sandigdhatvam.

NOTES

It is clear from the alternative reading which defines 'Sandigdhatvam' and from the fact that this fallacy is included in 'anaikāntika' that this line represents an unassimilated stage of the development of the doctrine of fallacies.

उपजीव्यप्रमाणनिश्चितसाध्यविपरीतत्वं कालात्ययापदिष्टत्वम् ।

Upajīvya-pramāṇa-nis'cita-sādhya- viparīta-tvam kālātyayāpadiṣṭatvam.

The Time-lapsed Reason is one where the opposite of the thing to be proved has been ascertained by a stronger reason to be present in the subject. (162)

NOTES

This fallacy is also called Bādhita. It is defective reasoning. It is not needed because the obvious purpose of the reason to prove the connection of the subject and sādhya (probandum) has been defeated by the opposite of the 'sādhya' having been already ascertained to be true of the subject.

यस्य हेतोः साध्यविपरीतसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स प्रकरणसमः ।

Yasya hetoḥ sādhyaviparītasādhakam hetvantaram vidyate sa prakaraṇasamaḥ.

Equivalent to the Proposition is that Reason which has got another reason capable of proving the exact opposite. (163)

NOTES

This fallacy is also called 'Satpratipakṣa'. Some texts omit this line, which is significant. Ghate admits the existence of a good deal of confusion among the various texts with reference to Sections 161 and 163. This section is one which has been a good deal meddled with. The impression

is strong that this line, section 163, is modern in expression and perhaps indicates the effort of some one to remove the old fashioned fallacy of Sandigdhatva and replace it by Prakaraṇasama. With reference to sections 161 and 163, certain important indications as to S'ivāditya's date can be gleaned. Bhāsarvajnā's *Nyāya-sāra* has the list of fallacies of reason as S'ivāditya gives in the Uddes'a Khaṇḍa (Section 34); namely, asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika, anadhyavasita, kālātyayāpadiṣṭa, and prakaraṇasama. As S'ivāditya strictly follows the same order in the lakṣaṇa and parīkṣā khaṇḍas also, the reading of 161 and 163 as adopted here in the text must be considered right. But the alternate reading for 161 defining Sandigdhatvam is evidence of an earlier stage of the formulation, for Sandigdhatva is a fallacy which is one of the three spoken of by Kaṇāda and one of the four given by Pras'astapāda. When exactly this Sandigdhatva was given up, along with the other typical Vais'eṣika fallacy of Anadhyavasita, and the five fallacies as given by the *Nyāya Sūtras* were adopted, can be inferred from our text. Evidently both Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāya-sāra* and the *Saptapadārthī* belong to the stage of transition when six were adopted. Soon followed the school of Navya-Nyāya and the syncretist writers who finally adopted the five fallacies as given by the *Nyāya Sūtras*.

(See note on Section 34.) (See Appendix B)

The fact that S'ivāditya is undecided about giving up 'Sandigdhatva' as suggested by the alternative reading, appears to the editor to point to the priority of S'ivāditya to Bhāsarvajña, whose

date is reckoned to be about A.D. 950.[1] (See Textual Introduction also on dates.) This would tend to confirm the suggestion that S'ivāditya is also prior to Udayana.

अनिष्टव्यापकप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः । तुल्यत्वेन अभावयोः प्रत्यभाववचनं प्रसञ्जनम् ।

Aniṣṭa vyāpaka prasañjanam tarkaḥ.
Tulyatvena abhāvayoḥ pratyabhāva-vacanam prasañjanam.

Confutation or Reductio ad absurdum is the reduction of an undesirable pervader. This reduction is the statement of one undesirable negation as concomitant with another negation (which is desired by the opponent). (164)

NOTES

Reductio ad absurdum is a valuable aid in reasoning. The conclusion derived is absurd. But it is meant to be so in order to show an assumed position is not true. The relative absurdity of a conclusion which is the pervader is traced to the erroneousness of its pervaded.

(T. S. B., p. 356.)

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[1] V. S. F., p. 12.

निद्रादुष्टान्तःकरणजं ज्ञानं स्वप्नः ।
योगजधर्माननुगृहीतस्य मनसो निरिन्द्रियप्रदेशावस्थानं निद्रा ।

Nidrāduṣṭāntaḥkaraṇajam jñānam svapnaḥ.
Yogajadharmānanugṛhītasya manaso nirindriya pradeśāvasthānam nidrā.

Dream is the cognition born of the mind when it is vitiated by sleep.

Sleep is the condition, which, not being connected with the yogic state of Samādhi (trance), is produced when the mind abides in a region where it is out of contact with the sense organs. (165)

NOTES

Cognition of the dream state is a form of false knowledge. P. D. S. speaks of it as a kind of avidyā. It refers to objects which do not exist. There is also another view that dream is the vitiated cognition based on remembrance. In dream though the mind is free of connection with sense-organs, it produces cognitions because it is in conjunction with the soul. But in dreamless sleep, the mind according to this system retires into a part of the heart called 'Purītat'. Yoganidrā or the sleeplike condition of trance is different from sleep, as the Yogī has full control over his mind, though sense-contact is suspended.

वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रग्रहणं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
विशिष्टस्य ग्रहणं सविकल्पकम् ॥

Vastusvarūpamātragrahaṇam nirvikalpakam.
Vis'iṣṭasya grahaṇam savikalpakam.

Indeterminate cognition is that where the object alone is apprehended apart from its attributes. Determinate cognition is that which apprehends objects with their particularities or attributes. (166)

NOTES

There is a marked difference of opinion between the Navya-Nyāya and the older Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system on this question of the possibility of apprehension of an object without qualities. The older school believed that the first cognition of an object in the distance was of something indefinite, which in a subsequent moment is perceived with attributes. But Navya-Nyāya contends that indeterminate apprehension is inferred as necessary for giving rise to a determinate perception. This is an interesting psychological question.

अतीतावच्छिन्नवस्तुग्रहणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् । दुःखसाधनज्ञानं हानम् । सुखसाधनज्ञानं उपादानम् । उभयासाधनज्ञानं उपेक्षा ।

Atītāvacchinna vastugrahaṇam pratyabhijñānam; duḥkhasādhanajñānam hānam; sukhasādhanajñānam upādānam; ubhayāsādhanajñānam upekṣā.

Recognition is the cognition of an object conditioned by past knowledge.

Knowledge of harm is the cognition of a thing as a cause of pain.

Knowledge of what is beneficial is the cognition of a thing as a cause of pleasure.

Indifference is the cognition of a thing as neither desirable nor harmful. (167)

NOTES

(See section 37.)

उत्कटैककोटिकः संशय ऊहः। अनालिङ्गितोभयकोटि अनवधारणज्ञानं अनध्यवसायः।

Utkaṭaika koṭikaḥ saṁs'aya ūhaḥ; anāliṅgita ubhayakoṭy anavadhāraṇa jñānam anadhyavasāyaḥ.

Conjecture is a case of doubtful knowledge where one alternative looks most probable. Indefinite knowledge is that which does not

specially refer to either of two alternatives but is vague knowledge lacking ascertainment of details. (168)

NOTES

Conjecture and Indefinite knowledge are to be included under Doubt in as much as they have the character of incertitude. Conjecture differs from Doubt in that it definitely leans to one alternative while doubt is undecided between two alternatives. Indefinite knowledge means lacking in details. It is somewhat like 'Nirvikalpaka,' indeterminate knowledge.

प्रयत्नोत्पाद्यसाधनाधीनं सुखं सांसारिकम् ।
इच्छामात्राधीनसाधनसाध्यं सुखं स्वर्गः ॥

Prayatnotpādya-sādhanādhīnam sukham sāṁsārikam. Icchāmātrādhīna sādhana-sādhyam sukham svargaḥ.

Worldly pleasure is that which is based upon means of fulfilment brought about by effort. Heavenly pleasure is capable of being fulfilled by means which depend upon the desire alone. (169)

NOTES

It is the belief that in heaven whatever one wishes one gets; while in the world effort is needed to find means of fulfilment.

Pad. interprets differently ; it makes heavenly pleasure one enjoyed in a body not produced by demerit, but solely due to merit ; while worldly pleasure is that which is enjoyed in a body which is the result of both merit and demerit.

सांसिद्धिकत्वं तेजःसंयोगानुत्पाद्यत्वम् ।
तेजःसंयोगोत्पाद्यत्वं नैमित्तिकत्वम् ॥

Sāṁsiddhikatvam tejas saṁyogānutpādyatvam. Tejas saṁyogotpādyatvam naimittikatvam.

Natural fluidity is one that is not due to application of fire ; accidental fluidity is brought about by the application of fire. (170)

कर्मजः संस्कारो वेगः । ज्ञानजः संस्कारो भावना । स्थित्यापादको गुणः संस्कारः स्थितिस्थापकः ।

Karmajas saṁskāro vegaḥ. Jñānajaḥ saṁskāro bhāvanā. Sthityāpādako guṇaḥ saṁskāraḥ sthitisthāpakaḥ.

Predisposition due to activity is velocity or speed. Predisposition generated by cognition is mental impression. That quality

9

which maintains the original condition is Inertia. (171)

NOTES

An alternative reading is ṛjutvāpādakaḥ instead of sthityāpādakaḥ in the third clause. This gives rise to a definite change in meaning. Usually in English editions of syncretist manuals the third variety of Saṁskāra is translated as elasticity. For this conception, going back to a previous condition is necessary and so ṛjutvāpādakaḥ is inconvenient as it means keeping straight on. But if the term is translated as inertia, namely, that power by which a body in a particular condition continues to be in that condition until interfered with, then ṛjutvāpādakaḥ is the right reading. T. S. takes it as going back to a former state and so has to define 'sthitis-sthāpaka' as 'punastadavasthāpādakaḥ' (that which restores the original condition).

The translation of Saṁskāra by the term predisposition serves to show how the three kinds, vega (speed), bhāvanā (impression) and sthitisthāpaka (inertia) are all forms of a disposition which facilitates the occurrence of a certain kind of action. (See section 47.)

अव्यापकत्वं स्वाभावसादेश्यम् । तदभावो व्यापकत्वम् ।

Avyāpakatvam svābhāvasādeśyam; tadabhāvo vyāpakatvam.

Non-pervasion means the existence at the same time with one's own negation. Pervasion is the opposite of that. (172)

NOTES

Non-pervasion means partial pervasion. The typical example given is, 'a monkey sitting on a tree'; it pervadas the tree only partially. Pervasion means covering the whole of the abode.

विहितत्वं धर्मोत्पादकत्वम् । निषिद्धत्वं अधर्मोत्पादकत्वम् । उभयविपरीतत्वं उदासीनत्वम् ।

Vihitatvam dharmotpādakatvam. Niṣiddhatvam adharmotpādakatvam. Ubhayaviparītatvam udāsīnatvam.

What is prescribed by scriptural authority is what produces merit. What is prohibited is that which produces demerit. Indifferent is that which is neither prescribed nor prohibited. (173)

NOTES (See section 43)

निर्बाधकं सामान्यं जातिः । सबाधकं सामान्यं उपाधिः ।

Nirbādhakam sāmānyam jātiḥ. Sabādhakam sāmānyam upādhiḥ.

Commonness or genus is that generality which is free of vitiating circumstances. Condition is that generality which is affected by certain defects. (174)

NOTES

(See Sections 52 and 70.)

Six vitiating circumstances are given by Udayanācārya. (1) Unity of the individual; *i.e.*, when there is only one like the sky, no jāti is possible; (2) Identity of things with difference only in name; such as Ghaṭa and Kalaśa; (3) Cross-division, *i.e.*, when two common characteristics are found without each other as well as together; (4) Want of finality 'anavasthitiḥ'; (5) violation of one's own nature; and (6) want of relation.

Prof. Kuppuswami Śāstri in his edition of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* observes in connection with this section, that Śivāditya was making use of a settled scheme of 'bādhakas' or limitations. The commentator, Mādhava Sarasvati, asserts in his note on this section that this was fixed by the authors of *Kiraṇāvalī* and *Līlāvatī*. On this basis Prof. Kuppuswami Śāstri inclines to the view that Śivāditya is later than Udayana and Vallabha the authors of these two works. But it seems equally plausible to suggest that Śivāditya was a contemporary of these two writers or even that these two writers were referring to a common accepted opinion which had become settled by their time, which opinion Śivāditya also

utilises in this section. The break[1] in Nyāya-Vais'eṣika tradition that is observed between the time of Udyotakara and that of Vacaspati Mis'ra must surely be due to paucity of material that has come down, or been discovered, rather than to any sudden interruption in the development of the Nyāya Vais'eṣika. It is quite likely that many doctrines like the bādhakas, hetvābhāsas, s'abda-pramāṇa, etc., were being discussed and taking shape in the system during this interval. S'ivāditya, Udayana, Vallabha, and Bhāsarvajnā may be considered to be joint inheritors of the tradition so far accumulated.

आरोपितनीलरूपो अभावो अन्धकारः ।

Āropita nīlarūpo abhāvo andhakāraḥ.

Darkness is (really) the negation (of light) whereon the blueness is (only) imposed (by the mind). (175)

NOTES

This section refutes the contention of the Bhatta Mīmāṁsakas that darkness is a separate substance. (See sections 4 and 55.) (See also Textual Introduction.)

ज्ञानसंबन्धो ज्ञानविषयत्वम् ।

Jñāna sambandho jñāna viṣayatvam.

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[1] I. L. A., p. 29.

The relation of knowledge arises by any thing being an object of cognition. (176)

तत्त्वज्ञानेन नियमेन अवच्छेद्यत्वं प्रमेयत्वम् ।

Tattva-jñānena niyamena avacchedyatvam prameyatvam.

Being the object of right cognition consists in its being characterised solely by ascertainment of reality. (177)

गुणादिषु च संख्याव्यवहारः संख्याप्रत्यासत्तिनिबन्धनः । अत एव संख्याप्रत्यासत्तिनिबन्धनत्वम् ।

Guṇādiṣu ca saṅkhyā vyavahāraḥ saṅkhyā pratyāsatti nibandhanaḥ.

Ata eva saṅkhyā pratyāsatti nibandhanatvam.

The predication of number of qualities is due to the co-existence of number with qualities in the same abode. Hence it is that number is said to co-exist as involved in quality. (178)

NOTES

This section explains why number need not be a separate category.

कार्योत्पादकत्वं कारणत्वम् । स्वसमवेतकार्योत्पादकत्वं समवायिकारणत्वम् । समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नं अवधृतसामर्थ्यं असमवायिकारणत्वम् । उभयविपरीतत्वं निमित्तकारणत्वम् ।

Kāryotpādakatvam kāraṇatvam.
Svasamaveta kāryotpādakatvam samavāyikāraṇatvam; samavāyikāraṇa pratyāsannam avadhṛta sāmārthyam asamavāyikāraṇatvam; ubhayaviparītatvam nimittakāraṇatvam.

That which produces an effect is the cause. Intimate cause is that, in intimate relation with which, the product comes into existence. Non-intimate cause is that whose causal capacity is ascertained and which is closely connected with the intimate cause. Instrumental cause is a cause that is neither of the above two. (179)

NOTES

(See section 62.)

Here S'ivāditya deals in detail with the three kinds of causes. The inherent or intimate cause is the special feature of this Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system. It is comparable to the upādāna or material cause of the Sāṅkhyas. But the contention of the Naiyāyikas is that the effect comes

into existence in inseparable union, ayutasiddhi, with the cause. This is due to the doctrine of inherence which is made the basis of causation.

The *Tarka-Saṅgrāha* gives a fuller and more developed definition—Kārya niyata pūrva vṛtti. Here the elements of necessity and antecedence are emphasised. It is improved by the addition of ananyathāsiddhi, *i.e.*, that which cannot be explained as due to anything else. That brings in the element of unconditionality.

Non-intimate cause is always a quality which is in intimate relation with the substance which is intimate cause. Instrumental causes are accessory causes like the loom in the case of the cloth.

इयत्तावच्छिन्नपरिमाणयोगित्वं मूर्तत्वम्। तदभावोऽमूर्तत्वम्।

Iyattāvacchinna parimāṇa yogitvam mūrtatvam; tadabhāvo amūrtatvam.

Corporeality consists in possessing dimensions characterised by 'this much', etc. Non-corporeality is the opposite of corporeality. (180)

NOTES

Non-corporeality is the same as vibhutva, all-pervadingness.

The mūrta or corporeal substances are Earth, Water, Light, Air and Mind. The Non-corporeal or vibhu substances are Time, Space, Ether and Soul. All-pervading substances are without limited dimension and hence cannot be capable of

action while corporeal substances are capable of being called substances possessing the capacity for action.

कार्यायोगव्यवच्छिन्ना सामग्री ।

Kāryāyogavyavacchinnā sāmagri.

Totality of causes is that without which the effect is never produced. (181)

NOTES

It is interesting to compare this with Mill's definition of cause as the sum-total of antecedent conditions which being present the cause invariably follows. Thus in the case of a pot, the cause is the totality of the following: the clay, the quality of the clay, the potter, the wheel and the stick.

संज्ञामात्रेण पदार्थानां अभिधानं उद्देशः ।

Saṁjñā mātreṇa padārthānām abhidhānam uddes'aḥ.

Enumeration (or Enunciation) is the naming of categories by designation only. (182)

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वसंस्काराः पृथिवीसमवेताः ।

Rūpa rasa gandha spars'a saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva gurutva dravatva saṁskārāḥ pṛthivī samavetāḥ.

रूपरसस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्व - गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कारा अप्सु समवेताः ।

Rūpa rasa spars'a saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva gurutva dravatva sneha saṁskārā apsu samavetāḥ.

रूपस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वद्रव - त्वसंस्कारास्तेजः समवेताः ।

Rūpa spars'a saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva dravatva saṁskārās tejas samavetāḥ.

स्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वसंस्कारा वायुसमवेताः ।

Spars'a saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva saṁskārā vāyu samavetāḥ.

संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागशब्दा आकाशसमवेताः ।

Saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga s'abdā ākās'a samavetāḥ.

संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागाः कालदिक्समवेताः ।

Saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāgāḥ kāla dik samavetāḥ.

संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेष प्रयत्नधर्माधर्मभावना आत्मसमवेताः ।

Saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga buddhi sukha duḥkha icchā dveṣa prayatna dharmādharma bhāvanā ātma samavetāḥ.

संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वसंस्कारा मनःसमवेताः ।

Saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṁyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva saṁskārāḥ manaḥ samavetāḥ.

Colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority,

posteriority, heaviness, fluidity, and predisposition are qualities in intimate relation with Earth.

Colour, taste, touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, heaviness, fluidity, viscidity and predisposition are qualities in intimate relation with Water.

Colour, touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity and predisposition are qualities in intimate relation with Light.

Touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority and predisposition are in intimate relation with Air.

Number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, and sound are in intimate relation with Ether.

Number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, and disjunction are in intimate relation with Time and Space.

Number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and impression are in intimate relation with Soul.

Number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, posteriority, priority and predisposition are in intimate relation with Mind.

(183)

NOTES

Of the qualities, viscidity is peculiar to water only ; Sound is peculiar to Ether only ; cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression are peculiar to Soul only. Priority, posteriority and velocity are common to five corporeal substances. Number, dimension, severalty, conjunction and disjunction are common to all the nine substances. Touch is common to the first four substances. Odour and inertia are peculiar to Earth. Taste and heaviness are found in Earth and Water. Colour and fluidity are common to Earth, Water and Air.

The word Predisposition (Saṁskāra) is found as mental impression in Soul, as inertia in Earth, as velocity in the five corporeal substances, namely, Earth, Water, Air, Light and Mind.

It is interesting to notice that in these physical theories, the early Nyāya-Vais'eṣika thinkers did not recognise that air also has heaviness or gravity.

कर्म मूर्तद्रव्यसमवेतं अनित्यमेव ।

Karma mūrta dravya samavetam anityameva.

Action (or Motion) which is in intimate connection with corporeal substances, is non-eternal. (184)

NOTES

Kaṇāda defines Motion as that which resides only in one substance, and is devoid of qualities and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction. It is to be carefully distinguished from guṇa or quality; because the latter is a permanent feature of substance, while motion is transient. For example, the heaviness of a body is considered a quality, while its falling is considered an action. "It is a distinction between continuant and current qualities" (quoted from I. P., Vol. II, p. 208). Five stages in motion are distinguished: an object is first in contact with a definite point of space; by the motion, there is a separation, then there is destruction of the connection with the first position, then there is the conjunction with a new point in space; then the motion ceases (I. L. A., p. 190).

सामान्यं द्रव्यगुणकर्मसमवेतम् ।

Sāmānyam dravya guṇa karma samavetam.

Generality resides in intimate union with Substance, Quality and Action. (185)

NOTES

See sections 52, 70 and 111.

विशेषास्तु नित्यद्रव्यसमवेताः ।

Vis'eṣāstu nitya dravya samavetāḥ.

Particularities are in intimate union with eternal substances. (186)

NOTES

(See section 71.)

समवायाभावावसमवेतावेव ।

Samavāyābhāvāv asamavetāv eva.

Inherence and negation (non-existence) are not in intimate union with anything. (187)

NOTES

Inherence is definitely asserted to be not in intimate relation with anything else in order to avoid a regressus ad infinitum and in order to distinguish it from conjunction. It is relation which does not need to be explained by a third thing. Thus, whereas conjunction between the hand and a book is explained by means of action, the inherent relation between the cloth and the threads is not in need of a third thing to explain their union; similarly non-existence also is not in intimate relation with anything else. (See later, section 197).

द्रव्यं तु कार्यरूपं स्वावयवसमवेतम् ।
अकार्यं द्रव्यमसमवेतमेव ॥

Dravyam tu kāryarūpam svāvayava samavetam. Akāryam dravyam asamavetam eva.

Substance when in the form of product is in intimate relation with its parts ; and when not a product, it is in not intimate relation with anything. (188)

NOTES

The relation of substance and its parts is an instance of inherence. According to the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika, the substance and its parts are ayutasiddha, inseparable. The destruction of the substance results in the destruction of the parts.

विनाशस्तु द्रव्यस्य समवाय्यसमवायिकारणविनाशाभ्याम् । गुणस्य तु समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तकाराणविनाशविरोधिगुणेभ्यो विनाशः । कर्मणः समवाय्यसमवायिकारणनाशोत्तरसंयोगाभ्यां विनाशः । प्रागभावस्य प्रतियोग्युत्पादनसामग्रीतः । अन्योन्याभावस्य प्रतियोगिविनाशकारणात् ॥

Vinās'astu dravyasya samavāyyasamavāyikārana vinās'ābhyām. Guṇasya tu samavāyyasamavāyi nimitta kāraṇa vinās'avirodhiguṇebhyo vinās'aḥ. Karmaṇaḥ

samavāyyasamavāyi kāraṇanās'ottarasaṁyogābhyām vinās'aḥ. Prāgabhāvasya pratiyogyutpādana sāmagrītaḥ. Anyonyābhāvasya pratiyogivinās'akāraṇāt.

Destruction of a substance arises from the destruction of its intimate and non-intimate causes. Destruction of a quality proceeds either from the destruction of its intimate cause, or from the destruction of its non-intimate cause or from the destruction of its instrumental cause, or from the production of a contrary quality.

Destruction of action or motion proceeds from the destruction either of the intimate cause or non-intimate cause or from a subsequent conjunction. Antecedent non-existence is destroyed by the same cause that produces its counter-entity. Reciprocal non-existence is destroyed by the causes which destroy its counter-entity. (189)

NOTES

(See General Introduction.)

This elaborate account of destruction and creation is first given by Pras'astapāda in his book, *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.* The modern

Naiyāyikas try to reduce the account of destruction to uniformity by stating that there is only one cause for the destruction of all effects, namely, the dissolution of the union which is the non-intimate cause that brings about the product.

उत्पत्तिस्तु द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तकारणेभ्यः। तत्र समवायिकारणं त्रयाणां द्रव्यमेव। असमवायिकारणं द्रव्यकर्मणोः संयोग एव। गुणस्य तु असमवायिकारणं क्वचित्समानजातीयं क्वचिदसमानजातीयं गुणान्तरं क्वचित् कर्म। निमित्तकारणं सर्वेषां ईश्वरेच्छादृष्टादीनि। अन्योन्याभावप्रध्वंसाभावयोस्तु निमित्तादेव केवलादुत्पत्तिः।

Utpattis tu dravyaguṇakarmaṇām samavāyi asamavāyi nimitta kāraṇebhyaḥ. Tatra samavāyikāraṇam trayāṇām dravyam eva. Asamavāyikāraṇam dravyakarmaṇoḥ saṁyoga eva. Guṇasya tu asamavāyikāraṇam kvacit samānajātīyam kvacit asamānajātīyam guṇāntaram kvacit karma. Nimitta kāraṇam sarveṣām īśvarecchādṛṣṭādīni. Anyonyābhāva pradhvaṁsābhāvayos tu nimittād eva kevalādutpattiḥ.

The production of Substance, Quality and Action is due to three kinds of causes:

intimate, non-intimate and instrumental. Of these, Substance alone is the intimate cause of all the three. In the case of Substance and Action, the non-intimate cause is only a conjunction. In the case of Quality, however, the non-intimate cause may be sometimes another similar quality, sometimes another dissimilar quality and sometimes an action. The instrumental (or operative) cause for all are God's Desire, Adṛṣṭa (merit and demerit), etc. As for Reciprocal and Subsequent Non-existence, they require only an instrumental cause for their production. (190)

NOTES

This doctrine of creation as given here involves the conception of cause as threefold. As already explained, the samavāyi or material cause is always substance. It is the material out of which all things are formed. The asamavāyi or non-intimate cause is a relation or quality always. Among instrumental causes, the sādhāraṇa or general causes are common to all things and ever present. They are God, Adṛṣṭa, etc. Asādhāraṇa or special instrumental causes are agents and accessories.

In this section, S'ivāditya explains how each of the categories is created and in the last section, how they are destroyed. Sāmānya (generality), vis'eṣa (particularity), and samavāya

(inherence) are considered eternal and therefore never produced. So also two of the four kinds of non-existence, namely, antecedent and absolute non-existence.

अपरं तु सकलं शास्त्रं सुबोधमिति ।

Aparam tu sakalam s'āstram subodham iti.

The rest of the science is easily grasped. (191)

NOTES

This section is a sort of final statement, winding up the subject. But immediately S'ivāditya evidently feels that he has made an oversight and refers to a few more concepts.

वैशिष्ट्यं अन्यव्यावृत्तिः ।

Vais'iṣṭyam anyavyāvṛttiḥ.

Qualification is differentiation from all other things. (192)

NOTES

An alternative reading is to have Vis'iṣṭam instead of Vais'iṣṭyam. The latter is preferable, because here the author explains what being qualified means. He has dealt with Vis'eṣa, one of the seven categories already in section 71.

समानाधिकरणं व्यावर्तकं विशेषणम् ।
एक विभक्त्यन्तपदवाच्यत्वं समानाधिकरणत्वम् ॥

Samānādhikaraṇam vyāvartakam vis'eṣaṇam. Ekavibhaktyantapadavācyatvam samānādhikaraṇatvam.

An attribute is one that has the same abode with another thing and is that which differentiates its substratum from everything else. Having the same abode (in the case of substance and attribute) is indicated by (the usage of) words standing in the same case termination. (193)

NOTES

This expression, samānādhikaraṇam, having the same abode with another thing, is one of the concepts frequently employed in Indian philosophy. In the grammatical structure of sentences this relation is expressed by two words standing in the same case. For example, in rūpavān ghaṭaḥ both words are in the nominative singular. That indicates that 'rūpavān' is an attribute of ghaṭa. If we have an expression like jaṭābhih tāpasaḥ, the quality of having clotted hair being used in the instrumental case, while tāpasah is in the nominative case, indicates that it is only an upalakṣaṇa, *i.e.*, an accidental characteristic.

This distinction between upalakṣaṇa and vis'eṣaṇa is another serviceable concept for analysis.

व्यधिकरणं सद्व्यावर्तकं उपलक्षणम् ।
भिन्नविभक्त्यन्तपदवाच्यत्वं वैयधिकरण्यम् ॥

Vyadhikaraṇam sadvyāvartakam upalakṣa-
ṇam. Bhinna vibhaktyantapadavācyat-
vam vaiyadhikaraṇyam.

Accidental characteristic is one that has a different abode from the thing that is distinguished. Having a different substratum is indicated by a different case termination. (194)

NOTES

This distinction between vis'eṣaṇa and upalakṣaṇa bears a parallel to the relation between jāti and upādhi. While the latter arises in connection with the category of Sāmānya (Generality), the former arises in connection with the category of Vis'eṣa (Particularity). Prof. Kuppuswami S'āstri in a very illuminating paragraph in his edition of Tarka-Saṅgraha (p. 45), remarks: "Sāmānya and Vis'eṣa may appropriately be described as the two poles of the pluralistic realism of the Nyāya Vais'eṣika system."

An alternative reading, in this section, has 'avacchedakam' for 'sadvyāvartakam'. The translation of the line would then be: accidental characteristic is that which particularises and has a different abode. The term avacchedaka is a favourite one with Navya Nyāya. It has three distinct meanings, as analysed by Cowell.

T.S.B., p. 373.) It means either distinguishing, or particularising or determining. In the present context, the second meaning is suitable and the changed reading does not make any substantial difference from the reading adopted.

जातिप्रत्यासत्तिरधिकरणत्वम् ।

Jāti pratyāsattir adhikaraṇatvam.

Being the abode or substratum consists in possessing a generality which is in intimate relation with itself. (195)

NOTES

Nyāyakośa defines pratyāsatti as 'Sāmānya viṣayaka jñāna'. It is a relation of knowledge which has for its object the concept of generality. A pot, for example, is said to be the abode of potness, because the relation of generality is inherent in the pot. Being an abode therefore means that potness, the generality of pot, is found in pot. Ghate remarks that the word 'jāti' should be taken as equivalent to 'sāmānya'.

सकलमूर्तसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् ।

Sakala mūrta saṁyogitvam vibhutvam.

All pervading means being conjoined with all corporeal substances. (196)

NOTES

(See section 180.)

विद्यमानयोः संबन्धो युतसिद्धिः ।
अविद्यमानयोः आधाराधेययोः संबन्धो अयुतसिद्धिः ॥

Vidyamānayoḥ sambandho yutasiddhiḥ. Avidyamānayoḥ ādhārādheyayoḥ sambandho ayutasiddhiḥ.

The relationship between things before contact is separable connection. Inseparable connection is the relation which exists among things which are never apart from each other, like the relation of the abider and the abode. (197)

NOTES

These two terms, 'yutasiddhi' and 'ayutasiddhi' are needed to explain saṁyoga or conjunction, and samavāya or inherence. Inherence implies inseparable connection.

(See notes on sections 187, 72 and 9.) The essence of inseparable connection lies in the fact that if one is destroyed, the other is destroyed also.

श्रेयःसाधनाभिधायकं शास्त्रमिति ।

S'reyas sādhanābhidhāyakam s'āstram iti.

A S'āstra or science is what teaches the means leading to final beatitude. (198)

NOTES

S'ivāditya is harking back to the aim of all science already explained by him in section 64. (See also Introduction.) In Indian Philosophy the pursuit of knowledge is a means to an end, the end always being nihs'reyasa or supreme bliss, though called variously by different systems.

सप्तद्वीपा धरा यावत् यावत् सप्त धराधराः ।
तावत्सप्तपदार्थीयमस्तु वस्तुप्रकाशिनी ॥

Saptadvīpa dharā yāvat yāvat sapta dharā-
dharāḥ
Tāvat saptapadārthīyam astu vastuprakās'
inī.

May this (treatise) the Saptapadārthī be the light-giver as to the nature of things as long as the Earth with the seven continents and the seven mountains continues to be. (199)

NOTES

This final verse is very aptly conceived. The emphasis on seven which is a very important feature of the title is reinforced by the reference to the seven mountains and the seven continents of popular Hindu Paurāṇic lore. The seven mountains are: himavat, vindhya, malaya, mahendra, sahya, ṛkṣa and pariyātra. The seven continents are: jambu, plakṣa, s'ālmali, kus'a, krauñca, s'aka and puṣkara.

इति श्रीशिवादित्यविरचिता सप्तपदार्थी समाप्ता ।

Iti S'rī S'ivāditya viracitā Saptapadārthī samāptā.

Thus ends (the treatise) Saptapadārthī written by S'rī S'ivāditya.

APPENDIX A

PROF. KUPPUSWĀMI S'ĀSTRI in the Introduction to his edition of the *Tarka-saṅgraha* holds the view that Udayana is earlier than S'ivāditya. His grounds are quite different from Ghate's (see Textual Introduction). (1) He considers the definition of darkness given by S'ivāditya in section 175 of the text as a combined form of the definitions given respectively by Udayana, and S'rīdhara in his *Nyāya-Kandalī*; the omission of the word 'bhā' is due, according to him, to the view that a definition should contain no unnecessary word. (2) The list of six fallacies which is given by S'ivāditya in the *Saptapadārthī* is given by Bhāsarvajñā in his *Nyāya-Sāra*. Bhāsarvajñā's date is calculated[1] to be about A.D. 950; and he must therefore have been an early contemporary of Udayana. Hence S'ivāditya might be later than both. (3) S'ivāditya in section 174 of the text refers to a settled scheme of bādhakas. The commentator of the *Saptapadārthī* mentions[2] that Udayana and Vallabha fixed the bādhakas, while commenting on this section.

Examining these fresh grounds, the present writer sees no positive reason to change the

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[1] H. I. L., p. 358.

[2] S. P. R., p. 70.

opinion put forward in the Textual Introduction. Taking the first, the contention that S'ivāditya's repudiation of darkness is based on Udayana's and S'rīdhara's statements cannot be considered convincing; for all writers of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika school are bent upon repudiating darkness as a separate substance which was being contended by their common opponents, the Bhātta Mīmāṁsakas. Whether we take the expression, भाभाव: तम: (bhābhāvah tamaḥ) of Pras'astapāda or the line, आरोपित नीलरूपं तम: āropita nīla rūpam tamah) of S'rīdhara, or S'ivāditya's आरोपित नीलरूपो अभावो अन्धकार: (āropita nīlarūpo abhāvo andhakāraḥ); or Udayana's आरोपितं रूपं तमो भाभाव: (āropitam rūpam tamo bhābhāvah), there is a determined effort on the part of these Naiyāyikas to refuse darkness a place as a separate substance. These verbal similarities point only to the importance of the subject. The second contention that the scheme of six fallacies adopted by S'ivāditya is found in Bhāsarvajñā's *Nyāya-sāra* cannot be made to prove that S'ivāditya borrowed from Bhāsarvajñā any more than the converse contention. Bhāsarvajñā's account[1] gives not six but seven fallacies including one more, viruddha-vyabhicāri. This indicates that Bhāsavajñā was giving a comprehensive account of fallacies and, if anything, was perhaps taking the six fallacies of S'ivāditya and adding to the list.

With regard to the third contention the evidence only points to the fact that the question

[1] H. I. L., p. 368.

of bādhakas was well settled by the time of Udayana and Vallabha. How much earlier than them it might have been settled is not clear. The interval[1] noted by historians of Indian Logic between the age of Udyotakara, and the age of Vācaspati Miśra must certainly have seen development in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, though written records of the time have yet to come to light. That was the time, perhaps, when several of the questions like the bādhakas above referred to, the doctrine of fallacies, etc., were getting into settled shape. And Udayana, Śivāditya, Bhāsarvajñā and Śrīdhara can be, without much danger of error, considered to be the joint inheritors of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition so far developed.

Note: The part of the Introduction of Prof. Kuppuswami Śāstri's book where this topic is discussed was not ready at the time the above was written; but the points are discussed because of the extreme kindness with which he gave the present writer an oral summary of his arguments.

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[1] I. L. A., p. 29.

APPENDIX B

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

NEITHER the Nyāya nor Vais'eṣika Sūtras give indication of being theistic systems. The oft-quoted line of the Vais'eṣika Sūtras, 'Tad vacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam,' cannot be said to refer distinctly to God, though such a claim is put forward. The Nyāya Sūtras make only a casual reference to God. Pras'astapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* does indeed mention God in his opening verse and in his description of Creation and Destruction; but in his hands God does not take a prominent position in the system. S'rīdhara in his *Nyāya Kandalī* discusses God as a subdivision of the Substance, Soul, and gives great importance to God. But the rise of the concept of God as a prominent feature of the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system dates from Udayanācārya, whose classical masterpiece, the *Kuṣumāñjali*, sets forth the Naiyāyika arguments for God's existence in a definite form.

The Nyāya-Vais'eṣika system posits eternal atoms and the eternal souls and assumes adṛṣṭa or unseen destiny for setting the atoms in motion to combine and constitute objects. The souls also in the periods of interval between destruction

and re-creation of things remain inactive. Adṛṣṭa is required to apportion to each individual soul its share of merit and demerit. This unseen destiny or adṛṣṭa is conceived of as an unintelligent principle. To guide its operation God the Omniscient is necessary.

Other arguments for God's existence are summarised in the following verse of Udayanācārya:

> Karyāyojanadhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ s'ruteḥ,
> Vākyāt saṅkhyāvis'eṣāc ca sādhyo vis'vavid avyayaḥ.

"From effects, combination, support, etc., from traditional arts, from authoritativeness, from S'ruti, from sentences thereof, and from particular numbers—an everlasting Omniscient Being is to be established."

Of these, the first, the causal or creationistic argument is the most important and characteristic Naiyāyika proof. The argument is summarised as follows by Athalye[1]: every effect must have an agent; the Universe is an effect; it must have an agent, who is called God. This argument assumes the universal validity of the causal concept, the need for an intelligent producer, and the need for an extraordinary being for the producer. This argument has been challenged by the rival schools of Hindu thought such as the Vedānta, which question the statement, that what is true of parts, namely, being produced things as in the case of a jar, need be true of the universe

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[1] T. S. B., p. 138.

as a whole, which also asserts that everything in the world need not be a product. The Naiyāyikas themselves admitting the eternality of atoms, Souls, Space, Time, Ether and Mind have admitted some things as not being products. This is considered inconsistent with the position that a creator is necessary for everything. To call the world a product is to beg the question, for the validity of the causal conception itself requires the proof of God and so it cannot be used to prove God.

The remaining seven proofs given by Udayanācārya may be summarised as follows: The combination of two atoms to make a binary implies an intelligent agent; the fact that this universe is supported assumes a supporter; the traditional arts involve necessarily an intelligent designer; if the Vedas are to be accepted as sources of right knowledge, it must be because God is their author; the Vedas attest the existence of an author of the world; the sentences of the Vedas require an author; and lastly number also requires God to be postulated.

These Nyāya proofs of God have been assailed in the history of Hindu thought. The concept of adṛṣṭa has been objected to as a resort of the Naiyāyika whenever a natural explanation is not available. The Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta in particular have been very hard on it. The inconsistency of admitting some things as eternal, such as souls and atoms while requiring God to explain other things is made the chief point of attack.

[The reader can refer to Athalye's notes on *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, pages 137-142, S. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pages 165-173, Keith's *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pages 266-72, for a fuller treatment.]

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